Takaful 2011

The First Annual Conference on Arab Philanthropy and Civic Engagement

Selected Research
Takaful 2011

The First Annual Conference on Arab Philanthropy and Civic Engagement

April 16 - 17, 2011
Amman, Jordan

Selected Research
# Table of Contents

**Introduction**  
2

**Iraqi American Diasporic Philanthropic Remittances to Iraqi Refugees in Jordan: Past Projects and Potential for Future Partnerships**  
*Caroline Blayney*  
4

**Hezbollah: Between Islam and Political Society**  
26

**Popular Mobilization and Social Entrepreneurship in Lebanon**  
*Omar Bortolazzi*  

**Philanthropy in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Lifestyle and Liberty in the Name of Piety and Islam**  
*Nora Derbal*  
46

**Religious and Ethnic Motivations for Serving Others in the Arab World: Evidence from Lebanon**  
*Shawn Teresa Flanigan*  
76

**Charity and the Trust Deficit**  
*Anjum Haque*  
98

**Community Foundations As A Vehicle for Institutionalizing Corporate Philanthropy In Egypt’s New Cities: A Case Study of 10th of Ramadan City**  
*Mahi Khallaf*  
112

**Better Knowledge, Better Giving: The Need for Philanthropic Data in the Arab Region**  
*Atallah Kuttab and Paula Johnson*  
144

**U.S. Foundation Funding in the Middle East and North African (MENA) Region**  
*Molly Schultz Hafid, Nadia Roumani and Archana Sahgal*  
152

**Muslim Philanthropy And The Production Of Space: The Muslim Philanthropy Digital Library Case**  
*Sherine El Taraboulsi*  
170

**Charity, Civil Society, and Social Capital in Islamic and Christian Societies, 1200-1700: Models and Hypotheses for Comparative Research**  
*Nicholas Terpstra*  
184
Introduction

While philanthropy has some of its oldest roots in the Arab region, contemporary research on giving and other forms of civic participation has until recently been sparse. That situation is changing as the region experiences a period of unprecedented political and social transformation. A young cohort of scholars are addressing a wide range of significant topics, from the intersection of faith and giving to the business case for investing in sustainable development. In order to bring together this growing research community, an annual conference was proposed in 2010, initially at a meeting of the advisory committee of the John D. Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement. One year later the first Takaful Conference was held in Amman, Jordan with nearly 100 in attendance. 'Takaful', which translates as solidarity, was chosen as an apt title for gathering research in a field which is both multidisciplinary in its intellectual origins and brings together citizens, business leaders and public officials in its practical manifestations.

The research papers in this volume were selected from among nearly 30 presented at the Takaful Conference on Philanthropy and Civic Engagement in the Arab Region. It was the first in what is anticipated will be an annual gathering of scholars and practitioners in this emerging field. The conference was jointly organized by the John D. Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement at American University in Cairo and the Columbia University Middle East Research Center (CUMERC) in Amman, under the patronage of HM Queen Rania al Abdullah of Jordan. It was heartening to note the enthusiastic response to the conference – 75 abstracts and panel proposals were initially submitted – as well as the high level of discussion and debate that the findings generated. We believe the papers in this volume, many by promising graduate students, testify to the thoughtfulness and rigor of research currently underway across the region.

The April conference was held at a pivotal moment in the history of the Arab region. Popular uprisings in two countries in North Africa, Tunisia and Egypt, had overturned entrenched dictatorships; neighboring countries were struggling to do the same. Ideologies and regimes that had held sway for half a century while excluding citizens from shaping their own destinies were being overthrown. The protesters were asking for an end to corruption and unfair distribution of the fruits of developing economies. Perhaps most significantly, young people were taking the stage as the generation that broke through barriers of fear and inertia with a new vision for shaping a democratic future. That vision blends both global elements of connectedness with patriotism and grounding in local history and culture. At the core is an unprecedented civic spirit that is spawning myriad local initiatives for social advancement. Spring 2011 was thus an auspicious moment to launch a research conference on civic engagement and philanthropy.

The papers in this volume are based on research conducted before the events of early 2011, although many authors have made revisions that link their findings to relevant developments that followed. The original call for proposals in October 2010 offered a wide array of topics that could be addressed. In order to encourage dialogue between practitioners and scholars, both were invited to contribute papers, and the insightful presentations from managers of corporate and private foundations added greatly to the deliberations. The Arab Foundations Forum sponsored a panel discussion as did the Muslim Philanthropy Digital Library project. In the end, the papers selected for the first Takaful conference fell into five thematic groupings, each represented in the selection of research papers reproduced in this volume.
An important cluster of studies addresses the complex intersection of religion, charity and social responsibility. Terpstra’s paper explores the historical connections between Christian and Muslim endowments, while Taraboulsi underscores the diversity of philanthropic culture and practice across Muslim-majority communities. Bortolazzi takes on the thorny topic of Islam, politics and charity in Lebanon. A second empirical study in Lebanon by Flanigan compares ethnic and religious motivations for service.

Another cluster of papers is concerned with the current and potential role of the business sector in advancing social responsibility. Khallaf’s research examines the challenges and promise in Egypt for private sector investment to help create new philanthropic institutions.

Philanthropy is becoming increasingly global in its networks and capital flows. The paper in this volume by Kuttab and Johnson examines the difficulties in measuring philanthropic capital and reports on some of the international and regional efforts to fill the data gap. The paper authored by Schultz Hafid, Roumani and Sahgal tries to fill another lacuna in knowledge about donor giving from North America to causes in the Arab region. Blayney looks at transnational giving by Iraqi-Americans to Iraqi refugees in a third country, Jordan.

Contemporary philanthropy in the Arab region grapples with the need for appropriate measures of self-governance and codes of practice, especially in the wake of recent reform movements. Haque’s contribution offers a case study from Pakistan of one innovative scheme for certifying civil society groups that meet standards jointly agreed upon by government and the sector itself.

Finally, the paper by Derbal offers insight into the nuanced motivations for giving among individuals and families in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. We feel sure that these ten research offerings will provide rich food for thought and debate. It is our hope that this will become an annual publication which both disseminates the best of contemporary research on the region and stimulates further inquiry and a wider pool of engaged scholars.

I take this opportunity to thank Sherine El Taraboulsi for working tirelessly with our authors to bring this volume to publication. She was ably assisted with overall design and editing by May Mostafa, Michael Ayoub and Michael Lethem. At an earlier stage, we are grateful to Dr. Atallah Kuttab and Dr. Mona Tagi for serving with me on the conference program committee, and to Dr. Safwan Masri and his staff at CUMERC for co-hosting the Takaful conference to a high standard. Takaful would not have been possible without the support of committed donors who believe in research, including Canada’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the Ford Foundation, and Columbia University.

Hoping to see many of you at next year’s Takaful conference.

Dr. Barbara Ibrahim
Cairo, September 2011
Iraqi American Diasporic Philanthropic Remittances to Iraqi Refugees in Jordan: Past Projects and Potential for Future Partnerships

Caroline Blayney

1 Caroline Blayney was a J. William Fulbright Fellow to Jordan from 2009-10 and is currently with the Danish Refugee Council in Iraq.
Abstract

Following the 2003 American-led invasion and ensuing sectarian fighting, many Iraqis have sought refuge in Jordan. As of 2010, it is estimated that up to half a million Iraqis reside in Jordan. In response to the invasion and refugee crisis, some members of the Iraqi American diaspora have sought ways to contribute to the support of refugees. In the United States, members of the Iraqi American diaspora have created philanthropic organizations to help meet the assistance needs of these Iraqi refugees. These organizations hold mandates for promoting educational exchange, poverty alleviation, and medical aid. Founded and funded in the United States, they have not only assisted Iraqis in exile but also have fostered community and relationships amongst members of the Iraqi diaspora. By examining established diasporic philanthropy organizations and their mechanisms for providing assistance to refugees, conclusions can be drawn about what component factors are important to leverage and sustain these organizations and their work. This deeper understanding of the Iraqi diaspora’s work in Jordan reveals the challenges diaspora organizations can face in Jordan’s institutional environment as well as their potential as partners for international aid organizations.

Diaspora Development and Assistance

The study of transnationalism and the diaspora is a developing field of research. Often combining multiple academic disciplines, its aim is to better understand how individuals and diaspora groups relate to their place of origin or ancestry. These connections can be economic, social, and political. However, they frequently are overlapping and varied. Transfers of money, social capital, time, and information flow between groups as well as individuals throughout the world, not just the country of origin. Transfers are as diverse as the groups or individuals from which they originate and vary by destination. Because of the new prominence of transfers to and from diaspora groups, academics, policymakers, and development practitioners have begun examining patterns to better understand how, why and through what means diasporas engage in transnational activities.

The potential of diasporas as partners for development has recently received academic attention. This concept is premised on the understanding that members of the diaspora have an advanced knowledge of the internal factors in their country of origin which can be shared to design more effective international development. Therefore, diasporans or diaspora organizations can partner or inform international aid research, planning, and programming in their country of origin. Such partnerships between diasporans or diaspora organizations and international organizations can link common programs, co-fund projects, or provide support and capacity-building.

The role of the diaspora in conflict and post conflict reconstruction is also a valuable topic for current study. Specifically, in regards to this research are questions concerning remittances as forms of livelihoods or assistance for those in exile. The vast majority of countries currently experiencing post-war transitions are “highly dependent” on remittances as are groups such as internally displaced persons and refugees who are left vulnerable after conflicts with their livelihoods threatened. In protracted cases of exile, remittances can provide a vital source of income and ameliorate life conditions. Savage and Harvey make the case that humanitarian actors should better understand remittance patterns, delivery, and ruptures in conflicts to inform
their own work and to be aware of specific resulting vulnerabilities. Under consideration in the case studies presented here are two Iraqi diaspora organizations supporting refugees in Jordan. Therefore, this research is situated in the larger context of the diaspora as partners for international development and assistance as well as diaspora support of those in exile.

**Diasporic Organizations and Philanthropy: Key Terms**

The term diaspora refers to a group of people (diasporans) who live outside their country of origin, but who maintain linkages to that country. This simple definition is expanded on by Scheffer: “Modern diasporas are ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin – their homelands.” Membership in a diaspora requires both a heritage of migration as well as active engagement with others in either the country of origin or settlement.

Just as a diaspora member’s identity can be grounded in multiple sites of belonging, so too are diasporas usually heterogeneous; comprised of multiple groups in terms of generation, gender, religion, class, or clan. In this research, the term diasporan refers to a person who either originated, or whose ancestry can be traced, to the modern territory of Iraq. Additionally, a diasporan in this context actively engages with people of this background in either the country of origin or in settlement. The Iraqi diaspora is heterogeneous, with individuals and groups identifying along varied religious and ethnic lines. Additionally, the Iraqi diaspora is “layered by periods of out movement from Iraq, including both exiles and voluntary migrants.”

Remittances are transfers sent between the diaspora and the country of origin. They can take the form of financial, social, or human capital as well as information. The majority of remittances are private or are sent to individuals from diasporans. Alternatively, collective remittances from diaspora groups often have a philanthropic agenda and are intended for public use. The greater part of remittances examined herein are monetary and are given by diaspora groups with a philanthropic aim. However, remittances of time and information are also present in the findings.

Philanthropy is the voluntary giving of goods, services, or social capital from private actors for public purposes. Thus to use Johnson’s framework, we can understand diaspora philanthropy as characterized by: “1) charitable giving from individuals who reside outside their homeland, who 2) maintain a sense of identity with their home country, 3) give to causes or organizations in that country, and 4) give for public benefit.” Even though the two organizations presented below channel remittances to Iraqis in exile, the above definition is still relevant as transfers for civic means flow from the diaspora to those at home or near in settlement.

What does the term ‘diasporic organization’ mean in this context? Within the literature on transnationalism and diaspora, typologies have been created to categorize different kinds of diasporic groups based on their purpose and means of cohesion. Moya offers what he calls a generic definition of voluntary associations as “secondary organizations that exist between the primary links of kinship and the equally non-voluntary arrangements of tertiary institutions like the state.” In response to the vague nature of definitions such as ‘association’ and ‘immigrant’, he offers a set of categories based on the defining characteristics of the group. In the context of this study, ‘hometown associations’ is the most adequate definition.
Moya describes the actions of hometown associations in two ways. Their first purpose is to “preserve and promote connections with the area of origin” through civic projects.\textsuperscript{(xv)} Secondly, hometown associations offer spaces for migrants to interact and socialize in the country of settlement.\textsuperscript{(xvi)} Waldinger et al. describe hometown associations as fostering social ties “here” and development “there.” \textsuperscript{(xvii)} The organizations presented below perform both of these functions. Other definitions of hometown associations require that the civic projects be carried out in a specific region or locality by immigrants from that same area.\textsuperscript{(xviii)} The organizations in this research do not remit directly to the founders and members’ specific place of origin. Since remittances go to Iraqis in general, I chose to employ “diasporic organization” instead of “hometown organization” to better fit the organization in this study.

This paper is divided into two sections. The first examines four organizations founded by Iraqi Americans. This section explores the purpose and structure of the organizations, their function, and fundraising efforts. It discusses the motivations of the founding members. The second part of the paper explores the potential and the limits to diaspora engagement in the institutional environment in Jordan. This section brings to light the obstacles for diaspora organizations, yet how successful partnerships with international and local NGOs have fostered activities.

This paper is not a comprehensive survey of the Iraqi diaspora and their remitting patterns. Additionally, it does not focus on the ‘here’ effects of the organizations in the United States; further study is required to fully understand the impact these organizations have on the Iraqi diaspora and if philanthropic organizations become sites for bridging within the diaspora. Little has been published on the Iraqi American diaspora with relation to remittances. The remitting patterns (both public and private) and motivations of the Iraqi diaspora are also areas for future study.

Of the four organizations considered in this research only one, the Chaldean Federation of America, is non-secular. Considering the religious make up of Iraq and the Iraqi diaspora as a whole, it is valuable to examine diaspora philanthropy organized around religious establishments, particularly Islamist charity. Such organizations are not included in this study because I did not encounter any in the course of my research. However, this is not evidence of their absence.

Methodology

Both Rally for Iraq and the Chaldean Federation of America’s Adopt-A-Refugee-Family Program were selected as case studies for their mandates and operational status. Of the four organizations which fit the criteria for diasporic philanthropic organization, Rally for Iraq and the Adopt-A-Refugee-Family Program are the most developed in terms of carrying out their mandate.

Research was conducted from December 2009 to September 2010 under a 2009-2010 J. William Fulbright Fellowship. More than 45 interviews were held in Jordan, New York, Detroit, and via telephone to other locations in the United States. Personal and telephone interviews were conducted with members of the Iraqi diaspora, Iraqi refugees and migrants in Amman, international non-government organizations, and participants in diaspora-led initiatives. Contacts were made through snowball sampling and all interviews were semi-structured. An attempt was made to survey donors. However, only two responses from over 500 surveys distributed to Rally for Iraq’s donor base were received. Therefore, this last source of information was not taken into
account in the final analysis. All key informants were offered the opportunity to read the final version of this paper and make comments.

**Iraqis in Jordan**

It is estimated that up to half a million Iraqis have sought refuge in Jordan since the American-led invasion in 2003, though this number is highly debated between the Government of Jordan (GoJ) and the international community. These exiles joined Iraqis who had previously settled in Jordan and those who, for economic and physical security purposes, circulated between Iraq and Jordan. As Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Iraqis are not recognized by the Government of Jordan (GoJ) as refugees. Rather, they are considered 'Arab guests' per Jordanian law. Yet, a 1998 Memorandum of Understanding with GoJ allows UNHCR to recognize Iraqis as refugees on a prima facie basis since February 2007. This affords the international community space to provide limited refugee rights such as nonrefoulement and refugee status determination while durable solutions are enacted.

The Iraqi displacement has become a protracted crisis. Safe and dignified return to Iraq is not currently possible and it is not likely to become an option in the near future. The GoJ has made it clear that local integration will not be a possibility for Iraqis. While third country resettlement is the preferred solution of the UNHCR, the majority of Iraqi refugees will not have access because of the limited number of opportunities relative to the total refugee population.

The GoJ has allowed Iraqis to attend primary and secondary school and to access Jordanian health facilities at the level of an uninsured Jordanian. Aside from the limited few who have the monetary resources to secure residency permits from the GoJ, the majority of Iraqis are not able to work legally in Jordan. Therefore the vast majority must work illegally or rely on remittances or support from the international community to meet basic needs in exile. According to the 2007 FAFO household survey, 41.3 percent of families Iraqi families in Jordan received transfers of income from Iraq and 22.3 percent of families received transfers of income from outside of Jordan or Iraq. Subsequent studies have shown that the Iraqis’ insecure legal status, as well as lack of access to livelihoods has left them increasingly vulnerable within their host community.

With savings and remittances reportedly dwindling and a lack of access to legal livelihoods in Jordan, the majority of Iraqis are left in an increasingly vulnerable position. Furthermore, while young adults and professionals live without access to the formal economy, many of their skills and knowledge atrophy.

**Iraqis in America**

The Iraqi diaspora in America is comprised of diverse ethno-religious groups, voluntary and economic migrants, exiles from previous wars and internal politics as well as recently resettled refugees. The 2009 US Census reported that 101,163 Iraqis (identified by race) lived in the United States. The Iraqi diaspora in the United States includes Sunnis, Shi’ites, Kurds, Assyrians, and Chaldeans. Large Iraqi communities have been established in Detroit, Chicago, San Diego, Nashville, and Los Angeles. In Detroit, the Iraqi population is majority Catholic and has a large Chaldean presence.
The heterogeneous nature of the Iraqi diaspora is due to patterns of both forced and voluntary migration from Iraq as well as ethnic and religious affiliations. Al-Ali employs the term “layered” to describe this diversity of migrants in the diaspora. The diaspora originated in the 1940s when Iraqis arrived in the United States to pursue degrees, eventually settling and bringing over family members. This initial migration spurred further economic and political migration. Political changes within Iraq, two wars, and international sanctions pushed Iraqis from their country into the diaspora.

Some of the Iraqis displaced by the 2003 American-led and its violent aftermath have been resettled to the United States and other third countries. In 2009, the United States accepted 17,000 Iraqi refugees; an increase from 2006 when it accepted only 202. This dramatic increase was the result of the Refugee Crisis Act of 2008. The International Rescue Committee found that recently resettled refugees generally have encountered great difficulty finding employment due to the economic downturn. Post-traumatic stress disorder and other medical issues also negatively affect some resettled refugees’ ability to meet their basic needs.

Outside of Al-Ali’s work on the Iraqi diaspora, little scholarly research has been conducted on the social relationships between Iraqis and whether or not bridging now occurs between the diverse groups that comprise the Iraqi diaspora.

**Iraqi Diasporic Philanthropic Organizations**

The following diaspora organizations are interviewed for this research project: Rally for Iraq, Chaldean Federation of America: Adopt-A-Refugee-Family Program, Iraqi American Higher Education Foundation, and Iraqi Medical Sciences Association. These organizations have differing mission statements and purposes (please see Figure 1), yet they are all involved in meeting the educational, medical, and financial needs of Iraqis both in Iraq and those in exile in neighboring countries. Through social and fundraising events, email networks and annual conferences, these organizations connect Iraqi diasporans nationally and internationally.

Both the Iraqi Medical Sciences Association (IMSA) and the Iraqi American Higher Education Foundation (IAHEF) are organizations founded by the Iraqi-American diaspora to facilitate professional and social connections among the diaspora as well as peers in Iraq. Additionally, both are engaged in philanthropic activities. IMSA was founded in the late 1990s to: build a network of Iraqi doctors and scientists in the United States; to promote social, academic, and professional ties; to organize humanitarian projects abroad. Annual conferences and quarterly newsletters keep members connected and involved. IAHEF was founded in 2009 by a member of the Iraqi diaspora during his time as a Franklin Fellow with the US Department of State. The organization maintains a database of Iraqi academics and provides an online network for Iraqi and non-Iraqi professors. By connecting peers, the website plans to promote professional exchange, partnerships for research, and collaboration on resources or grants. IAHEF’s founder stated that a key to resurrecting Iraq’s education system is the “effort to harness members of an Iraqi diaspora that includes Muslims, Christians, and Jews,” and he optimistically asserts that, “this will not be hard.”
Iraqi Diasporic Philanthropic Organizations: Case Studies
Rally for Iraq

In response to the 2003 American-led invasion, three second-generation Iraqi Americans came together to create Rally for Iraq. Seeking a way to help from their positions in the United States, they set out to create a grassroots organization to support youth education. This scholarship fund for Iraqi students provides funding to pursue higher education in the United States. The founders believe that a long-term educational initiative will reduce the negative effects on education and human capital resulting from the 2003 invasion. Rally for Iraq has built an endowment large enough to sponsor its first Iraqi student for the 2011 American academic year, and to hire one of the founders as full time staff.

Since the start, the three founders of Rally for Iraq have continued to take leading roles in fundraising and programming. They are supported by a four-person board of directors comprised of prominent Iraqi American professionals and academics. The team came together in 2007 and received non-profit status in the same year. Lacking a central office, members connected through the web or conference calls and meetings in Boston, New York, and Washington, D.C. Until recently, all team members volunteered their time in addition to their full time employment or studies.

Rally for Iraq’s goal is to offer between 5 and 20 scholarships a year. To apply for these scholarships, Iraqi students must be currently enrolled in a graduate degree program within the United States. Criteria are based on academic achievement and need. Rally for Iraq publicizes the application process on their website. Through connections with university professors in Iraq and neighboring countries, they have begun to get the word out to Iraqi students about their scholarship opportunities.

Fundraising for the endowment has been a central activity for the founders. The effort began in 2007 by selling Iraqi themed vintage tee-shirts and hosting an Iraqi film festival. The founders also promoted Rally for Iraq at events such as the Arab American Festival and the Iraqi Medical Sciences Association convention. Through personal contacts, a newly created website, and social media such as Facebook, they built a network of supporters and donors. At the start, the founders reached out to their family and friends. Over time, their network grew and they have sought funding from corporations and foundations. Their donor base is still a “hodgepodge” with the majority being one time donations.

While they do not request information about or track the background of their donors, their general sense is that Arab Americans and Iraqi Americans make up only a minority of contributions and the majority come from non-Arab or non-Iraqi Americans. The organization’s hope is that, after granting the first scholarship, their legitimacy will be established and they will receive more donations.

Fundraising events provide an invaluable opportunity to promote Rally for Iraq and to bring donors together. Events have been held in New York and Chicago. The first such event was a dinner in New York’s West Village neighborhood, where Iraqi friends of the founders donated the venue and food. At an evening gathering in summer 2010, also in New York, members of the Iraq donor
community were joined by recently resettled Iraqi refugees. This event provided space to “build community between the two groups,” which one of the founders called, “unexpected and lovely.”

Rally for Iraq has also partnered with Iraqi artists as a fundraising mechanism and a way to increase visibility. In the summer of 2010, the organization collaborated with Iraqi artist Wafaa Bilal. The Rally for Iraq website recounts:

Together, RFI and Bilal aim to raise $105,000 in charitable donations dedicated to the Rally for Iraq Scholarship Endowment. The fundraiser will consist of Bilal tattooing 105,000 dots on his back to commemorate 105,000 Iraqi and American lives lost during the war. Bilal is asking donors to match each tattoo with a one-dollar contribution to Rally for Iraq. This art-inspired fundraising effort will be exhibited live on the web at WafaaBilal.com and RallyforIraq.org as well as at the studios of the Elizabeth Foundation for the Arts for 24 hours. Names of Iraqi civilians who have lost their lives will be read for the duration of this commemorative exhibit. (xxxiii)

This event was covered by The New York Times (xxxiv) and the publicity enabled Rally for Iraq to promote their work and bring attention to on-going issues in Iraq to a much wider audience.

The founders expressed multiple motivations for their work, including pride in their Iraqi heritage and desire to aid in the reconstruction of Iraq. During an event at Boston College, one of the founders related her feeling helpless and powerless as an Iraqi American in the wake of 9/11 and the 2003 invasion. She remarked “my family are not strangers to war, however, I am.” For her, establishing Rally for Iraq met her need to “find a way to do something” from “here” to “help people there.” She sought to counter inaccuracies presented about Arab Americans and Muslim Americans present in American discourse following 9/11. (xxxv) It was important for her to find a way to reasonably respond to the crisis from her position in the United States and to leverage her knowledge of American culture and the education system for philanthropic aims. Another of the founders spoke about wanting to make an impact from his position in the United States. His gratitude for his own education and professional success was a driving force behind his philanthropic work because he wanted to make it possible for other Iraqis to have similar opportunities.

**Chaldean Federation of America: Adopt-A-Refugee-Family Program**

The Chaldean Federation of America’s Adopt-A-Refugee-Family Program (AARF) was established in 2007 to assist Iraqi refugee families displaced by the 2003 invasion and sectarian fighting. Founded in Michigan, the program supports those in exile in Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. Since its inception, the program has been successful in raising funds and transferring these directly to those in need abroad. In Jordan, the distribution of funds is carried out through a partnership with the Jesuit House in Amman. Even though the program was founded under the Chaldean Federation’s ‘programs and services’, AARF receives donations from, and provides assistance to, both Chaldeans and non-Chaldeans.

An Iraqi-Chaldean businessman located in the Detroit area founded AARF in reaction to the events unfolding in Iraq post-2003 and the continued flight of Chaldeans from Iraq. In coordination with the Chaldean Federation of America, he traveled to Jordan and Syria in 2007 to assess the situation.
of refugees and to recruit partner organizations. During this trip he established contact with the Jesuit House in Amman. The program’s founder is AARF’s chairman. Additionally, the organization is supported by a committee of 15 members. All AARF staff members volunteer their time.

AARF provides cash assistance to Iraqis in exile in order to “re-establish their security and livelihood.” To date, the program has successfully sent over 1.4 million USD to Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria. Funds are collected in the United States with all overhead costs covered by the Chaldean Federation. For donations to Jordan, funds are pooled and transferred to the Jesuits in Boston who transfer the amount to the Jesuits in Amman, who oversee local distribution of funds.

The relationship with the Jesuit House in Jebel Hussein, Amman plays a central role in executing AARF’s mission. One of the Jesuit fathers, who was born and trained in Iraq before fleeing to Jordan, works directly with the founder of AARF. At the start of the program the father assembled a list of families in need. Initially, these were families that he came in contact with at services or through home visits offered by the Jesuit House. Over time, word spread; referred by Church members, others arrived at the Jesuit House to request assistance. At first, the families were majority Chaldean or Iraqi Christian. As the displacement continues and refugees have learned of the assistance, non-Christian Iraqis now seek and are granted assistance. However, the father makes it clear that AARF’s first priority is to help Iraqi Christian families.

Each month the AARF in Jordan provides approximately 172 families with 100 to 125 USD. The cash is used for living expenses, food and non-food items, medication, or hospital fees. AARF does not require the families to track or account for their usage of the funds. A small pool of cash for emergencies is maintained by the founder, which the father can request in special instances. The father reports that AARF funds fill the gaps in INGO or GoJ activities. He reports that it helps refugees “to keep going.”

The father retains a static list of families who receive monthly allowances. All recipients of AARF funds must be registered with UNHCR. When a family is resettled or deemed to no longer require assistance, they are taken off the list and another family takes their place. The father and two Jesuit nuns monitor the families through home visits and informal information networks. He says that occasionally there are disputes over who is given a place on the list and that in some instances, members of disputed families will call from the United States to make a case for their relatives. When requested, the father sends letters or pictures of recipient families to donors in the United States.

AARF relies on the father’s judgment to decide which families are most in need. The deciding factors are his overall sense of the community needs and how the families spend their allowances. He explains that his first principle is: “Anyone who comes is like the poor beggar. Some cases have enough, some need more; we try our best to determine this.” However, “whatever their case – if they come, they need.”

AARF has established an informal partnership with Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) through the Jesuit House. Many who receive cash assistance from AARF also benefit from services of the JRS. Among other forms of assistance, JRS offers community activities including an after school program for children, the “Family Visits Program,” and monthly get-togethers for the elderly. Most
beneficiaries are Christians from Amman, Hashmi Al-Shmali, Jebel Hussein and Marka. However, non-Christians also are welcomed and frequently attend events as well as financial assistance. AARF’s informal partnership with JRS allows the Jesuit House to meet refugees’ community, monetary, and other needs. The father also refers families with health problems to CARITAS for treatment.

Funding for AARF financial assistances comes from donors in the United States. The founder began appealing for donations in 2007, starting with his personal contacts: his business network; clients; friends; the church; the Chaldean community; and the wider, local community. His ability to raise funds rested, on the strength of his relationships and his standing in the community. People knew that he had a solid reputation and that they could trust him with money. In the last two-and-a-half years, he has worked to maintain this reputation within the community.

The majority of funds for AARF are given in small amounts by private individuals. Some of these are donated on a monthly or periodical basis. On average there are 2,000 donations received per month. This amounts to roughly 40,500 USD a month in total. However, as a result of the recent global financial crisis, average funding levels have decreased. AARF hosts community fundraising events, such as shows for children. Local businesses in Michigan have also partnered with AARF to offer special deals or discounts with proceeds donated. The founder remarks that there is a high level of community support for AARF from local schools, businesses, and families. While AARF does not track donor background, it estimates that 70 percent of funding comes from Chaldeans and 30 percent from the larger community.

AARF is committed to 100 percent of donations being transferred directly to the adopted refugee family and to transparent transfers. These two points came up repeatedly in the course of interviews with staff and are very visible in AARF promotional materials and website content. This focus on transparency and direct allocation of funds appears to be a kind of second mission statement of AARF.

In fact, the relationship between the founder and the father is extremely strong and mutually respectful. The father says of the founder: “He raises a lot of money and distributes all of it. None of it is squandered. I have a lot of respect for him. He is trustworthy with money, which is rare. In these parts of the world a lot of money is squandered or goes missing. He is very careful.”

Spiritual and humanitarian commitments compel the founder and Jesuit father to carry out this work. The founder cites spiritual motivations as the predominant reason for beginning AARF. As well, after the 2003 invasion, he was moved by the experiences and persecution of Iraqi Christians. He asserts that Christians “paid a heavy price for the invasion.” In learning of their “dire need” he came up with the idea for AARF. The father also cites religious motivations: “Whatever we cannot do, God will complement. We do our best and leave the rest in His hands, in God and His work.” Interestingly, he says that he is able to carry out this work in the community in Amman because he is perceived as neutral. He believes this is partially due to his mixed background: his father is of Latin origin, his mother Armenian, and maternal grandfather Chaldean. This has given him a “balanced way of thinking” and taught him to “never pick sides.”
Themes and Trends

Strong and respected leadership plays a large role in the success of these organizations. In all cases, leadership relies on prominent community standing to draw donations and membership over periods of time. Accountability for funds and activities is important within the current climate of heightened scrutiny on the leaders and organizations by donors and the outside community. In response, the leaders appear to emphasize their distinguishing characteristics such as education, standing in the community, or professional achievements.

This comes across in conversation and also in written materials. In the case of AARF, the founder is featured in a Chaldean church publication as a community leader and humanitarian. In an opinion piece for The New York Times, the president of the Iraqi-American Higher Education Fund sites his recent work with the US Department of State and his Franklin Fellowship. Additionally, leaders and board members are well-connected to Iraqis in the United States and Iraq as well as neighboring countries. These connections appear essential to fundraising but also to implementation of programs. Therefore, leadership with distinguished community standing and extensive personal connections are essential elements for organizations to achieve their objectives.

Another common theme raised was the difficulty of initial fundraising. Some interviewees mentioned a perceived trend that their donors, members of the Iraqi community both in Jordan and the United States, approach donating to organizations with an abundance of caution. However, the more successful or established the program, it is perceived by some, the less reticent Iraqis are to donate. It is worthy to note that of the two case study organizations, both have thus far received a substantial amount of private donations from outside the Iraqi diaspora. Additionally, interviewees related difficulties in fundraising due to the global economic crisis.

Throughout the research process, it was frequently noted that awareness of the existence and work of Iraqi diasporic organizations in Jordan was not common; in some cases Iraqi diasporic organizations in the United States did not know of one another. Overall, it appears that these organizations have, thus far, a relatively low profile. This may be because most of these groups have been founded relatively recently and are still in the initial phases of formation or implementation. However, this could also indicate a secondary challenge to these organizations. The sharing of information, best practices, and outside funding opportunities is crucial among organizations pursuing common goals. A heightened awareness of one another and greater representation in the wider international NGO community is beneficial.

Iraqi Diasporic Philanthropic Organizations and the Institutional Environment in Jordan

At this moment in the Iraqi refugee crisis, what role can diaspora organizations play in the Jordanian institutional environment and what benefits could partnerships bring to both diaspora organizations and international NGOs? As stated above, the refugee crisis has become protracted with these populations becoming increasingly vulnerable. Concurrently, international aid money is waning. In this context, established Iraqi diasporic organizations could take on a more prominent
role in aid provision through partnerships. As de Haas notes, partnering with a mobilized diaspora can be mutually beneficial to both the diasporic organizations and to development actors. In fact, in the case of Jordan, UNHCR made the recommendation for partnerships with international NGOs as the best way forward for diaspora organizations. This next section will further examine the Jordanian context and explore some of the barriers for entry facing diasporic organizations, discuss successful past partnerships and the mutual benefits, as well as draw conclusions about future potential.

Since 2006, when the majority of Iraqis arrived in Jordan, international aid has targeted the gaps where GoJ cannot provide assistance. UNHCR is mandated with the responsible for the registration and reception of refugees as well as providing cash assistance to those in need. UNHCR also coordinates efforts with international and local NGOs as well as Jordanian community-based organizations. Programs for Iraqi refugees and vulnerable members of the host community provide much needed assistance in the areas of health and psychosocial care, formal and informal education, vocational training, community support events, legal aid, cash and non-cash items, and support programs to counter negative coping mechanisms targeting women and children. To these ends, there are many NGOs established in Jordan with the knowledge and capacity to assist Iraqis which could serve as valuable partners to diaspora organizations. However, international donor support is waning and programs are being reduced. In this climate, diaspora organizations can provide valuable funds and technical expertise. Partnerships with NGOs could facilitate the entry of diaspora organizations into the institutional environment. Assisting Iraqis in Jordan, while simultaneously meeting the needs of all stakeholders has proven difficult for many NGOs. Sassoon notes that NGOs must work towards a “delicate balancing act between helping refugees, satisfying the national government’s rules and regulations and dealing with the local popular reaction.” Furthermore, burden sharing with the host community and government has taken a central role in assistance to Iraqis in Jordan. Because the majority of Iraqis settled in the capital city of Amman, they have been highly visible to their hosts and require equivalent services.

At the onset of the refugee crisis, Iraqis were commonly perceived by the host community as a burden on the infrastructure and natural resources of Jordan prompting the GoJ to call upon the international community to share the responsibility of meeting their needs. Financial assistance has been provided directly to Jordanian ministries for capacity building and improved service delivery. Additionally, organizations which assist Iraqi refugees are required to also support vulnerable members of the host community. The Jordan Ministry of Social Development requires that, of assistance provided to Iraqi refugees, at least 20 percent must be made available to service vulnerable Jordanians. In fact, many implementing partners set a quota of 25 to 50 percent for such assistance to vulnerable hosts. For small or new diaspora organizations, supporting vulnerable communities in addition to refugees is a barrier. Thus partnership with a regional or international partner which is registered and experienced in navigating the institutional environment is beneficial to diasporic organizations.

UNHCR Jordan recognizes this and recommends partnerships between diaspora organizations and established NGOs as a way forward. In the past, UNHCR Jordan has not had a Memorandum of Understanding or partnered directly with any Iraqi diaspora group. Instead, they recommend that
access to work in Jordan is best achieved through partnerships with those already in place. Two such partnerships were examined in the course of this research; both proved mutually beneficial for the diaspora organization as well as the NGO.

The Adopt-A-Refugee-Family program has been successful in partnering with the Jesuit Refugee Services and Jesuit House. The partnership facilitates the dispersal of funds from the United States into the community with a guarantee of orderliness and transparency because it is subject to a well-established, built-in monitoring and evaluation mechanism. Jesuit Refugee Services and the Jesuit House, who reported reluctance at being perceived as sites of monetary assistance, have been able to provide a separate entity to meet this need of refugees. This partnership allows both parties to meet their respective objectives.

In the summer of 2009, the Medical Partnership Project for Refugees in Syria and Jordan facilitated health exchange programs for doctors in the United States. The program was instituted by a professor at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. and a second generation Iraqi American who was, at the time, a Fulbright Fellow in Syria. The team recruited doctors from the Iraqi Medical Science Association and from other connections both within and outside of the Iraqi American diaspora. Eighteen doctors and nurses traveled to Syria as well as 15 to Jordan to provide workshops and lectures for local medical professionals and to host clinics for refugees.

The Project partnered with local and international NGOs in Jordan. These included Jordan Health Aid Society, Noor Al-Hussein Foundation, International Medical Corps, UNHCR, and CARE International. These organizations helped arrange and provide logistical support for capacity building training with Jordanian and Iraqi staff. NGOs also provided contacts within the refugee population, and supplied translators or facilitators for the duration of the program. Some also provided office space or other equipment.

The partnerships allowed doctors the access to local practitioners which they required through introductions and guidance. Some participants in the Syria program commented that without the partnerships, they would not have been able to carry out their work. Others who did not speak Arabic or who were not of Iraqi descent described their Iraqi counterparts at NGOs and those participating in the program as essential to navigating cultural and linguistic barriers.

While partnership can be mutually beneficial, issues were raised by some NGOs interviewed in Jordan concerning their barriers or limitations. Some were concerned in general about the origin of the funds raised by diaspora organizations. It was explained that some NGOs in Jordan felt under scrutiny to account for their sources of funding. Therefore, they would need a high level of guarantee as to the reputation of the source and intention of funds before they could be accepted. Additionally, some NGOs are mandated to not discriminate between beneficiaries based on race or religion. It was raised that if the diaspora organization had specifically targeted beneficiaries based on competing criteria, this could be problematic. Finally, and particularly for the smaller NGOs, their limited funding or staff size could make it difficult to sponsor or partner with diaspora organizations. If unfunded, the additional time, office space, or staff required could make partnerships unrealistic.

Other issues have come to the fore when assessing potential partnerships. De Haas discusses two points which could be extremely significant in this context. He recommends that double agendas
must be avoided. (xlvii) Shown above, diaspora organizations are under tremendous scrutiny from their donors and the wider community. The leadership of these organizations must take extra care to maintain their standing and reputation. Partner development actors must be aware of this and upfront in expectations and agendas. High levels of trust will most likely be important. As de Hass remarks also notes, capacity building or support for diaspora networks by development actors must strike the “delicate balance between strengthening and patronizing diaspora organizations.” (xlviii) Iraqi diaspora organizations have taken impressive steps and must be recognized for this if future partnerships are to occur.

Partnerships with the Iraqi diaspora in Jordan, if approached correctly and if mutually beneficial, could be an opportunity for sustained support in the context of diminishing funding and protracted urban crisis. Thus far, the diaspora organizations presented in this research have assisted refugees and NGOs with funding, professional knowledge as well as educational and medical support. This diaspora philanthropy is a unique, albeit minimal, form of burden sharing from the diaspora to the Jordanian government and community. If these diaspora organizations can continue to raise funds and grow, they could become important stakeholders given their funding sources, networks and connections, and vested interest.

Conclusion

In response to the 2003 American-led invasion of Iraq and the ensuing sectarian conflict, some members of the Iraqi American diaspora have mobilized and establishing organizations to offer assistance. These organizations provide aid to those in exile in neighboring countries and to those remaining in Iraq. To date, these organizations have provided education, financial, and medical aid. Beyond assisting those abroad, the organizations utilize online networking and fundraising activities as sites for collective activity and action amongst the US diaspora. However, more research on this component of networking is required in order to better understand its impact.

Since their inception, both Rally for Iraq and the Adopt-A-Refugee-Family Program have successfully raised funds to support refugees in Iraq and elsewhere. Events and campaigns have sought donations from Iraqis and non-Iraqis in the United States. Both rely on the respected position of their leadership as well as the personal connections of their founders and board members to successfully fundraise and carry out their work abroad. Furthermore, and pertaining to all the organizations interviewed in this study, their relatively low profile are a secondary challenge in efforts to fundraise or partner with international NGOs.

In the context of assistance provision to Iraqis in Jordan, diaspora organizations have begun to successfully partner with international and local NGOs. These partnerships have been invaluable to both parties in mobilizing funds as well as supporting programs and activities. Partnerships could be valuable for other diaspora organizations who are interested in operating in Jordan. UNHCR recommends this as the best way forward and indeed evidence in this paper supports the importance of partnerships. However, the evidence also points to the burgeoning capacity in the Iraqi American diaspora, as well as some groups’ targeted beneficiaries. If partnerships can be mutually beneficial and respectful of each organization’s mandate and abilities, then this mechanism is highly valuable. Diaspora philanthropy can take on a more central role in assistance provision to Iraqis as their exile remains protracted and their vulnerabilities increase.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Founding Date</th>
<th>Membership Size</th>
<th>Mission Statement</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Medical Sciences Association</td>
<td>1997/1998</td>
<td>400 to 500</td>
<td>To develop and promote professional, educational, community, and humanitarian charitable efforts for the Iraqi healthcare community in the U.S.</td>
<td>Promote educational endeavors and carry out humanitarian programs and fundraising for charitable and humanitarian community in the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi American Higher Education Foundation</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1 Founding Member, 15 Person Board, 2 Staff in Jordan</td>
<td>Establish online database to allow for Iraqi and American faculty and professionals to network, share funding information, and build peer relationships between professors to network. Sharing available funding opportunities with humanitarian organizations.</td>
<td>Establish relationships and build peer Dray for Iraqi and American faculty and professional, database to allow for Iraqi and American faculty and professionals to network, share funding information, and build peer relationships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaldean Federation of America: Adopt A Refugee Program</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2 Staff in Jordan</td>
<td>To provide financial support, through donations and charitable contributions, to Iraqi refugees who were forced to leave their homeland due to the ongoing turmoil within Iraq and those who were forced to leave their homeland who cannot otherwise provide for themselves by partnering with humanitarian organizations working in the Middle East.</td>
<td>To provide financial support, through donations and charitable contributions, to Iraqi refugees who were forced to leave their homeland due to the ongoing turmoil within Iraq and those who were forced to leave their homeland who cannot otherwise provide for themselves by partnering with humanitarian organizations working in the Middle East.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rally for Iraq Organization</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3 Founding Directors</td>
<td>To the reconstruction of their homeland, the youth of Iraq who left Iraq and those who have the skills to contribute to the reconstruction of their homeland.</td>
<td>Fund grants to study in US colleges, Graduate schools, and reeducation programs, and building scholarships for Iraqi refugees to study in US colleges.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Works Cited


Chaldean Federation of America, 2008. 2008 Program Update. [leaflet].


End Notes


xii. Ibid.


xvi. Ibid. 848

xvii. Ibid. 849

I would like to thank those who gave their time to this project, especially the founders of the Adopt-A-Refugee Family Program and Rally for Iraq. As well, I am grateful for the time, support, and advice of Lidwien Kaptiejs, Geraldine Chatelard, Jamal Al Jabiri, Yves-Kim Créac’h, and the Fulbright Commission in Jordan. A special thanks to all who read draft versions of this paper.


The above comments were taken from Boston College’s program “Growing Up Iraqi in the United States.”

There is no Chaldean Church in Amman. Once a week, a Chaldean service is given in a
meeting room of the Jesuit House. The Jesuits have been in Amman since the 1980s.


xli. Ibid., 55


Hezbollah: Between Islam and Political Society
Popular Mobilization and Social Entrepreneurship in Lebanon

Omar Bortolazzi

---

2 Omar Bortolazzi is currently a full time researcher at the Philanthropy and Social Innovation Centre (PhaSI) at the Department of Historical Studies, University of Bologna and a fellow researcher on Contemporary History at the same department.
Foreword

It’s been over a decade since political Islam in itself is no longer the major issue in Middle East politics. Welfare, democratization and a vivid debate on civil society are. Islamists’ credibility as political actors hinge upon the concrete alternatives they present to authoritarian, corrupt or sometimes absent governments with their skewed distribution of wealth and resources. In this regard, each country in the region presents a unique configuration of Islamic forces and opinions.

While civil society has a plethora of definitions, the London School of Economics Centre for Civil Society offers a useful working definition:

Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, and family though in practice the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women’s organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups.

In addition to the LSE definition of civil society, it is appropriate in our context to define the concept of “political society” as it was conceptualized by Partha Chatterjee. According to Chatterjee political society is a domain of institutions and activities where several mediations are carried out. Thus, “the politics of democratization must therefore be carried out not in the classical transactions between state and civil society but in the much less well defined, legally ambiguous, contextually and strategically demarcated terrain of political society.”

The idea of political society is potentially radical in identifying that the populations which make up this alternative site are neither agents of the state nor civil society. They are often excluded in the process of political participation: “for the sake of survival and livelihood, they have to negotiate with both state and civil society or public sphere, domains often led and occupied by the middle-class bourgeois subjects and social elites.” I find Chatterjee’s definition of political society more persuasive and more consonant within the Middle Eastern context while “civil society” of citizens represents more of a Western model of politics. Furthermore, in most Middle Eastern countries the communal and corporate groups within the population relate to political parties via continuous bargaining and deals and exchanging electoral support for welfare provisions directly delivered to that specific group. This is certainly the case in Lebanon, where state personnel or the ruling party strikes mutually beneficial deals with patrons, notables and chiefs representing particular interests.

In this context the usage of “political” Islam is most appropriate as it defines programs for social, economic and government reform, as well as attempts to form and mobilize constituencies on that basis. This political society references Islam for general ethical and legal guidance, rather than aiming for an Islamic state or deriving strict rules from sacred sources. Additionally, it combines a whole range of strategic actions adopted by subalterns as part of this much less well defined domain of political activity. It is less ideological in differentiating between political movements.
organized around alternative (to both state and civil society) democratic and radical principles, and the strategic and contextually defined “politics of the possible.” In fact, it combines them together to include a seamless domain of negotiation and survival. (vi)

Another aspect to clarify is the intersection between economy and civil society. A renowned civil society theoretician, John Keane, disagrees with the exclusion of the realm of the economy from that of civil society. He argues that satisfaction with the material conditions of life cannot be separated from the realm of civil society. (vii) This is particularly true if we take into consideration the extremely poor economic conditions of the Lebanese Shi’a in the 60’s and how the greatest majority of Shites in those years were politically and economically unrepresented. Shiites’s population growth and urban migration began in Lebanon during the 60’s and culminated during the civil war in the mid-70’s. This population boom placed a heavy pressure on urban social services.

The collapse of the state during the Lebanese civil war caused community mobilization in the Muslim south, where its institutions continue to this day. Thousands from the south moved to the southern suburb of Beirut, building illegal settlements that until the early 2000’s made up 40 percent of the homes in the area. (viii) Where a state is absent or defunct, organized self-help fills the vacuum; when states become more vulnerable enduring and large-scale mobilization develops.

Understanding the relationship between the state and civil society organizations, including politico-religious social welfare providers, requires an understanding of who or what constitutes the state. There is no single state in Lebanon. Rather, each confessional group is either a mini-state within a state or at least controls part of the state apparatus. (ix)

The Harakat al Mahrumeen, founded by Imam Musa al-Sadr (hereafter harakat-Amal) and Hezbollah’s law-enforcement apparatus, fell somewhere between a social movement and a quasi-state with a proper infrastructure of social development. Currently, the Hezbollah and harakat-Amal movements control the suburban municipalities of South Beirut with an impressive welfare apparatus consisting of schools, hospitals, education centers, family associations, etc. Over the last fifteen years the Hezbollah has transformed itself from an extremist group rejecting participation in Lebanese politics to a party with considerable autonomy and political power.

The “Hezbollah model” has become synonymous with a militarily successful, politically astute, and strategically flexible organization. It has managed to garner wide popular support in the Arab world, and is respected for most of its actions and social services. Given its staying power and influence, Hezbollah has been heralded as an exemplary model for others to emulate. How has this social movement turned political party managed to survive and evolve into one of the most influential Islamic organizations over the years? (x)

This reaches to broader questions. What are the mechanisms through which politico-religious social welfare provision garners support for providers, who may cater to a circumscribed portion of the population? Do their actions cement sectarian identities and undercut national state-building efforts or, alternatively, complement and coexist with national identities and institutions? (xi) In societies ostensibly divided along ethnic, religious or other identity-based lines, a shared experience of citizenship is especially critical.

Hezbollah is misrepresented by simplistic stereotypes which typically inform depictions of the organization in the global media. This paper will offer an alternative, more balanced and nuanced
Musa al Sadr: The Voice of the Unspoken Shi’a

Musa al Sadr was born in Qum, Iran, in 1928. The son of an important religious leader he pursued an education in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). Initially he studied at a madrasa in Qum but, one year after his father’s death, he moved to Najaf, Iraq. He first visited Lebanon, which he considered his ancestral home, in 1957. Musa al Sadr was a man of great intelligence and charm at the time of his arrival in Lebanon. He started attracting a wide array of supporters, ranging from middle class Shi’i merchants to disenfranchised youths.

What Musa al Sadr did bring to Lebanon, in addition to his considerable attributes, was the ability to lead and unify a fragmented and victimized community. He reminded his followers that their deprivation need not be fatalistically accepted because, so long as they could speak out through their religion, they could overcome their condition. As he once observed, “Whenever the poor involve themselves in a social revolution it is a confirmation that injustice is not predestined.”

The Shiites resented the fact that although Muslim sects appeared to have surpassed Christian population growth, they had not received the proportionate share of political influence required by Lebanon’s confessional formula. They also decried the disproportionately advanced socio-economic development of the Christian sectors of the capital while Shiite sectors remained neglected.

Imam Musa al Sadr soon transformed religious commemoration into vehicles for building communal solidarity and political consciousness. One of his first significant social acts was to establish a vocational institute in the southern town of Burj al Shimali. As individuals and political parties have done for many years in Lebanon, al-Sadr established charitable organizations through which he could provide services to the Shi’a which the government did not and, at the same time, established him as a benefactor of his community. He did this by expanding existing charitable organizations and by establishing new institutions such as al-Muu’assasa al-Ijtima’iyya (Social Institute) which provided shelter for Tyre’s orphans and destitute. His growing influence through the movement he founded – Harakat al Mahrumeen and its Amal militia – prior to the civil war, gave direction to the political and social awakening of the Shi’a. In addition to giving a voice to the socially and politically alienated population, Musa al Sadr’s success radically reduced the authority and influence of the traditional Shi’i elites.

Previously, clan-based leadership amongst Lebanese Shi’a was the oldest form of community political organization. It emphasized familial loyalty clientelism as the primary means of social ordering. Musa al Sadr represented the beginning of an institutionalized political and social consciousness that addressed issues beyond the immediate purview of traditional Shi’a familial leadership. Musa al Sadr understood extremely well the complexities of the sectarian Lebanese political system and consequently chose the most appropriate means to alter the political and social status quo that so disadvantaged Lebanese Shi’a.

In August 1978 imam Musa al Sadr flew from Beirut to Tripoli to attend ceremonies commemorating the ascent of Muhammar Qaddafi to power in 1969. Soon after his arrival, al Sadr vanished under
circumstances that remain mysterious. Most Amal leaders as well as many historians and analysts believe that the Libyan leader Qaddafi is responsible for his disappearance. While the mystery of Musa al Sadr’s fate remains, his disappearance has been of enormous symbolic importance to Harakat Amal and his persona has been elevated to that of a national martyr for many of Lebanon’s Shi’as. More than thirty years after his disappearance, Musa al Sadr’s pictures still adorn the streets of many Lebanese towns and villages. His success stems from his keen understanding of the importance of the spoken word to motivate the masses, combined with an ability to create institutional framework that would give him (and successive leaders) formal influence in the Lebanese political system.

Along with Musa al Sadr’s disappearance, Israel’s 1978 Israeli’s invasion of Lebanon and the Iranian Revolution greatly contributed to Amal’s renewed popularity. The Khomeinist Revolution not only proved to be an exemplary model for action but also a precise pattern for emulation. The Litani Operation resulted in a mass exodus of Shiites to the suburbs of Beirut, swelling the ranks of impoverished young people around the capital. This exodus generated what Rosemary Sayigh called the hizm al bu’us (“the misery belt”) around Beirut.

Under the leadership of Nabih Berri – imam Musa al Sadr’s less charismatic successor – Amal expanded from an adjunct militia to the Movement of the Deprived: a political reform movement. After the second Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Syrian government, which lacked the means to fight a conventional war against Israel in Lebanon, encouraged the most uncompromising elements in the Shiite community to spearhead a counter-offensive against the new status-quo. Syria encouraged the deployment of several hundred Iranian pasdarans in the Beqaa Valley which it controlled, enabling the Islamic Republic to participate directly in Lebanon’s politics. During the same period, an internal split occurred inside Amal’s ranks and, in the second half of 1982, Ayatollah Mohtashemi – the Islamic Republic’s ambassador to Damascus – brought together various Shiite groups and clerics under the single banner of an organization which was named Hezbollah (party of God).

An analytical account on the formation and first years of Hezbollah and its politics is beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless, it should be noted that throughout the 80’s and early 90’s the party of God operated as an agent for the growing radicalization of the Shiite community and as a tool for the Iranian policy. What is strictly pertinent to say is that – with the devastations of the civil war and the Israeli war – within the community, a major charitable program was set in motion with the general logistical and financial support of Tehran (whereas Amal was economically supported by Syria). Aid was distributed to the young urban poor through a network of religious clerics affiliated with Hezbollah, blending the social needs of the disenfranchised with the political interests of Syria and Iran on Lebanon.

Today, Amal is still a rather powerful party which provides various services to its supporters including schools, clinics and hospitals. However, in general, it has much less impact on Lebanese society than Hezbollah. While Amal lacks a benefactor such as Iran, Nabih Berri, a well placed member of the Lebanese political system, is an important source of ‘government’ funds. Amal is losing ground in the Shi’a community because it is perceived as corrupt and as having adapted to the Lebanese clientelist system. While Amal’s social activities are perceived to be top-down forms of political patronage, Hezbollah has a reputation for being an exception. The party not only
has an anti-clientelist and anti-sectarian program on paper\textsuperscript{(xxxii)}, but also emerges as a model of active citizenship and voluntarism in practice.

**Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah: Oracle and Legacy**

During Lebanon’s civil war another important figure, the prominent Shiite marja Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah (1935-2010) emerged. He spoke about the necessity of creating a dawlat al-insan, or “human state,” that would provide the resources for people to help themselves and one another. Coming from a Lebanese family, but born in Najaf (Iraq), Fadlallah returned to Lebanon in 1952. Over the following decades, in addition to intense academic activity, Fadlallah also founded several Islamic religious schools and established the Jam`iyyat al Mabarrat al Khairiyah\textsuperscript{(xxxiii)} (The Society for the Benevolent Charity), a public library, and a women’s cultural center. In addition to the Mabarrat Association, at the heart of Fadlallah’s infrastructure were also al-Ma’had al Shar‘i al Islami (The Islamic Legal Institute) and the Usrat al Ta‘akhi (The Fraternal Society). The Society re-established its husainiya\textsuperscript{(xxxiv)}, opened a religious book-store and a medical clinic.\textsuperscript{(xxxv)}

Fadlallah’s concept has inspired the emergence of many private social-service associations, most of which serve the Shiite community. Some are linked directly to Fadlallah or to other leading sayyids, institutions, and parties, notably including the Musa al Sadr Foundation, the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council, the Amal movement, and Hezbollah. Sometimes these associations are built by families. However, more commonly, they are funded by municipalities or benevolent trusts (awqaf) which are often important centers for associational life; in smaller villages they are often the only site for social assistance.\textsuperscript{(xxxvi)}

Fadlallah’s philanthropy coexisted with his extensive intellectual and political activities. Besides its affiliated mosque, the Society, thanks to its orphanage and boarding school, provided for the pressing needs of some of the most underprivileged and vulnerable segments of society. During the establishment of the charitable society, Lebanon also witnessed the formation of al Ittihad al Lubnani lil Talibah al Muslimeen (The Lebanese Federation of Muslim Students). The Student Federation employed a variety of means to disseminate its ideas, ranging from the organization of periodical conferences and seminars to weekly lecture series and regular discussion circles at the federation’s headquarters.\textsuperscript{(xxxvii)}

Fadlallah’s rich complex of institutions today includes gas stations, a publishing house, a photocopy store, book-stores, gadget-stores, libraries, many orphanages, a restaurant, a leisure center, a factory for halal foods, and a computer store. Individual donations include: alms (zakat) such as gifts of food for the poor; Ramadan gifts, khums (a fifth of one yearly income after meeting living expenses), half of which is paid to one’s marja or wakil and the other half to a descendant of the prophet or sayyid; and ad hoc donations by the faithful (sadaqat). Respected jam`iyya are often authorized by several marjai’is to collect donations on their behalf. It is not unusual for as much as two million dollars to be collected on a single night during Ramadan.\textsuperscript{(xxxviii)}

Even though Fadlallah always rejected the media’s claims that he was the oracle and spiritual leader of Hezbollah, after his death the party’s television channel al Manar \textsuperscript{(xxxix)} reported that he
had at least “inspired the leaders” of the group. It added that “from the pulpit of the Imam Rida mosque in the Bir al-Abd neighborhood, Fadlallah’s sermons gave shape to the political currents among mainly the Muslim Shiite sect of Lebanon, from the latter half of the 1980’s till the last days of his life.” Even though Hezbollah’s official spiritual guide had always been imam Khomeini, Fadlallah’s opinions were very much taken into consideration by the party of God.

Hezbollah as Welfare Organization

Why is Lebanon an appropriate case for studying how private social welfare provision affects national integration in divided societies? First, politico-religious providers from a wide variety of religious communities are well established in Lebanon because of the historical development of sectarianism under the Ottomans. Additionally, Lebanon has a long-history of laissez faire capitalism, which hindered the rise of a developed national social welfare system. Finally, Lebanon’s multiple civil wars created a deeply divided society. During the ostensibly sectarian civil wars, which lasted from 1975 to 1990, many domestic sectarian organizations emerged or stepped in to provide basic social services. These organizations have lasting legacies for post-conflict social welfare provision. Even in developed welfare states, religious and ethnic organizations play an important role in social service provision. However, what is the linkage between social welfare and ethnic politics in a divided society with “weak” state institutions? A quick glance at the previous chapter partially answers this question, but - interestingly for Lebanon -what makes Hezbollah unique is the scope and range of the social and public services that it provides compared to other parties in Lebanon and religious-based organizations in the region.

As a result of the administrative and service gaps created by fierce fighting during the civil war, militia leaders had to create mini-public administrations in areas under their control. These handled essential tasks such as electricity, road repairs as well as the provision of educational and health services. The factors which determined the shape and expansion of these mini-administrations were the strategic location of areas as well as the extent of the human resources available. Hezbollah’s very first welfare provisions were mainly aimed at supporting the needs of the mujahiddeen fighting the Israeli army in the south and their families. Gradually those services expanded and extended to all needy civilians in areas under the party of God’s influence. But what differentiated Hezbollah from its Christian, Druze and Shiite’s counterpart militia Amal was the way the party of God was able to fund the welfare services it provided. Whereas the other groups had to rely mainly on government resources, Hezbollah’s incomes came directly from Iran, namely from Iranian institutions called bunyads – foundations run by the clergy, whose funds are used to finance Iran’s charitable activities abroad. The reason why Hezbollah’s social services differed so evidently from those supplied by the other militias is because the needs of the Shi’a community exceeded that of other Lebanese communities. Shiites in Lebanon were historically neglected in terms of basic infrastructures, organizations and institutions such as schools and hospitals. The civil war, two Israeli invasions, the intra-Shiite conflict between Hezbollah and its counterpart Amal further destroyed already heavily deteriorated infrastructures. At the end of the Civil War, Hezbollah leaders found themselves responsible for the half million or so inhabitants living in destroyed neighborhoods without electricity or water and a serious social service crisis; as thousands of displaced families were migrating towards Beirut’s suburbs.
The spatial dimensions of Hezbollah's political action are important to understand, as they reveal the strategies which the party of God uses to inscribe itself within the social and cultural environment from which it stems. For the greatest majority of Lebanese Shi’a, resistance is not only military but also social and cultural. In the Dahiyeh, the religious discourse takes a physical and spatial form: it becomes apolitical and identity-based territory, a place where society, space and politics are intertwined, negotiated and produced.

Hezbollah’s Makeover in Dahiyeh

Following the signature of the Ta’if agreement, Hezbollah underwent major changes, despite significant rivalries within the party. Its leadership decided to integrate into the national political system and run in the 1992 political elections. The party of God became “Lebanonized,” and slowly opened up to others, increasingly tolerating diversity that it had previously repressed. Yet, unlike any of the other Islamic movements in the Middle East, Hezbollah uses its good works as a means of underlining and enhancing its legitimacy as a bona fide Lebanese political party rather than as a means of challenging Lebanon’s pluralist system.

Hezbollah was responsible for controlling the severe health hazard that threatened the Dahiyeh area in the late 1980’s. Daily collectors started removing mountains of garbage, replacing a basic governmental function in several municipalities. This went on for five years until the Lebanese Sanitation Department started functioning again. However, it is important to point out that Hezbollah still trucks out some 300 tons of garbage a day from Dahiyeh and treats it with insecticides to supplement the government’s lack of adequate service. With 110 water tanks distributed across Beirut’s southern suburbs, the party also makes drinking water available to areas not endowed with such a public service. Three hundred thousand liters of water, available daily via mobile cisterns, reach 15,000 families. This service has been running free of charge since March 1990.

Hezbollah also concerned itself with agricultural activities through provision of agricultural credit, distribution of tractors, fertilizers, herbicides, transfer of knowledge for honey production and other cultivation, and setup of guidance and piloting centers. As Hezbollah insider Naim Qassem points out: “attention was also directed at vocational training, providing villages with water, electricity and sewage utilities, working towards the creation of educational institutions, cultural clubs, mosques and homes for needy families or martyrs’ relations.”

Nonetheless, Hezbollah’s Dahiyeh is not a place of exclusivity. People go to the Dahiyeh to buy food, visit family and friends, go to a doctor, and to purchase clothing and furniture. These people usually perceive the area as a rather ordinary neighborhood, similar to any other heavily populated area in Beirut. They do not see it as “Hezbollah’s land,” but as a more diverse, albeit chaotic, place. Furthermore, Dahiyeh is not necessarily synonymous of integralism and backwardness. Veiled women walk hand in hand with their unveiled counterparts and a rather visible Christian church lies within a few miles of M. H. Fadlallah’s offices and the mosque where the cleric used to deliver his sermons each Friday. Yet, for most, the southern suburb is simply a place one enters to meet Hezbollah’s members. Space is décor, background.
Hezbollah’s Social Activities: Religious Ethos and Political Resources

Many of Hezbollah’s social organizations are directly linked to the party’s formal leadership. The party exercises its authority on these organizations by appointing directors and managers, recruiting social workers or by simply imposing the associations’ direction. An example of these associations is the Philanthropic and Social Martyrs’ Institution (Shahid Association) which takes care of 1,384 families of martyrs from the Israeli invasions. It attends to 684 spouses, 1,215 children and 1,596 parents. A program of joint social responsibility ensures the availability of housing, education, clothing, health services and various other needs in addition to active participation in job placement once children complete their education. The association also monitored and assisted the families of 276 prisoners of war. It founded the Greatest Prophet Hospital as well as the Shaheed Educational Forum.

Even though Naim Qassem describes these organizations as being financially, operationally and managerially independent from the party, Hezbollah’s promotions documents present these organizations as supplementary to their service institutions (mu’assasat al-khidma). The same organizations support the party by adorning their leaflets with Imam Khomeini’s image and displaying posters portraying the martyr’s pictures on the association’s walls. Mona Fawaz counted about 15 such associations in southern Beirut. They are regularly registered at Widharat al-Dakhiliyah (Home Office) as “charitable NGOs.” These organizations are strictly interdependent and their administrators alternate their work within those NGOs and the Jihad al-Bina Development Association, the al-Manar Hezbollah’s TV channel and the Martyr’s Association.

As we have already pointed out, the Lebanese state does not provide enough social services to its citizens and each community in Lebanon has developed its own system of social safety nets. Hezbollah’s social institutions, however, are the most respected and efficient and stand out both quantitatively and qualitatively with respect to those organized by other communitarian parties or movements. Even though Hezbollah’s array of social services tends to be located in predominantly Shi’a areas, they are open to anyone requesting help regardless of their political views or religion. Many of Hezbollah’s social institutions were initially funded by Iran or are Lebanese branches of Iranian organizations. This is true of the Martyrs Association, which was created in 1982 by Khomeini and operates as a sister organization to an Iranian organization with the same name. The Islamic Charity Emdad (ICEC) was created in 1987 with Iranian financial support but today depends heavily on volunteer labor.

Along with the Shaheed Association, Hezbollah started the Emdad Committee for Islamic Charity to alleviate social hardship caused by the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. In only a few years, it was active throughout all of Lebanon. It established 9 branches, 5 schools and two care centers for handicapped children. The major objective of this association is to support and help families with no supporter or breadwinner. These families include those with a father who died, is detained, missing or suffers from a chronic disease. Families with social problems (divorce, physically handicapped or impoverished) can benefit from its services. The main condition to be included in its support program is the lack of any type of financial support. During times of war
and displacement, all families will be helped regardless of their religious or political status.\(^{(lviii)}\) The association provides services in the following domains: Financial aid, donations in kind,\(^{(lxi)}\) health care, education, recreation, and income generating programs. The social welfare and guidance program of the Emdad Committee Association also provides a social custody program to care for the families of prisoners and drug addicts. This program is looking after 40 children from such families. It provides for their education as well as their psychological and social support.\(^{(lx)}\)

The Jihad al Bina (“Effort for the Reconstruction”) Developmental Association is an umbrella organization encompassing numerous sub-committees and organizations engaged in a variety of activities aimed at developing infrastructure in areas of southern Lebanon. Officially established in 1988, Jihad al Bina initially sought to facilitate reconstruction amid the devastation of the sixteen-year Lebanese civil war.\(^{(lx)}\) Also known as the Relief Committee (RC), Jihad al Bina currently administers and funds a variety of social welfare and charitable activities. It displays a high degree of institutional development: in the Dahiyeh district the infrastructural and social welfare capabilities rival those provided by the Lebanese state. Additionally, Jihad al Bina encompasses numerous organizations devoted to improving medical services. Jihad al Bina also administers and funds primary, secondary and vocational schools in addition to participating in financial sectors such as financing micro-loans aimed at increasing agricultural development in those regions devastated by the civil war. Following the 2006 conflict with Israel, with nearly twenty years of experience in disaster management, Jihad al Bina was busy preparing for post-conflict relief even as Hezbollah’s military wing continued to battle Israeli forces in south Lebanon. The speed with which Jihad al Bina began assessing war damage and distributing funds spurred something of an “aid race.”\(^{(lxii)}\)

During the July 2006 war with Israel, when there was no running water in Beirut, Hezbollah was providing supplies around the city. People in south Beirut see Hezbollah as a political movement and a social service provider as much as it is a militia.

Hezbollah’s Islamic Health Committee\(^{(lxiii)}\) is another organ directly affiliated with the social services network. The Islamic Health Organization (IHO) manages nine health centers, sixteen fixed and three mobile infirmaries catering to fifty-one villages. Three centers alone have treated 111,077 cases since 2001, provided free medication and free health services to eighty-eight schools, and continue to provide regular vaccinations, in addition to launching promotions against smoking and disease-prevention awareness campaigns.\(^{(lxiv)}\) Provision of health services is heavily dependent on religious communities and political organizations. Most providers are either major institutions affiliated with medical schools or religious groups, most of which have hospitals or clinics. Over 100 hospitals exist in Lebanon, the majority of which are owned by physicians and are for-profit entities.\(^{(lxv)}\) Additionally, because of the indirect method of public financing of healthcare system, the population generally does not recognize the importance of state contributions to the operation of the healthcare system. State spending on health has increased since the war. At the same time, government financing reinforces rather than displaces private organizations.\(^{(lxvi)}\) As such, the impetus for the creation of community-based health centers comes from local districts, municipalities and, especially, non-governmental organizations and politico-religious organizations. The Rasul al A’zzam Hospital\(^{(lxvii)}\) located in Bourj al Barajneh in the southern suburbs of Beirut was established in the 1980s with financial assistance from Iran’s Martyr’s Foundation (Bonyad-I Shahid). Because funding from Iran has been greatly reduced, hospital administrator Hajj Mohammad Hijazi told “RFE/RL Iran Report”\(^{(lxviii)}\) that the hospital must rely on earned income and assistance from the
local al-Shaheed Organization. According to Hijazi, the hospital provides outpatient care for 5,000 people per month and emergency services for another 3,000 per month. He said patients of all faiths – Shi’a, Sunni, or Christian – are attracted by the low cost of care (about $10 per clinic visit).

This brings us to the question of whom do politico-religious providers target. A rather simplistic assumption is that such institutions target primarily the needy, lower middle-class and the underprivileged. Not to mention the dominant perception that politico-religious social welfare institutions only serve members of their own faith or political group. Yet, evidence seems to be a bit more complicated and it is common to see confessional and political groups service providers contend with the opposing groups’ offer.

As for those who benefit from medical services from politico-religious organizations such as those offered by Hezbollah, my personal twelve-year intermittent experience in Lebanon leads me to believe that religious organizations cater to beneficiaries inside and outside of the same religious group. Even though sectarian providers tend to locate their facilities in areas with large concentrations of co-religionists (who constitute their primary clientele) and even though Hezbollah targets Lebanese Shiites, doctors at Rasul al A’zzam hospital are more than willing to offer their services to non-Shi’a as well.

The directors of politico-religious social welfare institutions in Lebanon almost universally deny that they pursue political goals through social welfare activities. However, in reality, political and religious messages are prevalent in institutions run by all the major politico-religious organizations in the form of religious symbols or photos of the leaders of sectarian groups and political parties. This is the case of Hezbollah/Amal-run or affiliated organizations; images of imam Khomeini, Musa al Sadr, Hasan Nasrallah and other Shi’a symbolic figures are overtly displayed in their hospitals, shops, schools, offices etc. Likewise, Rafiq Hariri and his son Saad adorn many Sunni-related institutions and the Farah Social Foundation – a self-proclaimed indigenous development NGO – has photographs of Walid Jumblatt throughout the waiting room and administrative offices.

On the subject of health-care related associations, the Hezbollah-run al Jarha (Wounded) Association needs to be mentioned. Established in 1989, the organization is located in Beirut’s southern suburbs and cares for over 3,000 men, women and children. Eighty percent of the men the association assists were resistance fighters. The rest were wounded during the civil war or by Israeli attacks in the South. Once a fighter or civilian is hurt, the association steps in and pays all medical bills, including trips abroad for any needed surgery or therapy.

For those who need homes, the association purchases, furnishes and equips apartments. At times, a nurse or maid is employed. Each wounded person receives a monthly stipend from the association. The cash comes from a charity in Iran and individual contributions and mostly from the khoms.

Hezbollah also education to the needy, through ‘educational mobilization’, which has provided educational support to thousands of students (part of which was in the form of books and stationary, in addition to assisting with the school fees, scholarships and grants).
Institutionally very similar to al Rasul al A’zzam is the al Mahdi School. It was established by Hezbollah but is now funded and managed by another non-governmental organization, the Islamic Institution for Education and Teaching. The school is one of nine al Mahdi institutions in Lebanon. There also is one in Qom, Iran. Some of the schools, such as the two in Beirut, are private while those in the south and in the Beqaa Valley are funded partly by the government and partly with fees paid by students. Lebanese public education is scarce and abysmal in terms of quality. Therefore, parents and students are increasingly looking to private, sectarian institutions like the school in Dahiyeh, where the overall quality of education at the elementary and secondary levels exceeds that in the public school system. In some schools, academic quality increases with religious and political influence. For example, the al Mahdi School in Baalbek, opened in 1985 for kindergarten through third grade with fewer than 200 students enrolled at the time. It has since expanded to include all levels through grade 12, with total enrolment now exceeding 1,700 students. There are currently five kindergarten classes, with a sixth being added in the upcoming school year. Religion is a big part in these schools.

The imam al Mahdi Scouts are a Hezbollah youth movement which was established in May 1985 after the IDF withdrew from the security zone in south Lebanon. It has branches in the Shi’ite communities of Beirut, the Beqaa Valley and south Lebanon. It received a permit for its activities from the Lebanese ministry of education in September 1992, and is currently associated with the Federation of Lebanese Scouts. There are approximately 42,000 male and female imam al Mahdi scouts between the ages of 8-16 organized into 499 groups.

How does Hezbollah intertwine religious ethos and political mobilization in contemporary Lebanon? When analyzing Hezbollah, it is always necessary to consider the complex deployment of forces and services which are inextricably related to what the party of God represents; a political party with a military wing. The social, military and political resistance discourse plays a central role in providing legitimacy to Hezbollah. Nevertheless, it is important to contextualize these dynamics in the context of Lebanese neoliberalism; the notion of public good is poorly supported by a fragile State. In other words, Hezbollah’s social history is largely a product of Lebanon’s economic background and heritage. A long history of social insecurity created consolidated forms of clientelism. As a result, Hezbollah’s social activities feature consolidated forms of patronage: they create concrete job opportunities, they consolidate the beneficiaries’ gratitude towards the party and they generate in their supporters the belief that they are carrying out an ethical, political and social mission.
Afterword

Lebanon is case-study for examining how politico-religious social welfare provision affects national integration in divided societies. In such contexts, mobilization of supporters outside of electoral competition may be an important means of demonstrating political influence and pressing political demands. When multiple parties and organizations compete for supporters in a given community, political groups have even more incentive to cater to the welfare needs of potential core supporters. In Lebanon, two explicitly political organizations, Hezbollah and Amal, vie for representation and leadership of Lebanese Shiites. However, other groups, including the Mabarrat organization linked to Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, the Imam Musa Al-Sadr Foundation and, to some degree, the Shi’a Higher Council, focus on social activities with no apparent political goals. In exchange for services, politico-religious providers expect political support from beneficiaries through voting, volunteering in political parties or organizations, or generating community support for political organizations and parties affiliated with service providers.

However, services offered by a politico-religious organization such as Hezbollah are not necessarily available only to Shi’a beneficiaries. In this way, and a number of others, Hezbollah is very different from similar political organizations. The first peculiarity of Hezbollah is its early awareness of the need to accommodate a pluralistic society. The second is that Hezbollah benefits from the political and material support of Iran, and also from the rich intellectual background of contemporary revolutionary Shi’ism. The third difference is that, as it is first and foremost a nationalist resistance movement, Hezbollah finds support from a broader non-Islamist and, non-Shi’a constituency.

From the early Musa al-Sadr social movement – al Harakat-al Mahrumeen – to the emergence of Amal and then Hezbollah in the 1980’s, the party of God transformed itself from a radical movement into a political party with representation in the Lebanese government and a massive welfare system. Hezbollah has been a major provider of social services, education, hospitals, and agricultural services for thousands of Lebanese. It also operates an environmental department, a television channel, services which help refugees to find shelters during crises and an extensive social assistance program. Medical care is also cheaper than in most of the country’s private hospitals and free for Hezbollah members. The party of God is filling the service-vacuum created by Lebanon’s weak central governmental and together with Amal is busily working to gain exclusivity for the Shiite leadership.

I expect this short analysis of the grassroots appeal of Hezbollah to partially attack the stereotype of Lebanese Shi’a as a religiously obsessed group with low socio-economic status and a strong political isolation. Results partially suggest that Hezbollah is not exclusively the vehicle of radical Shiites. Rather, other factors underlie its organizational expansion which have enhanced its influence on the population and which will have important implications for its growth and future direction.
Works Cited


Fawaz Mona (2004), ONG islamique dans le banlieu sud de Beyrouth, in Ben Nefissa S., Abd al-Fattah N., Hanafi S., Milani C., ONG et governance dans le monde arabe, Paris, Karthala/CEDEJ.


Harik Judith Palmer (1996), Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications of Popular


Korany Bahgat (2010), The Changing Middle East. A New Look at Regional Dynamics, Cairo and New York, American University in Cairo Press.


i. “Centre for Civil Society,” London School of Economics. http://www2.lse.ac.uk/CCS/home.aspx


xi. National and religious, regional or other non-national identities are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Lisa Wedeen, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power and Performance in Yemen, [London: University of Chicago Press, 2010]).


xiii. Ibid.


xv. As a result of a census taken in 1932, the 1943 National Pact gave the Maronite Christians the permanent presidency of the Republic and the Sunni Muslim the presidency of the Council of Ministers. The Shiites had to be content with the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies.


xxiv. Nabih Berri was elected in 1979.


xxxiii. Non-profit Islamic organization, providing academic and vocational education mainly for orphans, deaf and blind, orphanages, schools, institutions, medical centers, and other activities (http://www.mabarrat.org.lb/).

xxxiv. Congregatation hall for Shi’a ritual ceremonies, especially those associated with the remembrance of Muharram. The name comes from Husayn ibn ‘Ali, the grandson of Prophet Muhammad. Hussain was killed by Yazid I in Karbala (Iraq) over 1,300 years ago. Shi’a still mourn the death of Hussain every year on the day of ‘Ashura in husainyyas all over the world. A husainiyya is different from a mosque in that it is made mainly for gatherings for Muharram in the mourning of Hussain ibn ‘Ali, and may not necessarily hold prayer in jumaa’at or Friday Prayer unless there is a gathering at the same time, where they would make a jumaa’at at the time of prayer.


xxxvii. Sankari (2005), 167.

xxxviii. Ibid


xlv. J. Harik (2005), 82.

xlvi. Ibid. 83.


xlviii. Ibid.

xlix. Ibid. 15.


li. Ibid. 83.


lvi. Ibid. 447.

lvii. In 2006 only 90 employees of Emdad were paid out of a total of 440. Lara Deeb, An Enchanted Modern:


lix. 60 Food assistance according to a yearly plan (3 to 4 times per year), household necessities (carpets, refrigerator,

lx. kitchen utensils, blankets, mattresses, etc.), clothes for children according to needs, medicines and other necessary medical products, orthopedics for handicapped, stationary and school books.


lxiv. N. Qassem (2005), 84.


lxvi. Ibid


lxix. Many sources claim that the hospital services and facilities are provided totally free of charge to the people directly affiliated with Hezbollah.

lxxi. Ibid
lxxiii. N. Qassem (2005), 84.
lxxvii. Ibid. 12.
lxxviii. Ibid.
lxxix. D. Pioppi (2010), 70.
Philanthropy in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Lifestyle and Liberty in the Name of Piety and Islam

Nora Derbal

Nora Derbal is a PhD candidate at the Berlin Graduate School Muslim Cultures and Societies on trans-local benevolent engagement and international Muslim foundations.
Philanthropy in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
*Lifestyle and Liberty in the Name of Piety and Islam*

While Saudi philanthropy is usually characterized as a tool for terrorism, there is little awareness outside of the Kingdom about the vibrant culture of benevolent giving and community support that shapes the every-day life of many Saudis. This frequently overlooked activism sheds new light on the debate about civil society in Saudi Arabia. Within the philanthropic field lies great potential for participation and civic engagement. Hence, it seems surprising that in the context of Saudi Arabia, charity as a social phenomenon is largely ignored by cultural, social or political sciences.

**Current State of Research**

Numerous studies point to the many benevolent initiatives of the Kingdom. Yet only the political scientist Amelie Le Renard has begun the systematic examination of this trend. In her essay “Pauvreté et Charité en Arabie Saoudite” (2008), Le Renard sheds light on the practical experience of benevolent women’s associations (jam‘iyat khairiyya nisa‘iyya) in Riyadh and develops the thesis that a notorious mixing of welfare state and charity serves as a power-retaining technique for the ruling elite. In the same year (2008) Karim Shalaby adds to the discussion a survey of the main institutionalized forms of charity in Saudi Arabia. In his essay he highlights the extremely restrictive, un-transparent nature of the benevolent sector and notes that there is no statistically firm data on the amount of aid and the number of charitable initiatives for the country as a whole. Caroline Montagu (2010) adds her remarks on the deficient state of research on charitable initiatives in Saudi Arabia. At the same time her essay sheds light on the connection between the voluntary sector and the ruling Al Sa‘ud family. Montagu highlights the relevance of the topic by showing how voluntary social involvement in Saudi Arabia takes on the shape of an active and lively civil society.

Montagu’s essay takes a stand opposite the prevailing academic opinion which characterizes Saudi Arabia as an autocratic, absolute monarchy where democratic institutions, freedom of expression, political groups and hence civil society are heavily circumscribed or rather non-existent. Although Montagu’s thesis has been taken up as fairly stimulating and thought-provoking, it is nonetheless problematic in several aspects concerning the philanthropic field. Montagu mistakenly bases her paper on the assumption that there is no academic work by Saudis on civil society in the Kingdom. Her study starts with a Nortonian definition of civil society: “a mélange of associations, clubs, guilds, syndicates, federations, unions, parties and groups come together to provide a buffer between state and citizen. … the functioning of civil society is literally and plainly at the heart of participant political systems.” This definition is overthrown a few lines later in favor of a less “hard-edged definition”, as to “more fluid processes of traditional interaction” or any “formal and informal initiatives in society which have a direct bearing on the political level” or finally simply “rates of activism”. The reader is left with no clear idea of the central concept of her study. This vague idea of civil society is then applied to the charitable attitude of Saudis with little consideration on the cultural relativism of applying a concept that was developed in and reflects a European context, to the Middle East. Without differentiating much, Montagu wrongly describes the most diverse forms of ‘benevolent’ associations (welfare associations and charity organizations, but also state institutions such as the National Dialog, private schools and colleges,
hospitals and the chambers of commerce) as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or not-for-profit organizations (NPOs) with an intrinsic political ambition in order to prove her thesis that “Saudi Arabia has a thriving civil society.” (ix) The author refers to a few, contradictory examples to support her thesis. For example, she introduces Al-Birr Society first as an NGO and criticizes that “ignorance exists in the West about the prevalence of domestic non-governmental organizations (NGOs)” (x). Later on she admits that actually “Al-Birr is almost part of the government.” (xi)

Unlike Montagu, this study does not start from a theoretical angle but from benevolent practice. The following observations are based on six months of empirical research conducted while I was enrolled as a visiting Masters student at King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz University (KAU) at Jeddah. This paper aims at ‘mapping’ the voluntary sector in Jeddah. It will give an overview of the benevolent field that encompasses the three central forms of institutionalized, not-for-profit philanthropy: the welfare association (jam‘iyya khariyya); the charity organization (mu‘assasa khairiyya); and corporate giving of companies (CSR-initiatives). (xii) The first part of the paper (I.) examines their legal framework in the current political system. It follows an outline of today’s main fields of action, which touches upon the history of these institutions within Saudi society: Who are the major players in the benevolent scene today and whom do they help? The analysis then concentrates on two very prominent actors in the philanthropic field, women (II.) and adolescents (III.). (xiii) This practical approach is placed within the theoretical framework of Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’. (xiv)

I. Overview: Institutionalized Philanthropy in Jeddah

The oldest kind of benevolent institution, which is examined in this paper, is the welfare association (jam‘iyya khariyya). The first welfare association was established in 1964 with the foundation of the Women’s Welfare Association in Jeddah (al-Jam‘iyya an-nisa‘iyya bi-Jidda). The establishment of welfare associations is therefore much older than the second kind of benevolent institution examined in this paper, the mu‘assasa khairiyya, which can be translated as ‘benevolent’ or ‘charity’ organization, of which the first were founded in Jeddah in 2000. Namely these are the Charity Organization of Abu Dawud (Mu‘assasat Abu Dawud al-khairiyya) and the Charity Organization for the Mother of Prince Thamir b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (al-Mu‘assasa al-khairiyya li-walidat al-amir Thamir b. ‘Abd al-Aziz). Today, there are more than 420 welfare associations and 42 charity organizations registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs (Wizarat ash-shu‘un al-ijtima‘iyya, MOSA) in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (xv)

In the province of Mecca (mintaqat Makka), the most populous province in the Kingdom, there are 107 welfare associations registered with MOSA; 22 of these institutions are located in the Jeddah district (muhafathat Jidda). Of these welfare associations, 7 are only-for-women’s associations (jam‘iyyat khairiyya nisa‘iyya). In contrast to the welfare associations, which are mainly located in Mecca, most of the benevolent organizations are situated in Jeddah, the economic capital of the province: the province of Mecca has 22 benevolent organizations under the auspices of MOSA, 15 of which are settled and active in the district Jeddah. (xvi)

Since CSR-initiatives within the context of companies and corporations are not obliged to register with a state ministry, there are no accurate figures on how many businesses are active in community support. (xvii) However, local sources suggest that today every enterprise with a handful of employers carries out CSR at least in its external communication and corporate design. (xviii)
Historically there has always been a strong connection between the merchants (buyut tijariyya) and the communities in Jeddah, with the commercial elite being very active in the politics of the city and community services. Due to the increasing popularity of the term CSR, we find that long-existing charity measures and community services are increasingly referred to as ‘CSR-initiatives’. For example, the all incomes-serving philosophy of Al-Magrabi Hospitals, which was founded in Jeddah in the 1950s, is nowadays labeled as CSR, whereas older self-portrayals talk simply of a vision of “compassionate capitalism.”

The Legal Environment

At first glance, the Saudi Basic Law of Government (an-nizam al-asasi li-l-hukm), seems to explicitly encourage philanthropy: “(§ 27) The state guarantees the rights of the citizen and his family in cases of emergency, illness and disability, and in old age; it supports the system of social security and encourages institutions and individuals to contribute in acts of charity.” However, at the same time, citizens are missing essential rights like freedom of expression or freedom of assembly; human rights that seem to be the basis of any organized benevolent, voluntary or civil action.

All associations and organizations in Saudi Arabia need to be registered with the state and listed by the National Authority for Associations and Civil Organizations or NAA (al-Hai’a al-wataniyya li-l-jam'iyyat wa-l-mu’assasat al-ahliyya). The NAA is a governing state body responsible for developing the civil society sector. This sub-organization of MOSA is directly overseen by the royal family and is responsible for the supervision and evaluation of welfare associations as well as benevolent organizations. At the same time, it sets up the rules and structures that govern these institutions. So, the role of the NAA resembles - at the first glance - that of the Charity Commission in England or the Stiftungsaufsicht in Germany. However, the authority of the NAA goes much further. It has a veto power, which may apply to program development, permissions to receive visitors, or approval of board members. If the activities of the group do not match the vision of the NAA it can dissolve the organization or initiate a fusion with another group.

In its Draft Regulations of Associations and Civil Society Organizations the NAA requires welfare associations (jam'iyyat khairiyya) to have at least 20 founding members of Saudi origin who have not been convicted of a crime against honor or decency. If the NAA approves the association, it receives generous yearly financial support from the National Fund for Supporting Associations ranging from 50 000 to 5 million SRA depending on the nature of its activities and its geographic location. Moreover, material support from the NAA, such as land gifts, technical equipment, dates to be distributed among the poor during the fasting month of Ramadan, or privileged prices for electricity and water, is common. The NAA also dictates financial modalities to the associations: they may collect donations (sadaqat or zakat) and member fees, or set up a trust (waqf) to finance their activities.

A benevolent organization (mu’assasa khairiyya), on the other hand, can be founded by any individual Saudi. However, such organizations have no claim to financial support from the state and are not allowed to collect donations in public. As a result, benevolent organizations are financed solely by the private assets of their founder(s), member fees or endowments (awqaf). This relative self-financing grants organizations a certain liberty and relative autonomy in their activities. For
instance, visitors to welfare associations must first make the effort to receive a visiting permit from MOSA, whereas benevolent organizations may decide themselves whether or not to receive a guest.

Although most benevolent groups are registered with MOSA, there are some associations and organizations registered with other ministries, some of which seem less restrictive than the supervision of MOSA. (xxviii) No figures exist on the total number of organizations registered with other ministries. The practice is most visible in the area of benevolent organizations which specialize in health services. Due to their focus on health-related issues, they are registered with the Ministry of Health rather than MOSA. Prominent examples are the Help Center (Markaz al-‘Aun) and the Home Health Care Organization (al-Mu’assasa al-khairiyya al-wataniyya li-ar-ri’aya as-sihhiyya al-manziliyya). One explanation for this is that the Ministry of Health is one of the few employers in Saudi Arabia that allows men and women to work together in health services with no time-consuming, hard-to-get special permission. The Help Center, which offers a day-care program and vocational training for handicapped persons, openly talks about this advantage. Due to its registration with the Ministry of Health, the institution is allowed to accept handicapped boys and girls in its program. It also benefits from the fact that its employees might be men and women in a mixed environment. This mixed gender setting is a necessary and pragmatic consideration: there is not enough qualified male nursing staff in the country to do without women. (xxxix)

MOSA’s tight supervision of benevolent groups is often framed in the context of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which were financed by the Saudi welfare association Al-Haramain. (xxx) Due to international pressure the Saudi government has since been trying to hinder individual, uncontrolled donations. The influence of the state on benevolent action is increasing: Mosques, for instance, are no longer allowed to put up donation-boxes for collecting zakat, the obligatory religious alms for all Muslims, to support their local welfare associations. (xxxi) Additionally, the collection of donations as part of charity campaigns by private entities, such as university groups, is extensively examined and requires the approval of MOSA. (xxxii)

In 1995 the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), together with the Interior Ministry and the commercial banks established regulations in order to hinder money laundering. As a consequence of the increasing threat of regional and international terrorism, these regulations were updated in 2003. The updates specifically targeted the financial activities of benevolent institutions, greatly tightening government control over such activities. Titled Rules Governing Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting Terrorist Financing, (xxxiii) the updated regulations were distributed to all financial institutions of the country with the aim of re-establishing state control over all financial transactions within the philanthropic field.

This creates a burden on philanthropic institutions as it restricts their financial independence. For instance, the regulations deny welfare associations the ownership of a credit or debit card as well as any ability to possess liquid assets. For all benevolent organizations and associations it is forbidden to accept international financial contributions.

In the face of the strict legal environment governing welfare associations and benevolent organizations, CSR-initiatives enjoy the relative freedom of a legal grey zone. There are no outer official limits and regulations imposed on CSR-activities. Therefore, companies and business
corporations possess a unique opportunity for individual and family philanthropy: “an accommodation to and haven from some of the restrictions and risks that philanthropic work entails under the current legal and administrative systems.” (xxxiv) Depending on the size of the business and the emphasis on corporate giving, CSR-initiatives tend to be organized as ‘corporate foundations’, like the very prominent Abdul Lateef Jameel Community Service Programs, or simply as ‘departments within a company’, a path which the large Saudi conglomerate Dallah Albaraka chose “to serve the corporation’s commitment to sustainable development and social change.” (xxxv) Even more often ‘CSR’ is used to describe singular financial donations directed at local welfare associations or benevolent organizations, which carry out the actual philanthropic project. (xxxvi)

In between there are mixed forms between the classic welfare association (jam’iyya khairiyya) and the classic charity organization (mu’assasa khairiyya) and the most recent phenomenon of CSR-initiatives. For instance, some benevolent organizations, founded by influential business families, are logistically and financially bound to corporations and not to state ministries. (xxxvii) Hence, they enjoy the relative legal freedom of a CSR-project, while offering the fixed structures of a benevolent organization and its independence from market-economy-structures.

Today’s Fields of Action: A Renaissance of Giving

Empirical research into the philanthropic sector of Jeddah shows that increasingly more and more Saudis ‘are doing good deeds.’ The enormous increase in benevolent work is remarkable: since 2005, as many new welfare associations (jam’iyyat khairiyya) were established as in the previous forty years. (xxxviii) The institutional continuity that characterizes women’s associations (jam’iyyat khairiyya nisa’iyya) and the considerable material, financial and social assistance that these women have been offering over half a century to women in need seems noteworthy. By contrast CSR is a very young social concept whose virtues are intensely debated in Saudi society. (xxxix)

In an environment of expanding volunteerism, it is surprising to find that the fields of action of benevolent groups are expanding only slowly. So far most of the benefits are directed towards certain disadvantaged groups of society: orphans, the poor, the old, widows and divorcees and handicapped persons. Of the 16 welfare associations in Jeddah, 7 provide services to these marginalized groups. Jeddah businesses have recently added a focus on youth development programs by offering internships and vocational training, most notably to female students. (x) Following the national, state-sponsored Saudization-strategy, some businesses see their corporate social responsibility fulfilled by employing and training young Saudi nationals. (xi)

The focus on solely supporting socially disadvantaged groups - and not the engaging in other areas such as sport or cultural activities, music and science, which are important areas in the international philanthropic scene - appears to stem from the religious tradition of Islam. On numerous occasions the Koran calls for giving to the poor (al-fuqara’) and helping the people in need (al-masakin), but also to the indebted (al-gharamin) and to those who have fallen unintentionally into dependence or slavery. (xii) The correlation between the recipients of Saudi benevolent practice and the legitimate recipients stipulated within the Islamic tradition is telling of the motivation behind this focused giving.

The Saudi state exercises great influence over criteria defining those who are eligible to receive the services of benevolent institutions. Welfare associations in particular face strict regulations...
concerning who they may help. While foreigners used to make up a high percentage of the people receiving aid, since 2004 Saudi nationality is a nearly universal state-criterion for eligibility. However, visiting orphanages the outer appearance of some children suggests to the visitor that non-Saudi or half-Saudi children are sometimes taken in by these institutions although this is not openly discussed. This suggests an exception to the rule of nationality in some cases. Despite this, plenty of other examples exist where the autonomy and degree of self-decision-making of the benevolent institution depends to a great extent on the financial and/or political influence of the founder(s) or patron(s) of the organization or association. Furthermore, the broad field of CSR-initiatives offers the financially independent, influential business (families) the opportunity to become active without government restrictions.

The aid programs of charitable organizations are very diverse and go much further than to simply hand out a benefit payment or social security (ad-daman al-ijtima‘i). The activities mostly target symptoms of poverty, for example, through the allocation of foodstuff or donated used clothing. It seems, however, that a trend emerges towards more strategic help directed at long-term capacity development. This is indicated for instance by the Welfare Association of Modesty (Jam‘iyat ikfta‘ al-khairiya), the youngest women’s association in Jeddah. Founded in 1998, this is the only women’s association in the city which does not serve the socially disadvantaged. Instead, Iktifa’ targets poverty through the strategic collection of data in poor neighborhoods. This data is used to ascertain the root causes of poverty and financial dependence. Iktifa’ then shares its findings with collaborating classical welfare groups in order to develop best-practice methods. Other examples of this sustainable trend are the Welfare Association of Handicraft (Jam‘iyat al-aiyadi al-hirfiyya al-khairiya), which offers vocational training to the unemployed and the conservative approach of the Charitable Welfare Association to Help Young People to Marriage and Focus on Family (al-Jam‘iya al-khairiya li-musa‘adat ash-shabab ‘ala az-zawaj wa-at-taujiyya [sic! recte taujih] al-usari), which sees the roots of poverty in a dysfunctional Islamic society. These examples also prove the tendency towards an increasing specialization of services, in contrast to the older institutions which try to help whoever knocks at their door in need.

Furthermore, empirical research sheds light on the surprising fact that a great deal of benevolent action in Jeddah - especially by newer initiatives - takes place in the arena of healthcare. Out of 16 welfare associations in Jeddah, 8 are committed to health services. The discussion of this strong medical orientation is complicated: A national comparison of the profiles of welfare associations and charitable organizations is essential in order to assess whether this phenomenon is a specific feature of the city Jeddah or a national trend. From a historical perspective, an expansion of existing quarantine and health stations, and the presence of special medical facilities is conceivable as a result of Jeddah’s function as a pilgrim’s harbor. A special structure of need within the urban population of Jeddah cannot, however, be ruled out.

From a broader socio-political perspective, it would also be conceivable that the increasing philanthropic activity in the medical field correlates with a nationwide trend towards the privatization of health services. For the catalyst of this seems to be, amongst other things, the defective condition of the state-provided social health care.

The Saudi government appears to be unable to guarantee free medical care which meets the needs of the population. A steady demographic pressure, rising unemployment and an unwanted
dependence of the state budget on oil revenues has increasingly forced the government to push for a diversification of the economy and privatization of public welfare. The Kingdom is nowadays known for its free, though bad medical services, which is why more and more wealthy Saudis seek treatment abroad. It is logical, given this situation, that the philanthropic field will fulfill the growing needs of those who are unable to find adequate medical care in the public healthcare system or seek better treatment abroad. (xlviii)

The results of this mapping-approach of the philanthropic field of Jeddah can also be read in reverse: in what areas are the philanthropic initiatives of Jeddah not active? As noted before, philanthropic initiatives tend to be least active in areas which are traditionally valued by international philanthropy such as: sports, science and culture. (xlix) In the long run though, CSR initiatives seem to strive towards these areas, as the focus on youth and educational assistance, or financial support for the recently established King ‘Abdallah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) suggests. Moreover, in a national comparison, this approach can already be found in the Saudi capital of Riyadh, where the King Faisal Foundation offers one of the most excellent research centers and library in the Kingdom. (li) Perhaps this indicates that, in the future, museums and libraries will be built through philanthropic initiatives in Jeddah.

Especially for Saudi Arabia, it is also remarkable that the institutions described here do not explicitly engage in the religious sphere. In other Muslim countries, the philanthropic commitment of Muslims is described as penetrated by da’wa, (Islamic precepts and proselytizing). (li) The context of a religious culture of giving in which the legitimate recipient of charity is defined in the Koran to be - in addition to the poor and needy - those who “should be won (for the cause of Islam) (al-mu’allafat qulubuhum)” and those “in holy war (on Allah’s way) (fi sabil Allah)” raises some expectation of a missionary approach. (lii) This not-explicitly-religious giving could be the result of the Saudi state’s monopoly on religion which discourages private religious efforts by philanthropists. An additional explanation for this may lie in the fact that the religious sphere in Saudi Arabia is already seized by seemingly philanthropic state-institutions such as the omnipresent International Organization for Memorizing the Holy Qur’an or the pious religious endowments (awqaf). Additionally, officially every Saudi in the Kingdom is already Muslim by birth and receives a profound knowledge of Islam through state education. Hence, philanthropists in Saudi Arabia might not see a need to offer further services to promote Islam.

**Actors of the Philanthropic Scene**

The following description of the actors of the philanthropic sector is based on four ideal typical benefactors that primarily appear in the benevolent initiatives of Jeddah: Women, adolescents of the upper class, merchants and the royal family. (liii) The presented ‘types of actors’ are ideal constructions which shall help to explain why charity and philanthropy as a social phenomenon is more and more today becoming of increasing relevance. The proposed typology is not a reflection of reality. Rather, it is a guideline which, by bringing together all of the features that characterize one philanthropic type, aims to raise the awareness of the observer about the relationship between the charitable sector and its actors. (liv)

On one hand, philanthropic actors seem to act under the influence of a strong Arab (pre-Islamic) culture of generosity. On the other hand, they are exposed to the strong influence of Islamic tradition...
which appears to penetrate most aspects of life in the Kingdom. The moral imperative to give to the poor and needy is a key component of the Islamic faith. Significantly, the alms tax (zakat) is one of the five pillars of Islam (arkan ad-din). Additionally, in the Saudi philanthropic field there seems to be a surprisingly great knowledge of other religious concepts that promote a culture of giving, among others sadaqa (voluntary alms), waqf (religious trusts), the moral purification through giving or the merit of giving in the afterlife. Moreover, an implicit belief that the poor have a right (haqq) to the gift of the better-off appears to be the illusio or doxa of the philanthropic field in the context of Muslim societies. As an unspoken common belief this religious attitude seems to be at the base of action of all players in this religiously shaped philanthropic field.

The following analysis examines charitable actors against the question of how philanthropy shapes the relationship between the actor and his or her society. Following Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’, the observation of the philanthropic scene as a social space, or in other words ‘philanthropy as a field’, helps to decipher the hidden forces and mechanisms acting between the actors and their social environment. It is important to stress that the dynamics unleashed by the philanthropic field (i.e. the cultural and social capital that can be gained), are not to be understood as the individual and personal motives of the actors for their charitable commitment: “What exists in the social world are relations - not interactions or inter-subjective relations between actors, but objective relations that exist independently of consciousness and will of the individuals.” Since awareness of these unspoken, implicit mechanisms seems only partially available to the benefactors themselves, one should not assume them to be the singular driving force behind philanthropic action. The following analysis aims to bring to light these unconscious and unnoticed motivations.

II. Overview: Institutionalized Philanthropy in Jeddah

The first welfare association founded in Saudi Arabia in 1964 - The Charitable Women’s Association - was a women’s-only-institution. Shortly thereafter, two more women’s welfare associations were founded in 1975 and 1980. This means that women’s associations (al-jam’iyyat al-khairiyya annisa’iyya) are dated much earlier than mixed-gender welfare organizations (al-jam’iyyat al-khairiyya) in the Kingdom. The first official participation of Saudi men in a mixed charitable organization didn’t occur until 1983 with the founding of the Welfare Association of Piety (Jam’iyyat al-birr).

Since 1964 women’s welfare associations have followed the same principle: women help women. So in theory, only women are employed in this type of charitable organization. This means that in the buildings of the institutions there is no dress code for employees as it is else usual in public. During the hours when the associations allocate food to the needy, only poor women enter the buildings, some to receive food for themselves, some to collect for their family. Medical treatment, which is usually offered for free by the women’s associations, is carried out by a woman. The associations’ internal working and training places are only available to women.

The theoretical claim to strict segregation offers Saudi women a remarkably free action space. This is in direct contrast to the social welfare agencies of MOSA and other ministerial institutions where women are usually denied access. Because of the women-only premises within the charities, they are able to direct social assistance (ad-daman al-ijtima’i) directly to female recipients; in contrast to the regular social assistance, which only the male guardian (mahram) of a needy woman receives.
While women’s associations are segregated in theory, in practice it is not possible to impose strict segregation. The female social workers appear with their male drivers at the association and are accompanied through their working day by the facilities’ male drivers. In the buildings they meet security men and housekeepers and they tend to receive physical help from men in the distribution of goods and foodstuff. Due to the educational inequalities that women face in Saudi Arabia, they need male assistance in many legal issues. Finally, when communicating with donors such as owners of restaurants or supermarkets and in the management of the external properties of the welfare association, women interact almost solely with Saudi men.

Yet, women are not only active in female-only welfare associations but participate actively in benevolent organizations and CSR-initiatives too. The international stereotype of a Saudi woman is marked by passivity, oppression and powerlessness, while on the other hand in Western Europe and especially the U.S. - against a background of a long history of philanthropy and charity -women have only recently emerged as influential philanthropists. In contrast, women in the history of the Islamic world have always been present and represented as philanthropists, be it as trustees or benefactors.

The following analysis describes the situation of ‘the Saudi woman’ in consideration of the legal discrimination and strictly enforced segregation faced by Saudi women. Analysis of the officially propagated role model of the ideal Saudi woman shows how the exploitation of women as a category helps to legitimize and stabilize the rule of the royal regime. The official, female role model is not only the basis of a latent discrimination against women, but also the key to why women can be actively involved in the philanthropic field.

**Women in Saudi Society: Facing Male Guardianship and Sex-Segregation**

Although Western media emphasizes that ending forced veiling and the car ban would be important steps for the status of Saudi women, they are far more concerned with the legal immaturity and the powers of their male guardian (mahram) as a crucial initiator for the suppression of the female sex. The Saudi regime deduces the legal basis of male guardianship from an ambiguous Koranic verse (sura 4, verse 34), which states: “Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because God has given the one more [strength] than the other, and because they support them from their means.”

In the political discourse of Saudi Arabia this Koranic passage serves as evidence that in general men are superior to women and, therefore, every woman is dependent on the help, protection and the better discernment of her mahram. In everyday practice, this interpretation means that in all areas of life a Saudi woman needs the consent of her mahram for major decisions: to begin school or university studies, to take up a job, to travel abroad or to go on a plane in her country, to visit a doctor’s office or to get medical examination for her children. Women are also not allowed to sign contracts without the consent of her mahram. Saudi women face tremendous difficulties when attempting to appeal to authorities or courts.

At the same time every-day life of women in Saudi Arabia is characterized by a strict compulsory segregation of the sexes. For the public welfare of the Islamic community and the maintenance of morality, un-related men and women should not encounter in everyday life. Restaurants and
cafes have separate-sex areas for men and women. Similarly, banks, schools and universities, archives and libraries are characterized by their separate women’s sections or campuses. In Saudi Arabia there are shopping centers, gyms and travel agents only for women.

At present there exists hardly any public transport in Saudi Arabia - and where it exists, women are not permitted to use it on their own. Driving is forbidden to women and desert-like temperatures make a longer walk impossible. Thus, the implementation of gender-segregation requires Saudi families to exercise considerable organizational skills. Often, this requires considerable financial means. Women in families who cannot afford drivers are essentially isolated and immobile; they have no ability to travel or interact outside of the house. The much-cited discrimination and oppression of Saudi women is against this background - although often justified ideologically - rather a financial and organizational problem.

The Ideal-Typical Construction: The Saudi Woman as a Housewife and Mother

If one looks at gender relations in historical perspective, the trigger for the discrimination against women and their spatial separation does not lie solely in a uniform tribalism, conservatism and the patriarchal structures of Saudi society. Rather, it seems that women are constructed in this way to serve the interests of the Saudi government.

The ‘Saudi woman’ is constructed as a category and as a symbol of national unity. Only in this function could she be the ideal Muslim woman: she is a wife as well as mother, and her sphere of influence is the family. The American researcher Eleanor Doumato posits that this construct is used to maintain two ‘myths’ that legitimize and stabilize the rule of the royal family:

The first myth is that the Kingdom is a cohesive national entity fused by a common loyalty to Islam as shaped by the Wahhabi tradition, and that the Al Sa’ud family are qualified - and uniquely so - to defend Islam and to ensure the moral well-being of the Muslim community. The second is that the Saudi Arabian state is an extension of the tribal family

Within Saudi policy the woman is a ‘national treasure’ and her separation proves that the regime is advocating the Islamic character of the country and its cultural heritage. The binding of the woman to her mahram and the household embodies the image of a traditional family, counter-balancing social changes caused by technical and economic modernization of Saudi life and the influence of globalization. The ruling family manages to portray itself as a legitimate patriarch, who works against a general uncertainty in society by the disenfranchisement of women before the law.

Three developments have contributed to the enforcement and implementation of the ideal image of the Saudi women in society. First, the economic prosperity of the country since the 1960s oil production boom has allowed many families to give up on women as workers and to fully grant them ‘protection in separation’. Second, the religious establishment (‘ulama’) has become more influential on Saudi political culture because of the ambiguous performance of the Saudi government in the Gulf crisis and burgeoning criticisms of Westernization. Finally, religious-Islamic norms have become institutionalized in state facilities, such as the ban of gender-mixed
workplaces in 1969 and the establishment of women’s universities under the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, foundations, missionary work and guidance.\(^{(lxxix)}\)

That aside, there exist political reform measures which counteract this tendency and lead to a diversification of public opinion, especially on gender politics. The current head of state, King ‘Abdallah, is considered liberal-minded and reform-oriented. We see today, what would have been unthinkable ten years ago: female news announcers or press columnists who do not shy away from reporting on once social taboo topics such as violence at home and against women. The national press reports with pride about women, especially women from the upper-class, who have become successful entrepreneurs. As a major step in a political and social reform process, Nura bt. ‘Abdallah al-Faiyiz, who was made deputy education minister in charge of a new department for female students, is thereby the first female minister appointed in Saudi Arabia.

However, such steps do not seem to indicate a profound social change. Rather, they appear to be symbolic expressions of a gender policy which meets the expectations of an increasingly demanding social elite with token concessions. In particular, young, upper-class women are frequently outspokenly critical of the official female role image.\(^{(lxxx)}\) Their economic status allows such women to grow up with childcare and receive quality education which contributes significantly to their social development. Contemporary Saudi women have much more time to pursue other activities. However, the official discourse holds on to the traditional image of the ideal Saudi woman as a housewife and mother.\(^{(lxxxi)}\)

In Saudi Arabia, even if everyday practice offers occasional circumvention of strict segregation and legal discrimination,\(^{(lxxxii)}\) the maintenance of a segregated society is promoted by women as well as men. The political scientist Le Renard shows that there is no division of space in a domestic protected private sphere for the female usually the realm of the family versus a male public arena where power is held, political decisions are made and members of society beyond the nucleus of the family meet. There are public spaces for women, for instance women’s universities and separate government offices. Rather, we find that a comprehensive female society (“société feminine”)\(^{(lxxxiii)}\) has developed from this segregated system. As the illustration of the activities of women’s associations - according to the principle of help from women for women - has shown, the female philanthropic field is to be assigned to this area.

The Image of Lady Bountiful

In both women-only organizations and mixed-gender initiatives the commitment of Saudi women is supported. The participation of women as active actors in the charitable work is presented almost as a natural evolution of society:

With the development of this concept [of a natural, altruistic nature of all humans] social work has not only become a right (haqq) that each citizen (muwatin) has of his charity, rather it has become the task (wajib) of each citizen towards his society. This is not only the case for men, but the woman has also became a part of all areas of life (jami’ majalat al-haiya) and enjoys all her rights according to our Hanafi-Islamic faith (tatamati’ bi-haqqiha kamilan tab’an li-ta’alim dinuna al-islami al-hanifi).

Accordingly, charitable women’s associations (al-jam’iyyat al-khairiyya an-nisa’iyya)
began to spread everywhere in order to help the poor and to protect the family and its solidarity (takaful al-usra) and to protect her from disintegration and collapse (himayatuha min at-tafakkuk wa al-inhiyar). (lxxxiv)

The reason that active participation by women in the philanthropic field is tolerated and viewed as positive is due to the fact that such charitable work fits into the propagated image of a Muslim woman as responsible for family and household. Ahmad Salih al-Hajji, who wrote the standard study on charitable work of women in the Gulf region, describes the activities accordingly:

As the work and the goals of the women’s groups are similar (mutashabiha) one can summarize them as follows: The objectives of the charitable women’s associations and their social programs (ahdaf al-jam'iyyat al-khairiyya an-nisa'iyya wa-baramijuha al-ijtima'iyya):

1. Working to raise the living standards of the Saudi family to an appropriate economic, social and cultural level (al-'amal 'ala raf' mustawiyyat al-usra as-sa'udiyya, wa-wusul biha ila mustawa iqtisadi wa-ijtima'i wa-thaqafi munasib)
2. Supporting and strengthening the capability of the family […] (tad'im salahiyyat al-usra)
3. The empowerment of the Saudi woman […]
4. Promoting the interest of the Saudi child […] (al-ihtimam bi-at-tifl as-sa'udi)
5. Support of the disabled […] (al-mu'aqiyyin)
6. Amongst the individuals of society: to increase an awareness for culture, faith, health and society. (lxxxv)

As such, women’s associations reflect precisely the role which the Saudi woman is to meet in society. As a wife and mother she may commit herself in the charitable sector for the Saudi family and its children - beyond her own household. Consequently, official representations of female initiatives emphasize mainly their desired role as a family-nurse, presumably to create a legitimate framework for their own commitment: “The services of the welfare association are directed towards the care of the family (n’ayat al-usra) in view of the fact that this is the first pillar of society (bi-i'tibariha ad-d'ama al-ula fi al-mujtama’).” (lxxxvi) However, the officially legitimate framework within which women’s associations can situate themselves offers the women much more than this. The self-representation of the women’s welfare associations in Jeddah shows this process of official self-positioning; a background against which diverse community involvement beyond the public understanding of the role of women is further possible:

[The Welfare Association was founded] in order to meet the urgent needs of society, such as the support of motherhood and childhood (n’ayat al-umuma wa-at-tufula), medical and social assistance, to combat illiteracy, to train women for working, to strengthen family relationships, to offer social advice, as well as material and financial support. (lxxxvii)

**The Philanthropic Field from a Female Perspective**

How then do female benevolent actors situate themselves within official discourses? Within the philanthropic field, one can perceive two very different female groups of actors. First, there are women of the socio-economic middle and lower classes: the majority of the employed social workers who are financially dependent on a salary. They see the segregation as a blessing
because it enables them to support their own families with an income, while at the same time it allows them to ‘be themselves’. In a female space, they see the opportunity to ‘try themselves out’ or experiment with the latest fashion trends. In the other group, there is the socio-economic elite of the city of Jeddah, which occupies the top posts of the welfare associations. The welfare associations reflect the strong social and economic hierarchy of Saudi society.

Although these groups of actors are very different with regard to their economic and social status, within the women’s associations both groups exist in very similar structures and relations. The attractiveness of charitable work for both groups lies not least in the fact that it gives them the possibility to ‘generate’ their own capital. This is mainly social, cultural and symbolic capital, a fact, which has often been overlooked by studies on Saudi women. An insistence on the dichotomy of public and private, and a focus on economic capital as the key factor of power structures often leads to premature conclusions, such as an utter dependence of Saudi women on men and their absolute power over ‘the Saudi woman’.

However, women do retain a degree of independence through social, cultural and symbolic capital, even if they - at first sight - seem excluded from economic processes. For example, many women cannot raise the financial resources to afford a personal driver. Female friendships and social networks may help in this situation, as the driver of one woman often picks up and drives her friend or colleague. ‘Driver-sharing’ is thus a clear example of the transformation of social capital (friendship) into economic capital (transport and financial independence from the mahram).

**Capital Acquisition**

Actors in the philanthropic field can acquire social capital through charitable work in the form of friendships, contacts and social networks. Charitable commitment is attractive to many women because it is a legitimate space for social interaction outside the walls of their own homes. Female actors can get information from other non-related women, ask them for advice and discuss their opinions freely. Through the expansion of social relationships they create the basis for mutual support and assistance in emergency situations. Maintaining this network of relationships is an important investment for Saudi women: “In other words, the network of relationships is the product of individual or collective investment strategies, which deliberately or unconsciously are directed at creating and maintaining social relations, which sooner or later promise to be of direct benefit.” Furthermore, membership in a women’s association often brings members of the group ‘material’ benefits: welfare organizations often supply women with drivers who pick them up in the morning and deliver them after work to where they desire to go. Additionally, membership in a welfare organization allows women to utilize the premises and academic resources of the institutions such as libraries, computer rooms and recreational facilities. This is especially valuable because the traditional gender-criterion of access often dictates the action spaces of women. Social contacts serve as a door handle for access and a stepping-stone to gain cultural capital.

Once accepted to the community of respected philanthropists, the charitable female actor can acquire cultural skills, such as knowing how much zakat her family has to pay, or to whom and how much she should donate at the end of the fasting month Ramadan. The provision of religious education should also be regarded as cultural capital. In women’s associations, one can observe that almost every woman, whether social worker or member of the board, is always able to
comment on her work with a suitable Koranic verse or a saying of the Prophet Muhammad. The religious education imparted on women in these institutions is reflected in the fact that documents, brochures or information boards in the welfare association tend to be accompanied by a religious statement.

The acquiring of cultural capital enables women to present themselves as both educated and pious Muslims. This self-representation attains high symbolic value in Saudi society. The field research of Altorky shows that social prestige, through which an elite family distinguishes itself from others, is composed of their reputation, descent, piety, wealth and personal achievements. In this context, charity can function as a status symbol, since “reputation... requires keeping an open and generous house.” Furthermore, philanthropic commitment can act as a sign of piety. The giving of alms can be a statement of one’s prosperity. A senior position within a welfare association speaks for a distinction of personal achievements. The position speaks for organizational skills, high performance, durability and popularity. In this context, the philanthropic field appears rich in symbolic capital.

**Philanthropy as an Action Space**

The possibilities of the previously outlined capital accumulation exist for both groups of female actors, those from an elite household, as well as social workers from a more modest background. The economic and social class does not per se seem to cause differences in the nature of the capital in the field and the process of their accumulation. Therefore, a distinction of the female actors, which orients itself on the usage of the acquired capital, seems more appropriate. Such a distinction can also provide information on how the described women locate themselves against the official discourse of the ‘ideal type’ of Saudi woman.

Two types of charitable actors can be identified according to their use of philanthropically acquired capital. One type seems to utilize their accumulated social, cultural and symbolic capital for complying as much as possible with the ideal role model of a Saudi woman as a wife and mother. To the outside observer, the other type seems indeed also to match this ideal image. However, a closer look reveals that the knowledge and capital acquired through charitable work are used specifically to bypass existing social boundaries. Other women emphasize the self-fulfillment and the feeling of being needed; leaving their home every morning gives them a feeling of leading an ‘active’ life. For some, philanthropy can also act as a stepping-stone for a professional career. Women can gain work experience and knowledge about how to use computers and practice foreign languages from participation in women’s associations, granting them benefits in life outside the association. In this way, women can also gain experience in management positions - in the business world a predominantly male privilege - that can be of great use in the labor market.

Finally, through their charitable work, women can actively build their own parallel power structures through the development of social networks which stand outside of the male-dominated public areas of politics and business as well as the private home environment, guaranteeing them some social security.

**Conclusion: Liberty in the Name of Piety**

In conclusion, it appears that the cause of discrimination against Saudi women, ideal-typical gender modeling, is at the same time the lever for their active participation in the philanthropic field and
combating societal grievances. Saudi women act at the forefront of two societal conflict zones: first through their social work for the collective good; second through living an independent, self-determined life outside of the traditionally-staged family household. The discrimination that Saudi women face in the every-day-life is not to be diminished by such observations from the benevolent sector, if only because the possibility of access to the philanthropic field is open only to a few due to legal, financial and organizational factors. Still, more and more take this prime opportunity which the philanthropic field offers for Saudi women to lead an active, independent and fulfilled life and to promote social change.

III. Dedicated Youth

“Yasmine Idriss... Charity begins at 16”

“Yasmine Idriss is a 16-year-old Saudi girl who knows no limits when it comes to charity. She always tries to come up with new ideas to make the world a better place. [...]” (Arab News 3.03.2010)

Many Saudi adolescents between 15 and 30 years old are regularly involved in charitable projects with seemingly boundless enthusiasm. In this case the young girl Yasmine organized a basketball tournament at her private school, the American International School of Jeddah. The revenue of the sold tickets went to a relief project in Malawi. This example shows two trends: dedicated adolescents are generally part of the social and economic elite of the country, often attending expensive private schools; youthful charity is usually shaped by a highly enthusiastic event character.

A study by Altorky for the 1980s and 1990s shows that youthful charitable commitment is a relatively new trend in society. During the examined period, traditional forms of charity, such as the involvement in a welfare association, declined within the young generation of the elite. However, their parents were still expected to lead an open and generous household. If a family wanted to belong to the urban upper class, it had to fulfill the social expectations of the urban community. As a result of their wealth, it was expected that they arrange meals for the poor after great banquets, help out less fortunate neighbors and generally be open to pleas for alms. Altorky concludes that, due to economic reasons during the recession of the 1980s and 1990s, fewer and fewer young families of the upper class could fulfill these expectations and show social commitment as a sign of their social status and piety.

The following analysis shows that today’s charitable involvement among upper class young people offers them a new opportunity, not directly tied to funding, to comply with social expectations of the elite status while simultaneously strengthening their membership in the upper class.

Several factors lead to charity increasingly taking on the form of a lifestyle and an ‘event culture’ (Erlebniskultur) among young Saudis. The commitment appears to be an expression of piety while at the same time offering the opportunity to live a modern lifestyle and develop civic awareness. In light of today’s situation for the young generation, which even by the Saudi media is presented as precarious, charitable commitment offers a socially accepted, varied and exciting activity which serves the desire for self-realization for the young generation. Such self-realization is restricted in many areas of Saudi society, for example in the art and culture of the country.
Socio-Economic Background of Young People in Saudi Arabia

Current estimates suggest that 60% of the Saudi population is less than 18 years old. In the 1990s, Saudi Arabia had one of the highest population growth rates in the world with an average of 3.5%. The continuing high growth rate of 2.6% is currently being absorbed in the education sector through the development of public schools and universities. However, due to a generally poor level of education at public Saudi schools as well as a curriculum based on teaching religious values rather than labor-ethical values and technical skills, graduates are frequently unprepared for the labor market.

As a result, the labor market shows an increasingly high unemployment rate among young Saudis. Unofficial estimates put the unemployment rate at 30% among Saudi adolescents. Every year, some 100,000 primary school and university graduates enter the labor market which, according to official data, has roughly 454,000 unemployed persons. IIronically the Saudi labor market is at the same time characterized by a very high rate of foreign workers (4.6 million or 71% of the country’s workforce). Hence, the government-promoted solution to this situation - the Saudization development strategy - seeks to replace foreign workers with Saudis through various employment quota targets. However, as in most neighboring Gulf countries this goal is far from being accomplished.

The economic prospects are perceived as unsatisfactory and unsettling by many young graduates, as Yamani vividly shows in her field research on Saudi youth. The economic situation of the country, as well as a system of patronage and clientelism, based on kinship, has led to an increasingly widening gap between the wealthy elite, whose children enjoy private education, often abroad, and a lower class that does not enjoy such advantages.

For the upper class, unemployment usually does not induce economic trouble. Instead, the young people complain openly about boredom (malal), or a great void (faragh). In a country where: concerts, bars and night clubs are forbidden; museums, art exhibitions, sports clubs, cinemas and public libraries almost don’t exist; censorship and a lack of free expression are floating over all activities; print media is not the only one saying “in the end we are all bored.” Even at the highest domestic-political level, the subject is heard. The Fourth National Dialog, a government initiative which has taken place annually since 2003, organized closed discussions dedicated to “issues of youth - current status and future prospects.”

Faisal al-Mu’ammar, advisor to Crown Prince Sultan and head of the National Dialog, outlined three urgent issues for discussion: 1. The creation of jobs 2. The education system and the nature of vocational training in the Kingdom 3. Al-faragh, the emptiness or unfilled leisure time.

Graduates are not only facing economic insecurity and social boredom but also the influence of globalization and mass media. In particular among Saudi middle and upper class adolescents, these influences lead to a –an excessive consumer culture. The rush in the countless shopping malls anywhere in Jeddah on a Wednesday evening illustrates this consumption-centric behavior. A visit to the shopping malls is about more than buying goods. Rather, the malls are places for youth to meet one another and exchange thoughts; an escape from everyday life. In addition,
encounters with Western and Asian culture in everyday life - through trips abroad, interactions with foreigners in the country, Hollywood movies, satellite television, glossy magazines, countless web-forums and networks - often lead to a questioning of their own cultural values. Yamani's study on the identity of young Saudis clearly shows:

The key theme to emerge in all the interviews I conducted was the clash between a national, rigorous socialization and the uncertainties and promises stemming from wider access to different cultural influences. The majority of these young people recognize the nature and extend of the changes that they and their generation face. In their encounter with uncertainty most prove able to draw on three constants as a source of stability: the family, Islam and the nation. (cxiii)

Case Study: The Youth Organization Fainak

The first case study of a youth charity, Fainak (est. 2007), is considered to be the first self-organized youth organization in Jeddah, if not Saudi Arabia as a whole. (cxiv) With the help of a centrally located office space and word-of-mouth advertising, the group has formulated its goal: "Building an active concerned youth culture through innovative, entertaining events, programs and an interactive website... To expose youth to a wide range of experience, opportunities and resources. To drive positive change." (cxv) Thus, the name of the organization, which literally means 'where are you?' translates to their program. The Fainak is led by 22-year-old Mariya Mahdali and is staffed mainly by students from Jeddah's private universities and colleges. Its efforts are focused on designing a creative, exciting and varied program to offer to the Saudi youth scene as an alternative to emptiness and boredom. At the same time, young people are called upon to actively, responsibly and confidently get engaged in community affairs and the common good. Legally, the group has the status of a CSR of the publishing house Rumman Company. Even if the name appears nowhere in the profile of the organization, its CEO is officially and legally the chairman of Fainak. He is also the father of the young team leader Mariya. This shows that young people build their charitable efforts on family support; just as they do in the economic sphere. (cxvi)

As its biggest success so far, Fainak organized a ‘garage sale for charity’, (cxvii) a kind of flea market by and for young people. All profits from the flea market went to local charities (jam'iyyat khairiyya). The event is part of an annual series of monthly, charitable activities, which are perceived as ‘cool’, ‘exciting’ and ‘entertaining’, since the simple idea of hosting a flea market in Saudi Arabia is a novum. (cxviii) The flea market took place in the parking lot and the entrance area of La Promenade Center, one of the most fashionable shopping malls of Jeddah. The venue on the centrally located Tahliya Street clearly shows that this was a high society event.

Images that document the market show jolly, good-humored Saudi youth. (cxix) The boys do not wear the white, Saudi robe (thaub), and a red-white or white cloth on the head (shimakh or ghutra), which is held by a ring (‘iqqal), i.e. the traditional image of Saudi male. Instead, most young men wore jeans and colorful T-shirts with imprints of big labels like Diesel and Nike, or ironic sayings. Many wear baseball caps the wrong way around, some short pants and strikingly colored sneakers. The girls in turn, combine the black ‘abayya with large leather handbags, and large aviator sunglasses in the style of the trendsetter Ray-Ban. The scarves are loosely thrown around the head. In contrast to the young girls of state universities, who usually wear the complete veil
covering their faces (niqab), here every girl shows her face. The elegant appearance of the young women is made perfect with simple make-up, lipstick and sparkling embroidery on sleeve hems and edges of the black robes. Not only the loose dress code, but the mere fact, that boys and girls are shown together on photos of the event, speaks to the pursuit of a Western-oriented, modern and self-determined lifestyle, where the traditional Saudi gender segregation appears to be superfluous.

The Fainak-event exemplifies a social development which is frequently observed at similar charitable events. The committed volunteers, especially young people, only engage themselves for specific, unique events which promise entertainment value but rarely in the regular everyday work of the institutions. Thus, it comes as no surprise that - despite of the charitable, philanthropic claims of Fainak - no newspaper or news release names the recipient of the donation or the concrete aid project under the banner of a “Fainak Charity Garage Sale !!!”. Even the Fainak-magazine reporting on the event, does not mention which specific aid project was supported through the profits from the flea market. Rather, the good mood of the event is emphasized. It seems that the entertainment value of the event is of greater importance to the young organizers than the charity aspect.

**Case Study: The Young Initiatives Group**

The second case study deals with the online presentation of the Young Initiatives Group (YIG) and their film YIG2.mov. YIG is a youth group founded in 2010 which conducts charitable initiatives such as collecting garbage in the old city of Jeddah, mentoring programs for orphans or collecting and distributing old clothes to the needy. The group intends to join the Welfare Association of Majid b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz for Development and Services. Assumingly the strict legal environment governing civil society in the Saudi Arabia, which prohibits independent unions and organizations, motivates this strategic fusion with the progressive welfare association promoting vocational education and financial help to low-income families. In the video, YIG presents its work and appeals to the young people of Jeddah to become involved in aid work.

In this call for greater engagement, religion plays a crucial role. The entire internet-video stands under the theme “What if God gave you less?” Then, images are shown accompanied by melancholy Arabic music. A picture of a run-down kitchen is titled “What if this was your kitchen? If you can even call no stove, no refrigerator, no gas, no cutlery, a kitchen.” The image of a dirty latrine is commented with the words “What if this was your bathroom? If you can even call a bucket of water a bath.” Further, no Saudi household may lack air conditioning, but “What if this was as cool as your A/C got?” A broken device is demonstrated to the audience. At this point the young person is reminded “But God gave you more!” and images are presented of girls (without showing their face) in leggings, miniskirts, a glossy BMW, toilet paper, an I-Pad, a Blackberry and a four-poster bed. This is followed by a hadith and the invitation to behave generously in gratitude. It seems that YIG does not condemn prosperity, a non-traditional lifestyle and manner of clothing, but rather legitimize it as God’s gift. This video indicates that a modern lifestyle can be compatible with the identity of a devout Muslim.

The group commits itself to the community through its projects as well as involvement with the urban population. At the same time the dedicated young people stand out - probably unknowingly – from
the broad, needy population. In the presentation of their work, the YIG-video shows an expressive photograph in which a girl dressed in white robes with a white, light scarf, is sitting between a group of veiled women in black, teaching them something. The needy women with black face veils (niqab) stand out strongly from the presence of the charitable girl with her attractive features. Another picture shows four girls helping an old woman to find a job. The girls are dressed well and beautiful in the picture while the old woman is in a simple, wide house dress (jalabiyya), which is very sha’bi (simple or ‘popular’). The young people are dressed in tight-fitting black ‘abayas with glitter at the seams and trendy, oversized Ray-Ban sunglasses; one of whom has an expensive mirror-reflex camera hanging around her neck. All wear their veils very loosely showing bits of their hair.

Probably the contrasts described here do not appear as clearly in the real activities shown in these pictures and on the website of YIG. The purpose of the website is to create awareness of the work of the youth initiative and to promote participation. In the context of these pictures, the emphasis on the differences between the needy and the benefactors seem to be used to emphasize the severe circumstances of the poor and needy. The presentation of the young appears to be reflecting the ‘you-and-me’ adolescent so as to motivate cooperation and support for the project. Truthful to the ‘economy of attention’, the images are focused on attracting the attention of younger viewers.

Nevertheless, the social practice of voluntary work not only reflects the social gap between rich and poor but it seems that it covertly emphasizes it at the same time. Thus, the young people of YIG clarify and establish, through communicating their knowledge (for example in English courses which they offer in orphanages), the hierarchy between the voluntary teachers, easily conversing in foreign languages and the ignorant students.

**Conclusion: Charity as an Event and Lifestyle**

These two case studies demonstrate a number of common features of the charitable, youth involvement: charitable work which is attractive to adolescents is characterized by a highly entertaining event-character; ethical and moral considerations are connected to consumption and lifestyle; charity as an event culture (Erlebniskultur) makes it possible to meet the social expectations of the elite status, while at the same time serving the aspirations of young people for active participation in society.

Youth charitable activities must be seen against the background of the social environment facing Saudi youth; as Yamani shows, an environment which is considered by most Saudi adolescents as unsettling and uncertain. The trigger of the new awakening trend for charitable commitment among the young generation lies in the opportunities and possibilities for self-development which this socially recognized work offers to young people. A rising level of education without prospects or prosperity coupled with boredom and a lack of alternatives are factors which essentially shape charitable motivation. At the same time, such motivation is an expression of their Islamic faith. Charitable work allows young people to combine a Muslim religious identity with a Western, modern, self-determined lifestyle in which the traditional, boundaries of gender separation are removed. Simultaneously, charitable commitment also provides the opportunity to actively live out an authentic, self-concept of national identity.
End Notes


ix. Ibid, p. 68.

x. Ibid, p. 67.

xi. Ibid, p. 75.

xii. There are plenty more Saudi institutions in Jeddah that are philanthropic in nature, as for example the religious trusts (awqaf), royal decree associations or private schools such as Effat University. The focus of the paper is founded in the nationwide spread of the kinds of institution that are described here exemplarily, and reflects their centrality in Saudi civil society due to their high numbers.

xiii. This paper is an extract from my Masters’ thesis “Philanthropie in Saudi Arabien. Bestandsaufnahme und Untersuchung der organisierten wohltätigen Praxis in Djidda”, submitted to Free University Berlin in 2011, where you can find an overview of the philanthropic field of Jeddah in much more detail. The analysis of the philanthropic field there considers the four central actors of the benevolent field: women, youth, merchants and the royal family.


xvi. The numbers of the benevolent institutions were given to me by the Ministry of Social Affairs in Jeddah and represent the status quo from January 2010.

xvii. For my Masters’ thesis I collected information from 25 businesses in Jeddah, which are evaluated here.

xviii. Most Saudi businesses use themselves to describe their charitable activities - even in Arabic running texts - the English term CSR. Only rarely is CSR translated into Arabic as khidmat al-mujtama’ or mas’uliyya ijtima’iyya.


xx. See “Newspaper hits rise but CSR not yet defined” Arab News (15.02.2010) URL: http://arabnews.com/opinion/columns/article17398.ece?service=print (14.03.2011): “A search in the archives of the top 5 Saudi newspapers on corporate social responsibility and variations of the term shows an increase by more than 12-folds from 2005 to 2009 reaching 6,481 hits.”


xxii. The basic law is a set of laws and rights that was enacted in 1992 by royal decree of King Fahd (1982-95), that resembles up to date the unofficial constitution of Saudi Arabia. The royal decree in turn describes in it’s first article (§1) the Koran and the sunna, that is the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, as the constitution (dustur) of Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom therefore knows no formal constitution. For more detail on the Basic Law and its importance for Saudi Arabia see Al-Fahad, H. Abdulaziz: Ornamental Constitutionalism. The Saudi Basic Law of Governance, in: The Yale Journal of International Law 30 (2005), p. 375-396 and Nevo, Joseph: Religion and National Identity in Saudi-Arabia, in: Middle Eastern Studies 34 (1998) 3, p. 34-53, p. 35f. and 37f.


xxv. See Draft Regulations of Associations and Civil Society Organizations, § 4 for the composition of the board of the NAA: President of the institution is the Crown Prince, members include further the Minister of Social Affairs, the Minister of Islamic Affairs, Endowments and Guidance, the Minister of Labour and the Minister of Finance.


xxvii. See Draft Regulations of Associations and Civil Society Organizations, § 10.


xxix. For details see the official website of the Help Center under URL: http://www.helpcenter.med.sa/ (12.09.2010).

xxx. In addition to 9/11 the wave of terrorist attacks on Saudi soil in 2003 and 2004,

xxxi. Observation of the author at King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz University in Jeddah, where a group of sociology students wanted to organize a spontaneous fundraising for the victims of the earthquake in Haiti. After intensive efforts, even from teachers, the fundraising had to be cancelled due to the fact that it was impossible at such short notice to get an official permit, with no permit, however, it was too risky.

xxv. Shalaby (2008), S. 75.
xxxvi. For example, the conglomerate Savola Group is working to support disabled children, together with the Charity of Sight, see “Corporate Giant Building Bridges with Society” Arab News (24.1.2006) URL: http://archive.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=76718&d=24&m=1&y=2006 (6.10.2010), while Al Rabie Saudi Food Manufacturer Co. Ltd. based in Jeddah is going in cooperation with the charity of Prince Fahd b. Salman against liver and kidney diseases, see “Al Rabie honored for philanthropic role” Saudi Gazette (27.6.2010) URL: http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=2010062776454 (6.10.2010).
xxxviii. This observation corresponds to the boom that philanthropic institutions are currently enjoying in most parts of the world, see, for example for Germany Der Tagesspiegel (8.11.2010) “Vermögen und Vorsorge: Stiftungen - Vorteile für alle”: The capital Berlin employs 670 independent foundations under civil law, of which alone 50 were founded in 2009. Never before was such a high increase reported.
As’ad Jauhar, Professor at KAU and business analyst criticizes that businesses receive state benefits for employing nationals as a form of corporate responsibility when, in fact, they are offering poor CSR-programs, see “Private Sector flayed for not contributing to community work” Arab News (4.05.2010) URL: http://arabnews.com/saudiarabia/article55524.ece (14.03.2011).


The European Union, which has proclaimed the year 2011 ‘Year of the Volunteer’ identified in the course of the festivities that in the countries of the European Union sport makes up the area with the highest volunteer participation with 34% of total volunteers participating here, followed by 2. education, arts, music and cultural associations (22%), 3. religious or church groups (16%), 4. welfare and social associations (17%), 5. labor unions (13%). See “EYV 2011: Schwerpunkt EU. Zahlen zur Freiwilligentätigkeit in der EU” URL: http://europa.eu/volunteering/en/press-media/press-room (28.01.2011).

See King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies under URL: http://www.kfcris.com/ (29.10.2010).

“Middle Class Networks in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen,” Indiana 2004.

iii. From the Koran, ‘verse of zakat’, Sura IX: verse 60.

iii. Only the group of women and youth are discussed in the following analysis, you can find the discussion of the two other groups in my Masters’ thesis mentioned above.

iv. Beyond this proposed scheme it is quite conceivable that a philanthropic actor consists of several aspects of the here proposed types: for example, a teenager who works in a company, who is also a member of the royal family and engaged in philanthropy, or a charitable female entrepreneur, as opposed to the here proposed ‘generous merchant’. Not infrequently, charitable projects are implemented under the auspices of a ‘generous merchant’, but in fact the committed benefactors are the female relatives of the entrepreneur.


ivi. See Bourdieu, Pierre: “Meditationen.” Zur Kritik der scholastischen Vernunft, Frankfurt a. M. 2005 (original 1997), p. 129: “To discuss arguments you have to believe that they do deserve this, and above all that the debate deserves to be carried out. The illusio is not one of the explicit principles, the theories, which one puts up and defends, but the acting, the routine, the things that you do because they should be done and because they were always done.” Here in translation by the author. Similarly in Bourdieu (1998), p. 141.

lvii. See Singer, Amy: Charity in Islamic Societies, Cambridge 2008, p. 35: “The pre-Islamic idea that any property contains a surplus, which its owner must give away, finds a companion notion in the Qur’an verses 70:24 and 51:19, which asserts that the poor have a just claim (haqq) to a share in wealth. Both of these ideas also find an echo in Mauss’ understanding of the transformation of gift into alms based on the obligation of those with a surplus to share their riches.” The research of the French sociologist and anthropologist Marcel Mauss (1872-1950) was long considered pioneering regarding archaic societies and the phenomenon of the gift economy.


lix. It could be speculated that major motives for charitable work are believed to be a religious obligation, or the opportunity for self-fulfillment and self-realization. A study which deals with this complex phenomenon in the European context is Adloff, Frank/ Sigmund, Steffen: Die gift economy moderner Gesellschaften. Zur Soziologie der Philanthropie, in: idem (eds.): Vom Geben und Nehmen. Zur Soziologie der Reziprozität, Frankfurt am Main 2005, p. 211-237, p. 213ff.


lxi. In practice, the leadership positions of welfare associations are occupied by men only, since women are considered life-long perpetual minors before the law in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, they cannot take on the ‘guardianship’ of an institution.

lxii. All women in Saudi Arabia, even non-Muslim foreigners, must wear the ‘abaya, a black, coat-like wrap, in public, i.e. in mixed-gender rooms.

lxiii. There are, as far as I know, two exceptions to this rule: MOSA has a women’s branch in Jeddah and one in Riyadh.

lxiv. The historian and leading scholar in the field of female philanthropy, Mc Carthy, highlighted the marginal role that women is granted (even today) in the U.S. as a philanthropist, in her lecture ‘Women, Philanthropy, and Science” on 14.10.2010, at a conference of the Berlin Academy of Sciences on the subject ‘To donate, to make gifts, to shape’, see also Mc Carthy,


lxviii. For other interpretations of this koranic verse see Human Rights Watch (2008), p. 10ff.


lx. And possibly even more so the reality of single men, who - on their own - are not even allowed to enter family sections or on family days, which is possible for single women.

lxii. One example against the myth of a historical uniform tradition of Saudi Arabia is the ‘abaya. Before the 1980s, the black coat was worn only from women of the central region Najd. Today, the ‘abaya as a symbol of national unity has indeed replaced the regional costumes from different parts of the country, but still for many parts of the country, it cannot be considered an indigenous, conservative custom or tradition (’adat wa-taqlid).


Altorky, Soraya: Women in Saudi Arabia. Ideology and Behavior among the Elite, New York 1986, observations on the relationship of the living standard of families, the working force and the attitude towards women: “these observations attach yet another value to the concealment of women. It serves as a status marker, symbolizing the socioeconomic rank that facilitates its enforcement.”, p. 22f.

See Doumato (1992) and idem (1999).

See Prokop, Michaela: Saudi Arabia. The Politics of Education, in: International Affairs 79 (2003) 1, p. 77-89, AMEinfo: Women’s education in Saudi Arabia: The way forward, URL: http://www.ameinfo.com/199773.html (15.04.2010). Until 2002 all girls’ education was subject to the Ministry of Religion as opposed to boys’ education which has always been under the auspices of the Ministry for Higher Education. In 2002 the responsibilities for boys and girls were brought together under the Ministry of Higher Education.


For example, very few shopping malls check whether mixed-gender groups are actually relatives or not. Even the restaurants’ family area could be used for secret meetings of unmarried couples. In addition, women inevitably in everyday communication with drivers and domestic workers are confronted to non-related men.


Interview by the author with female social workers of the Charitable Female Association in Jeddah and with the sociologist Su‘ad ‘Ubud b. Afif in February 2010. See also Afif (2008) and idem (1993).


The importance of economic capital, also in the philanthropic field, is neither to be underestimated here, not least because many social workers work to support their families with an income. Furthermore, economic capital can be translated into other sorts of capital, as is often the case in the philanthropic field, for example when the amount of the membership
fee of a welfare association serves as a natural selection process over the exclusivity (the symbolic capital) of its members.


xciv. See Le Renard (2008), Pauvreté, p. 624f. and similar statements in interviews which the author held with committed Saudi women.

xcv. “Women barge into men’s domain, organize chocolate exhibition” Arab News (6.03.2010): The exhibition is considered to be the first major event organized by women. Both organizers have worked for a long time with the women’s welfare association Nahda Philanthropic Society (NPS) and remarked “‘My previous experience as a PR supervisor and later as assistant general director of NPS has helped me a lot in this,’ said Al-Sabiq. ‘My previous experience as head of the PR department at NPS has helped me organize the exhibition’, said Al-Shammary”.

xcvi. See “A Golden Chance to Focus on Volunteer Work Says Al-Yafi” Arab News (29.10.2006) URL: http://archive.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=87350&d=29&m=10&y=2006 (13.11.2010), Fatan al-Yafi was appointed head of the CSR-department of the enterprise Savola Group. This is the highest position that is occupied by a woman at Savola.

xcvii. “Yasmine Idriss... Charity begins at 16” Arab News (3.03.2010) URL: http://arabnews.com/lifestyle/art_culture/article25621.ece (18.11.2010).

xcviii. Similar projects are often conducted by students of the private Effat University or Dar Al-Hekma College, see “Students feeling responsible” Arab News (14.04.2009) URL: http://archive.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=121512&d=14&m=4&y=2009 (18.11.2010).

xcix. In addition to the described characteristics of the upper class, there are certainly, too, young, committed social workers who are simply dependent on income from permanent employment in a charity, but this seems to be a different phenomenon, which deserves an independent research, perhaps on poverty in Saudi Arabia.


See “RCC to hold employment exhibition” Arab News (2.03.2010).


cxi.

See Champion, Daryl: “The Paradoxical Kingdom,” London 2003, p. 11, who terms this form of political economy “asabiyya capitalism”.


cxvi. “What is fainak?” on youtube under URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N7hZFYlqDz (20.11.2010).

cxvii. As indicated by Yamani (2002).


cxix. Interview with the founder Mariya Mahdali during a visit to the author’s office in February 2009.


cxx. Thus mentioned for example by the director of the Charitable Women’s Association in Jeddah and her social workers in interviews conducted by the author in January 2010.

cxxi. Fainak-Magazine (2008), p. 3, also in the article “Young Saudis plan garage sale for charity” and “Garage sale’ draws big crowd” Arab News, as above mentioned. The receiving parties are only vaguely described as ‘welfare associations’ and ‘needy people’.

cxxii. “YIG2.mov” (4min 26) on youtube URL: http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=1ycpzlUBdBw (21.11.2010). The video was also displayed on facebook by Yamen S. Al-Hajjar in the context of the Saudi Debate Society on the 25.09.2010 and discussed there.


cxxiv. In YIG2.mov: “And for this privilege we have to be thankful in our thoughts and generous in our actions. The prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said ‘Do not turn away a poor man [...] even if all you can give is half a date. If you love the poor and bring them near you [...] God will bring you near him on the day of resurrection.’”

cxxv. Similar observations can be found in the behavior of the young Egyptian upper class, see Buitelaar, Marjo/ Saad, Nirvana: “Ramadan in contemporary Cairo: Consumption in the name of Piety and Authenticity,” in: Reconstruction 10 (2010)1, p. 1-11.
Religious and Ethnic Motivations for Serving Others in the Arab World: Evidence from Lebanon

Shawn Teresa Flanigan

---

4 Shawn Flanigan is a Public Administration Professor in the School of Public Affairs at San Diego State University.
Introduction

Research on volunteering has established a link between religiosity and involvement in volunteer work\(^{(i)}\). Studies have shown that religious communities find faith, mission and community service to be inextricably linked. \(^{(ii)}\) However, the majority of research on this topic has been conducted in the United States, and has focused on the experiences of Christian NGOs to the exclusion of other groups. Relatively little research has been conducted on the role of ethnic identity in giving and much of the existing research has focused on ethnic groups in the United States\(^{(iii)}\) and immigrant communities in Europe. \(^{(iv)}\) This body of research neglects many communities that are central to the fabric of Arab societies, such as Sunni and Shiite Muslims and minority groups such as Armenians and Palestinian refugees.

This paper seeks to examine the role that religion and ethnicity play in motivating service to others in the Arab world by focusing on the case of Lebanon. The paper specifically examines the role that religion and ethnicity play for staff members of social service NGOs. This is a limited but valuable population to examine due to their strong involvement in the social service sector. Lebanon is an excellent case study due to its great religious diversity and the numerous ethnic minorities living in the country. This work will begin by reviewing important aspects of the literature on religious and ethnic motivations for serving others. Then, I will present research findings based on interviews with 30 NGO staff conducted during field research in Lebanon in 2006. I will discuss the role that faith plays in influencing the attitudes and behavior of staff from religious NGO/social service providers in Lebanon, focusing on Christian, Druze, Sunni, and Shiite NGOs. I will follow by examining the experiences of interview participants from Armenian and Palestinian NGOs who are influenced not only by religion but also by ethnic identity.

Methodology

This paper presents information from a broader study examining faith-based NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon, and Sri Lanka. The Lebanon portion of this study involved interviewing 30 individuals who were employees or full-time volunteers at 22 NGOs. At least part of the work of these organizations involved providing health and social services to low-income individuals. Interview participants were selected in an effort to reflect the religious diversity of the population of Lebanon. In addition, several interview participants from secular NGOs were included in order to compare and contrast faith-based and secular NGOs. Table 1 shows the religious identity of the NGOs included in the sample and the number of interview participants from each NGO community. In addition, the percentage of the Lebanese population belonging to each religious group and the percentage of faith-based NGO interview participants from each religious group are included. The sample for the study was slightly over-representative of Christian organizations (42.9% of sample versus 39% of Lebanese population), and slightly under-representative of Muslim organizations (57.1% of sample versus 59.7% of Lebanese population). While the Lebanese government recognizes 17 separate religious sects, these sects can be roughly categorized as four major religious groups: Christians (including Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Catholics, and other Christian denominations), Druze, Shiite Muslims, and Sunni Muslims. Therefore, I made an effort to include faith-based NGOs from these four major religious groupings in my study. Many sources of demographic statistics include Druze as a Muslim religious group, including the United States
Central Intelligence Agency (2006) whose data is used in Table 1.

The Druze religion is an off-shoot of Islam. However, due to its nearly 1,000 year history as a separate sect and its incorporation of a number of non-Islamic beliefs such as reincarnation and forms of East Asian philosophy\(^{(v)}\), both Druze and Muslims consider the Druze religion to be distinct from Islam\(^{(vii)}\). For this reason, I also approached the Druze as a separate religious grouping.

Table 1. Religious Affiliation of Interview Participants’ NGOs, Populations, and Percentage of Faith-Based NGO Participants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO CATEGORY</th>
<th>NUMBER OF INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF LEBANESE POPULATION</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF FAITH-BASED NGO PARTICIPANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faith-Based</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>39% (vii)</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>59.7% (viii) (including Druze)</td>
<td>57.1% (including Druze)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As one might expect, all 21 interview participants from faith-based NGOs mentioned that their NGO had a religious founder or mentioned the role that religious identity had played in the founding of the organization. None of the secular NGOs made similar statements when describing their organization’s history.

Religious and Ethnic Motivations to Serve: The Role of Group Membership and Loyalty

When thinking about the influence of religious and ethnic identity on the desire to serve others, both group loyalty and religious ideology play a role. Group loyalty is often a motivator for altruistic behavior\(^{(ix)}\), and oftentimes voluntary activity is characterized by an explicit focus on within-group giving and activities that benefit others sharing a similar identity. Indeed, numerous studies of philanthropy indicate that charitable giving and the voluntary work of nonprofit organizations often target specific populations based on factors such as religion\(^{(x)}\), race\(^{(xi)}\), ethnic or tribal identity\(^{(xii)}\), kinship ties\(^{(xiii)}\), or national origin.\(^{(xiv)}\) As early as Weber (1963) and Durkheim (1954), sociologists studying religion have recognized the role religious belief plays in motivating human behavior and promoting communal activity.

Sociology of religion has been incorporated into theorizing on a number of subjects often associated with the nonprofit sector, including altruism\(^{(xv)}\), civic engagement\(^{(xvi)}\), and civil society\(^{(xvii)}\). While
scholars of religion approach the subject from a variety of perspectives, most contend that religious activity cannot be motivated solely by material interests. This perspective holds true even for the burgeoning school of rational choice theorists studying religion. Because religion connotes a system of beliefs and practices related to something “sacred” and historically has been shown to be a powerful force, one might argue that the religious orientation of faith-based NGOs will prevail over other factors that might determine organizational behavior.

According to these theories, many NGOs are created on the basis of group identity, and a great deal of voluntary action and philanthropy is conducted with the hope of helping those that altruists perceive as being part of their community. Simon (1993) emphasizes ethnic and/or religious group loyalty as an important motivator of altruistic behavior, though he cautions that knowing a group’s ethnic or religious identity is not always helpful in predicting attitudes and behavior. Anheier and Salamon (1998) assert that past research has established a close connection between religion and nonprofit activity. A great deal of charitable and volunteer activity is religiously motivated and religious convictions have figured prominently in the creation of many nonprofit institutions in the western world.

Philanthropy in ethnic and religious diaspora communities also provides an interesting illustration of within-group altruism and the ways in which religious and other identities interact. Indeed, for some communities it may be difficult to separate ethnic and religious identity into two distinct categories. As Gurr (2000) notes, shared religion can be one of the boundaries that ethnic groups use to define themselves. Werbner (2002) states that diaspora communities exist through flows of goods and money, gestures of giving, and public service. Philanthropic giving between diaspora communities and their homeland is a means by which diaspora communities establish political clout and cultural authenticity, both in their new immigrant communities and in their countries of origin. However, diaspora philanthropy need not be limited to members of one’s homeland, as is particularly evident in the case of religious diasporas. As Werbner notes, “When Muslim women in Bosnia or Kosovo or Kashmir are raped or their husbands tortured, it hurts Pakistani women in England.” Therefore, in her study of Pakistanis in Manchester, Werbner found women to be engaged not only in philanthropy directed toward their homeland of Pakistan, but toward other members of the Muslim diaspora as well.

In the case of Lebanon, group membership plays a central role in ethnic motivations for service provision by Armenians, Druze, and Palestinians. While staff members from Christian, Druze, Shiite, and Sunni NGOs insist they are willing to serve people from all ethnicities and religions, we find that these NGOs also provide services predominantly to members of their own group (See Table 2.)
Table 2. Service Recipients by Sect

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO CATEGORY</th>
<th>ORIGINAL SAMPLE</th>
<th>Primarily Serves Its Own Sect</th>
<th>Serves Religiously Mixed Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith-Based</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data from the thirty interviews indicate that in Lebanon, NGO social service provision is normally quite clearly structured along sectarian lines. All of the interview participants from Druze, Shiite, and Sunni faith-based NGOs indicated that their NGO primarily serves people from their own sect. Interview participants from Christian NGOs were more likely to report serving a religiously mixed group of individuals, with just less than half stating that they do not predominantly serve their own sect, but a mixed group. However, even in the case of Christian NGOs, the majority of interview participants indicated that their services primarily benefited individuals from their own religious group (See Table 2.)

Abul-Husn (1998) notes, “The political significance of the many sects in Lebanon lies in the role they play as social organizations through which personal and group security can be achieved.”(xxiii) The results indicate that this security also includes the security offered by faith-based social service NGOs. Indeed, most interview participants attributed the sectarian patterns of their own service provision to the inherently sectarian nature of service provision in Lebanon. As one interview participant noted:

It’s not in our rules or regulations to accept only Muslim children, but we have to be realistic. I mean, this is Lebanon. Lebanon is divided. We don’t reject any child because of their religion, but this is the situation everywhere. I mean, if you go to the Druze (NGOs), you will see that the majority are Druze. If you go to the Shi’a foundations, you see that most are Shi’a. If you go to the Christian (NGOs), you will see that they are Christian. I am sure it is also not in their rules or regulations, but the environment of Lebanon, it is a mosaic country, and with the geographical distribution, and with the sect lists, this is the normal situation. But we do not have any rule about it. On the contrary, we would like to have children with different religions. But on the ground if you come to visit us you will see that most are Muslims, Muslims of all sects. If you go to Christians you will see that most are Christians, and if you go to Druze you will see that most are Druze.

An interview participant from a Druze NGO notes the same phenomenon, but attributes it to the behavior of service recipients.
We don’t make a difference (among religions when providing services). Everybody who asks, we give. But mainly, mainly Druze. Because Muslims have their own organizations, so they go to their own organization. Christians have their own organizations, so they go to their own organization. But we never say no to anybody.

Another interview participant from a Muslim NGO mentioned how geographic segregation in terms of religion and political affiliation influences where his NGO can provide services.

Mostly our services target the areas where mostly Shi’a live. The people who benefit are not always Shi’a; they could be Shi’a, but if the areas they live in are mixed, you might have Christian, you might have Sunni, and you have Shi’a who benefit from the services. Because we are considered Hezbollah and the resistance, it is not easy. Because we are considered Hezbollah, it is not easy for us to provide services in an area that is dominated by another sect, because this might be seen as infringing on the other sect, and they would not be happy [laughs]. Even if we wanted to, we are not trying.

Some interview participants offered more specific reasons for sectarian divisions in service provision, including language barriers and the desire to preserve ethnic identity. However, these specific reasons were only mentioned by interview participants from Armenian and Palestinian NGOs. The specific case of these NGOs will be discussed later in the paper.

**Religious Motivations to Serve: The Role of Faith Ideology**

Research has shown that faith plays an important role in motivating the employees and volunteers of faith-based nonprofit service providers. As Nichols (1988) noted in his examination of nonprofits providing humanitarian relief: “it was religious motivation that inspired relief workers to travel halfway around the world and serve their fellow human beings.” A great deal of research on volunteering has established a link between religiosity and involvement in volunteer work. In Ebaugh et al.’s 2003 study of nonprofits serving the homeless in the United States, evidence suggested that volunteers at such organizations are religiously committed people who are motivated to work at a faith-based agency for religious reasons.

Meanwhile, a number of studies in the United Kingdom and the United States have shown that religious bodies themselves find faith, mission and action in the community to be inextricably linked. Bartkowski (2001) found that church involvement in social service programs in Mississippi in the United States is encouraged by the church’s values. In their study of the Anglican Church in England, Cairns, Harris & Hutchinson (2005) found that church leaders and volunteers felt that worship and social action are closely connected; that serving the local community was an integral part of practicing their faith.

Most of the research focuses on religion as a motivation for volunteering and service provision by Christian organizations. As such, it is important to reiterate that the teachings of other religious traditions also provide motivation for charity and service. As Anderson (1998) notes, “In almost every culture generosity, however we define it, is an ideal to be striven for, a goal to be achieved.” The tenets of Islam require charity and service to one’s neighbor: *zakat*, an obligatory charitable contribution of approximately 2.5% of one’s income, is an important source of income for many
Muslim charities. Much like Christianity, in Islam charity hospitality and philanthropy are seen as ways of achieving nearness to God. Philanthropy is central to Judaism as well, with many writers on the subject asserting that Judaism was the first religion to make charity, or tzedakah, a religious obligation. As will be shown below, religious ideology plays an important motivating role for service provision in many Lebanese faith-based NGOs.

**Integration of Faith and Service**

While employees of faith-based NGOs are interested in serving the material needs of poor clientele, it is easy to imagine that they are also interested in serving clients’ spiritual needs. In her study of congregations providing social services in the United States, Ammerman (2001) found that approximately 25% of congregations are involved in evangelistic and mission work in conjunction with service delivery. Bartkowski (2001) notes that in Mississippi, churches’ religious values often are intertwined in the delivery of food assistance, with staff focusing on both material and spiritual needs. In a survey of welfare-to-work programs in four U.S. cities, Monsma and Mounts (2002) found that about 40% of faith-based programs explicitly integrate religious practices into the services they provide. When studying programs for at-risk youth in the United States, Branch (2002) found that programming included faith-based elements such as the use of prayer in meetings and outreach, as well as the incorporation of religious concepts into program activities.

The degree to which religion is integrated into service provision can vary by agency. Some of this variance can be explained by the faith of the organization itself. In the Faith and Organizations study in the United States, Schneider, Day, & Anderson (2005) found that all of the organizations in the pilot study were immersed in the religious values of their founding faith. However, the role that faith played in programming varied. While African American and Evangelical faith-based NGOs actively used expressive faith in their programming, Jewish, Catholic, mainline Protestant and Peace Churches stressed tolerance for other religions in their programming and staff practices (Schneider et al., 2005). In Lebanon we find that staff from Christian NGOs more often described explicitly integrating faith into their service provision, and even seeing faith itself as a service that was being rendered (see Table 3).

Over one-third of interview participants from faith-based NGOs described religion as a service offered to clients; all of these interview participants were from Christian NGOs (See Table 3). In some cases, this idea of religion as a service was described in terms of actual scheduled activities, such as Bible lessons.

At the moment half of the children we serve are Christians, and half are Muslims, roughly. But all of them enjoy or profit from the same services, including the spiritual programs. They all participate in all the programs that we have.

We are a Christian organization, and we make that clear right from the very beginning. So when we have an interview, when we meet the child’s family, we will say right from the word go that we are a Christian organization, and as part of the services we offer we teach the Bible, and families have to sign an agreement saying that they accept that and agree with that.
So basically, we view our services in two categories—financial, and that’s relief, and developmental, which includes Christian education. That’s where reaching out to the individuals spiritually takes place.

However, other interview participants from Christian NGOs describe the more informal spiritual guidance, religious teachings, and emotional support they offer as an important part of their work, and a means of offering help to service recipients.

Anyone, any elderly or any child or teenager who hears something about God and what the Bible says, they would feel more or less relieved. So that is one way of helping the person, to help them have a different type of hope than what the surroundings will give. This is what makes our work different. The other services we give, the medical and financial services, these are similar to other institutions. Only the message of God is what makes our work different, and the way we give it to children and teenagers and elderly. Sometimes nothing that we can say can make things easy for the other individual, but when we give them the Bible and then try to say something, that makes his day better. That’s how we try to help.

Our aim is not only to educate people so they can make a good life, but to show them that life is worth living. I believe that we as people of faith would like people to see that it is not only by money or by material things that people live their life, but to show them that God has a purpose for their life and finding that purpose makes life meaningful. This is something we can give them.

This description of faith as a service to be provided to service recipients, or the description of sharing faith as an activity that takes place alongside other social service activities of the organization, was unique to interview participants from Christian NGOs. As I mentioned previously, more than four fifths of interview participants from Christian NGOs made some reference that portrayed religion as a service rendered by their organization. No interview participants from other faith-based NGOs or from secular NGOs made similar depictions of the activities of their organization.

Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO CATEGORY</th>
<th>ORIGINAL SAMPLE</th>
<th>Portray Faith as a Service Rendered</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith- Based</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is important to note that no interview participants, from Christian NGOs or otherwise, explicitly mentioned having a goal of recruiting adherents to their religion, even though this is sometimes discussed as one possible goal of faith-based social service providers. However, seven of nine interview participants from Christian NGOs mentioned that sharing their religious beliefs, religious teachings, or the “word of God” with individuals receiving services was one goal of their organization’s work. No interview participants from secular NGOs or other faith-based NGOs mentioned this as a goal of their organization. One interview participant from a Christian NGO explains,

I do believe, as Christians we believe that we provide here for those children the opportunity to hear the message of the gospel, and that is very important for us. Another main message for us it to provide a good educational program for those children… So the spiritual program and then the educational program, our priorities go like this.

There may be several explanations for this pattern among interview participants from Christian organizations, related both to the Christian faith and to the research process. As Cameron (2005) notes, “Intrinsic to the nature of Christianity is its characteristic as a missionary religion which requires its adherents to evangelise and witness.” One possibility is that the priority placed on witnessing and sharing ones’ faith within many Christian denominations causes Christian NGO workers to believe and behave in ways that are different than faith-based NGO workers from organizations of other faiths. The fact that interview participants from Christian NGOs were more likely than interview participants from other NGOs to report that they do not predominantly serve their own sect, as can be seen in Table 2, may also be an indication of a desire to share Christian teachings with non-Christians.

Another possibility is that the sectarian nature of service provision in Lebanon may cause workers from Christian NGOs to assume they are serving primarily Christian individuals, who would welcome Christian teachings and guidance as part of their services. While interview participants from Christian NGOs were more likely than those from other NGOs to report serving a religiously mixed group of individuals, the majority still indicated that their services primarily benefited other Christians.

**Evangelism as Motivation?**

Supply-side theories of the nonprofit sector also recognize the importance of group identity, particularly in terms of religion. Supply-side theories suggest that the emergence of nonprofit organizations has not so much to do with the demand for nonprofit services, but with the supply of entrepreneurs who are committed to their establishment. These theorists suggest that one of the most likely sources of such supply is religious institutions, particularly in circumstances where religious competition exists. It is argued that religious orders form nonprofit institutions not entirely because of altruism, but for the instrumental purpose of winning new adherents. The formation of NGOs is thus a way that religious groups can win devotees to their cause, and those with desperate needs for education, health care, or other basic supports will come to accept the faith of those who sponsor such services.
Indeed, a number of scholars have cited a desire for new adherents as an important factor fueling NGO growth abroad.\textsuperscript{xxxvi} As Cameron (2005) notes, “Intrinsic to the nature of Christianity is its characteristic as a missionary religion which requires its adherents to evangelise and witness. Given this context, tensions between proselytising and service provision seem inevitable.”\textsuperscript{xxxvii} In Lebanon, no staff members discussed evangelism as an explicit goal of their organization. However, several interview participants from Christian NGOs mentioned that evangelical activities such as sharing their religious beliefs, religious teachings, or the “word of God” with individuals receiving services were goals of their organization’s work.

**Faith and Employment in Lebanese NGOs**

It is interesting to consider how and why interview participants began working at their NGOs, as it provides some indication of the influence of religious identity and religious beliefs on their attitudes and behavior. When asked, “How did you personally come to work for this organization?”, personal ties within particular religious communities and religious belief or inspiration played an important role in leading many interview participants to work for their organization.

In response to the question “How did you personally come to work for this organization?”, just less than half of all the interview participants mentioned that their personal ties within a particular religious community had led them to work for their NGO (See Table 4). All fourteen who mentioned the role that personal ties within the religious community had played in their employment worked for a faith-based NGO. These personal ties typically involved a member of their religious congregation informing them of the availability of the job and referring them to the individual responsible for hiring, or their own personal ties to the NGO due to previous volunteer work through their religious congregation. Interview participants from Druze and Christian NGOs were most likely to indicate that they had come to work for their organization due to personal ties they had within their religious community. In contrast, only about one-third of participants from Muslim NGOs mentioned that they had come to their job due to personal ties within their religious community (See Table 4).

In addition to mentioning personal ties, a number of interview participants responded to the question “How did you personally come to work for this organization?” with stories about religious belief and religious inspiration. This mirrors much research on faith-based NGOs in the United States, which indicates that faith plays an important role in motivating faith-based NGO employees and volunteers.\textsuperscript{xxxviii} Interview participants from Christian NGOs were most likely to indicate that religious belief or religious inspiration was one of the factors that drew the individual to work for the organization (See Table 4). Interview participants from Christian NGOs often indicated that they view social service provision as a type of religious ministry. The quotes below offer examples of the role that religious belief plays in motivating interview participants from Christian NGOs.

We hope that this economic crisis would end someday, but again, even if it ends there will be families that will be in need of support, so actually, again as Christians our ministry is to help others. That’s what we learn from our Lord and we try to apply it here as a church, both financially and sometimes in different other social ministries, in counseling, in guiding people.
To us, we are just trying to reflect Christ's love to those needy people. We are just trying to tell them that God cares, that our Lord cares about them, and we are just trying to fulfill the ministry that is assigned to us.

However, Christians were not alone in seeing religious belief as a motivation for working in a social service NGO. More than half of the interview participants from Muslim NGOs stated that religious belief or inspiration was one of the factors that drew the individual to work for the organization (See Table 4). Several interview participants from Muslim NGOs shared examples of Muslim teachings that emphasize the imperative of offering service to others.

We were living in areas that were poor, and the need for services motivated us and gave us incentives. What added to this is the religious and moral side, the hadith (religious teachings). There is a hadith that I still remember that says "all the creatures are sons of God", so it described God as a man and all the creature as his sons, "and the most close to God is the most beneficial", so God said he is the father of all and the closest one to him is the one that benefits people the most. So this is one example of a really expressive hadith, it explains the role of human beings, and the principal role of the human being is to serve other people. There are lot of hadith that explain that people ought to serve each other.

The prophet said that he who sleeps and doesn’t care about others is not a Muslim. So imagine if I come here and I know that there is a sick man and I don’t help him, then I am not a Muslim or a human.

No interview participants from Druze organizations indicated that religious belief had played a role in leading them to their NGO work (See Table 4). This may be because, while Islam obliges its adherents to make charitable contributions of material goods and labor as a form of zakat or alms giving (xxxix), zakat took on a very different meaning when the Druze religion diverged from Islam. For the Druze faithful, zakat in the material sense is seen as less important than the act of soul cleansing and purification. (xl) As Obeid (2006) states, “to satisfy the requirement of zakat, it is not enough to donate material goods to safeguard the brethren; the effort has to extend to the spiritual realm as well.” (xli) One interview participant from a Druze NGO explained zakat as a practice that falls entirely outside the Druze religion.

The Muslims have much more income than we do. They are much more in numbers, and they have their zakat. I don’t know if you know about the zakat. It’s an obligatory donation in the Muslim religion. To give zakat, especially in Ramadan, it’s an obligation. They are obliged to give this, two percent of their income to charity. The Muslims have to give it, but the Druze don’t have zakat, so we don’t have to. It’s up to your wish and up to your ability, if you can give or not.

Therefore, while Druze NGOs’ staff members are undoubtedly engaged in charitable work, their attitudes and behavior may be influenced more by humanitarian aims than by religious belief.
Table 4. Reasons for Working in Social Service NGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO CATEGORY</th>
<th>ORIGINAL SAMPLE</th>
<th>Personal Ties in Faith Community</th>
<th>Religious Belief/Inspiration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faith-Based</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ethnic Motivations for Service: The Role of Cultural and Linguistic Preservation

The sample for this study also included several faith-based and secular NGOs serving the Armenian and Palestinian communities in Lebanon. These organizations reported the same sectarian pattern in their service provision, and these patterns are likely affected by many of the same factors that affect other NGOs. However, the reported motivations for service provision were much different than those reported by faith-based NGOs. Both minorities have been influenced at least in part by their past experiences of violence or exclusion. However, while religion seems to intersect with ethnic identity as a motivation for Armenian interview participants, Palestinian interview participants carefully distanced themselves from religion, instead embracing their national identity.

Language, Culture, and Faith- Lebanon’s Armenian Community

During the First World War, 1.5 million Armenians were killed in what was then Turkish Armenia. During this period the Turks attempted to extinguish the Armenians in the Armenian provinces of the Ottoman Empire through systematic ethnic cleansing. While the genocide has been carefully documented, it remains categorically denied by the Turkish government. Thousands of Armenians who were fleeing the massacres and deportation found sanctuary in Lebanon, where they were legally integrated into Lebanese society. As of 1998 Armenians in Lebanon numbered around 150,000. The Armenian population in Lebanon is predominantly Christian, and faith plays a strong role in the community. As one interview participant notes,

When you say Armenian you automatically mean Christian. Of course you have Armenians who have been converts to other religions, and you have those who are only nominally Christians, but no one usually says, “I’m not a Christian.” When you say “Armenian”, that’s automatically Christian.

However, in spite of a strong sense of Christian identity, the violence and exclusion of the Armenian genocide and mass deportation seemed to have the strongest influence on the identity of Armenian NGO staff. Without fail, interview participants from Armenian NGOs discussed the genocide and how it influenced their work. The historical experience of the Armenian genocide often intersected
with Christian faith as a motivation and inspiration for service provision, a congruence captured by one interview participant.

If you know anything about the genocide you know that about 1.5 million Armenians were massacred, and the remnants of those people ran away and came to Syria and Lebanon...But in that very very bad condition, the first thing they did was to establish schools and churches. I mean, they weren’t people who nagged about their condition. Of course, a lot of help came from different countries and organizations, and we are very thankful for that. But in addition to that help, the Armenian people were convinced that education, that faith, came first. Their condition did not define their future. They defined the future through what they saw as very important, and that makes this work we do today very important. I mean, people had hopes that brought us up to this stage where we are today. So we cannot just forget schools and churches and social institutions just because of financial difficulties, just because we are in a bad position nowadays. This does not justify anything. We should keep on going as we have always done. We have seen far worse days than these days so this drives us to keep going, and this is something I am proud of as Armenian. And I hope that the coming generations will be as proud as our ancestors were in the old days.

Most interview participants from Armenian NGOs indicated that their organization provided services almost exclusively to Armenians. Interview participants attributed this ethnically-based service provision to the geographic segregation of their community and to linguistic barriers presented to Arabic-speaking Lebanese in an Armenian language environment. However, a second reason for ethnically-based service provision that was mentioned by some interview participants was a desire to preserve the Armenian identity, language, and culture. Some perceived that this could only be done by keeping certain aspects of life, such as service provision, separate from mainstream Lebanese society.

But sadly, and I am speaking as an Armenian, we Armenians need to keep our identity. To do that we usually separate ourselves at least in some areas of life, because we have seen genocide, we know the danger of being dissolved or being cancelled from the map, being lost forever. We have tasted that, and now we don’t want a cultural genocide where Armenians will eventually become in Lebanon Lebanese, in Syria Syrians, in America Americans, and forget their language, culture, music, which is very rich."

Thus in the case of interview participants from Armenian NGOs, we see that ethnic identity, and occasionally religious identity, influence the attitudes and behavior of NGO staff. The result, however, is the same as for other faith-based NGOs; service provision becomes exclusive and structured along ethnic lines.

**Preserving Culture and Nation- Lebanon’s Palestinian Refugees**

During the First World War, 1.5 million Armenians were killed in what was then Turkish Armenia. After the 1948 defeat of the Arab armies by the Israelis, more than 750,000 Palestinians fled to neighboring Arab countries, with 200,000 settling in United Nations-operated camps near Lebanon’s major cities. Additional Palestinian refugees arrived after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and
Palestinian clashes in Jordan in 1970, bringing with them the PLO infrastructure. While Lebanon had previously welcomed refugees of Kurdish, Assyrian, and Armenian descent, legally and socially integrating them into society, the same was not true for the Palestinians. This was due in part to a broadly held belief among Arab countries that permanent integration would compromise the goal of Palestinians ultimately returning to their homeland. In Lebanon, an additional factor was the fear that integrating the Palestinians as a large group of mainly Muslim citizens would upset the country’s religious-political balance. Many Palestinians continue to live segregated from the rest of Lebanese society in refugee camps, and continue to face a number of legal and social barriers to their participation in Lebanese society.

Based on our understanding of the past and current condition of the Palestinians, one can see at least three ways that violence and exclusion might influence the identity salience of Palestinians in Lebanon. The establishment of the state of Israel, which pushed large numbers of Palestinians from their homes and into refugee communities throughout the Arab world, is a major factor that might increase the salience of Palestinian national identity. The continual exclusion of Palestinians from Lebanese society is a second factor that might increase identity salience. A third factor is the violence Palestinians experienced during the civil war. Interview participants from Palestinian NGOs told stories indicating that their experience as refugees, their continual exclusion from Lebanese society, and their experience of violence during the Lebanese civil war influenced their attitudes about the work in which their organizations were engaged. Their Palestinian identity salience was high, and all participants indicated that their Palestinian identity had far greater influence on their work than religious identity.

Perhaps the most commonly mentioned complaint among Palestinian interview participants was the exclusion of Palestinians from participation in Lebanese society. NGO workers saw this exclusion as having a negative impact on the practical nature of their work, and in many ways increasing their workload. Because Palestinians cannot work in approximately 70 professions, because they cannot be treated in Lebanese government hospitals, and because many are living in poor conditions in the camps, NGO workers felt that the social, economic, and health problems of service recipients were exacerbated. One interview participant notes,

The Palestinians in Lebanon are forbidden from civil and human rights. We are not allowed to be treated in Lebanese government hospitals. About 72 types of jobs, we are not allowed to work in them. We are not allowed to inherit property, like if it’s left to our children...If you visit the camps you can see how they suffer from segregation, from health, the living conditions, from crowdedness of houses and crowdedness inside the houses, and we have a high percentage of chronic diseases.

Much like the Armenians, Palestinians’ experience of being pushed out of their homeland caused interview participants from Palestinians NGOs to also give great importance to efforts to preserve Palestinian culture and identity. One interview participant explains,

One of our most important projects is saving the Palestinian heritage, the needlework and the embroidery that they do, the Palestinian folk dances... We also have a project where we emphasize on having every child know where he is from in Palestine, what city or village in Palestine, just to keep their memory.
One interesting characteristic of the interviews with the Palestinian NGO workers is their rejection of any affiliation with a religious identity. This usually came out in response to questions confirming that the NGO was not a faith-based organization. Several respondents took great care to explain that their Palestinian identity was most important, regardless of their religious identity.

For the Palestinians, we feel that it doesn’t really matter if we are Christians, if we are Druze, if we are Muslims, if we’re Jews. We don’t care, we are just Palestinians, you know? We are all Palestinians regardless of our religion. This is how I feel and this is how I feel that the Palestinians feel. Like here as I told you we have Christians and Muslims, and we live really peacefully, we are a family.

And we have another camp, I don’t know if you know about the other camp, it’s Palestinian Christians there. You know, it’s amazing, they still have the accent, the Palestinian accent. And for me, I’m a Muslim, but when I go there, I feel like I am going to Palestine. It’s overwhelming for me just to be there. And I don’t care- this is how we feel, the Palestinians. It’s Palestine, it’s Palestinians, it’s not what your religion is.

For interview participants from Palestinian NGOs, similar to those of Armenian NGOs, ethnic identity has a strong influence on the attitudes and behavior of NGO staff. Also similar to the Armenian NGOs, the Palestinian NGOs serve almost exclusively Palestinian recipients. Most interview participants attributed this to the geographic location of their work, which was typically focused inside Palestinian refugee camps. As is the case with the other NGOs examined, service provision is structured along identity-based lines.

**Conclusion**

This is a relatively small study examining the role of faith and ethnicity as motivations for service by NGO staff members in Lebanon. While the population examined here is limited and most certainly does not represent volunteer behavior as a whole, NGO staff and volunteers are a valuable population to examine due to their strong involvement in the social service sector in Lebanon and other Arab countries.

The interview data indicates that staff members from most of the religious traditions included in the study are motivated by their faith to be of service to others, and many believe the faith orientation of their organization adds value to their service provision. However, this perception differs based on religious tradition. Religious social networks also play a strong role in leading NGO staff and volunteers to become involved in a service career. The interview data indicates that staff members from Armenian and Palestinian NGOs have a strong motivation to be of service to their community due to past experiences of violence and exclusion in the region. The motivation to preserve linguistic and cultural aspects of their communities is paramount.

A better understanding of the influence of faith and ethnicity on service to others offers policymakers a potential opportunity to capitalize on this behavior and increase volunteerism, donations, and other forms of service. However, due in large part to Lebanon’s history of sectarian conflict and civil war, past experiences of ethnic and religious conflict motivate most groups to serve primarily members of their own ethnic and religious community rather than the community as a whole. This
pattern of service has the potential to heighten sectarian boundaries and increase conflict. In the case of Lebanon and other contexts plagued by religious or ethnic conflict, policy makers must be mindful of this dynamic. (xviii)


Greenspan, I. (2004). Mediating Bedouin Futures? The roles and influence of NGOs in the conflict between the State of Israel and the Negev Bedouins. Paper read at International Society for Third Sector Research Sixth International Conference, in Toronto, ON.


Vogel, Dita (2008), Highly Active Immigrants: A resource for European civil societies. New York: Peter Lang.


End Notes

i. (Greeley, 1997; Hodgkinson, 1990; Hodgkinson, Weitzman, & Kirsch, 1990; Lam, 2002)
ii. (Cairns, Harris, & Hutchison, 2005; Jeavons, 1994)
iii. (Smith et al, 1999)
iv. (Vogel, 2008)
v. (Obeid, 2006)
vi. (Abul-Husn, 1998)
vii. According to the CIA World Factbook (2006), Lebanon’s population is 39% Christian.
viii. According to the CIA World Factbook (2006), Lebanon’s population is 59.7% Muslim. This figure includes Druze along with Shiites, Sunni, and other Muslim groups).
ix. (Simon 1993)
x. (Anand 2004; Anheier and Salamon 1998; Ilchman, Katz, and Queen II 1998; James 1989; Smith et al. 1999)
xi. (Joseph 1995; Smith et al. 1999)
xii. (Smith et al. 1999; Greenspan 2004; Osili 2004)
xiii. (Isdudi 2004; Paulos; Smith et al. 1999)
xiv. (Cochrane 2004; Smith et al. 1999)
xv. (Wuthnow, 1993)
xvi. (Skocpol, 2000)
xvii. (Wuthnow, 1999)
xviii. 3 Economists have been interested in religion since the time of Adam Smith (1759). Rational choice studies of religion tend to focus on religious markets, religious human capital, and churches as clubs and firms. Many of these studies emphasize maximization of after-life utility, free riding, or competition among sects as opposed to material benefits of religious participation (Iannacconne, 1998).
xix. Marx (2003) demonstrates the important role that religious exclusion played in national consolidation in Europe; Huntington (1993) argues that religion will be one of the fundamental sources of global political conflict in coming years.
xx. (Werbner, 2002)
xxi. Ibid, (p. 125)
xxii. Because secular NGOs by definition do not belong to any sect, seven secular NGOs were included in this column not because they primarily serve individuals from their own sect, but because they serve a homogenous group of individuals primarily from one single sect.
In this table the percentage of interview participants mentioning a particular reason for working in a social service NGO does not add up to 100% because many participants mentioned more than one reason for choosing their line of work.
Charity and the Trust Deficit

Anjum Haque

---

Anjum Haque is the Executive Director of the Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy.
Introduction

This paper was presented at the 2011 Takaful Conference in Amman, Jordan. This conference was held in the wake of the Egyptian revolution and the amazing awakening in the Arab World. The events following the Egyptian revolution have inspired movements worldwide and the effects are still being felt throughout the world. While the repression unleashed on the people in some countries is shocking and painful, the overall change that has been wrought in the psyche of the people and their leaders cannot be overstated. Repression may wreak havoc in the short term but the enduring spirit of the people will bring its own dividends in the long run.

Though on the surface the subject of this paper is philanthropy, it is really a call for generating indigenous resources in order to release honorable people from the shackles of servitude which indiscriminately borrowing nations put them in. These are resources that will help reduce the inequalities between the rich and the poor; inequalities which fuelled the recent uprisings in the Arab world. Socio-economic conditions which lead to the marginalization of the masses have to be addressed in an indigenous manner with local problems being resolved through local solutions. The values of human dignity, rights, responsibilities, equality and service entrenched in the Muslim psyche are now the hallmark of the modern world. If these values are to be truly revived in the Muslim world, they will need galvanizing by local initiatives. This can only be accomplished through partnerships with a robust civil society which has the ability and legitimacy to rise to the occasion and inspire the people. The lack of access to a reasonable level of success economically, socially and politically has to be replaced with a more equitable solution that will ensure honor and dignity for people, translating into the provision of services like education, health and poverty alleviation.

The voices of the Arab Spring demand rights for the people: they demand political freedom, the ability to make their own destiny; they demand an end to socio-economic inequality. However, all these aspirations need a reality check. They can only be achieved through a process, and that process necessarily has to involve the development of civil society, strengthen partnerships between the public and private sectors and make the government accountable.

Issues around the Continuum from Charity to Strategic Philanthropy

Strategic philanthropy is the cornerstone of charitable giving. This is especially true in the Arab/Muslim world. However, despite its huge potential in this region, philanthropy has not been effectively institutionalized. The continuing debate between giving to individuals for relief and giving to institutions for sustainability forms the defining ends of a continuum which is the subject of much debate and discussion. While it is not possible to proffer absolute choices to givers, the space between the two choices can yield a number of options.

The history of Philanthropy predates history itself. It has been the single most sustaining of activities for the dispossessed since times immemorial. Though the basic impulse for giving is largely faith based, it is essentially a moral urge that exists in human beings irrespective of school of thought, religion, color or creed. Helping humanity in distress is a basic part of every religious creed.
Philanthropy was practiced by ancient civilizations in the Middle East, Greece and Rome. One example was an endowment supported Plato’s Academy (c.387 BC) which existed for almost 900 years. In terms of institutionalized giving, the Islamic waqf goes back to 7th century AD. The medieval church was similarly involved in philanthropy during the 17th and 18th centuries. 17th and 18th century Europe engaged in philanthropy which received its modern day fillip in the 20th century when private foundations were able to mobilize millions of dollars for humanitarian needs. The 20th century witnessed the phenomenal rise and strengthening of these foundations. As profits in the corporate/financial sectors increased dramatically so too did the amount of funding they provided for the formal charitable sector. Much like in the preceding three centuries, the 21st is seeing further evolution in the relationship between the private sector and philanthropic organizations.

There is a both a historical and practical distinction between charity and philanthropy. Literature on the subject is now rich and diverse but quite clear on the difference. Charitable giving can be defined based on several categories based on individual, cultural, ethnic and religious preferences. There is a huge amount of giving taking place the world over; this giving has incredible potential not only in terms of absolute numbers but in terms of the qualitative change it can infuse in the lives of those who need it. It has the capacity to answer to the needs of the givers, recipients as well as the facilitators, all of whom are important protagonists in this rewarding enterprise. What these protagonists need to do is to find a suitable synergistic mix to move the process forward. Unfortunately poverty is increasing faster than efforts directed towards controlling or alleviating it. The underlying problem here is the need for sustainability which will impact poverty better than giving for immediate relief. However, giving for immediate relief is an integral and immensely important part of anti-poverty activity which arguments in favor of sustainability do not ignore. The sight of human suffering and deprivation is too intense to be relegated to concerns for future deals or future benefits alone.

While philanthropy has many different definitions, it is important to look at it in terms of a phenomenon that encompasses all kinds of giving and charity. In particular, how various forms are practiced by different cultural, ethnic and religious groups. The purpose is to address social issues which are inadequately remedied by the state, leading to a steady decrease in the humanity of those affected.

It is imperative that enhanced social and economic goods be produced to address these gaps. Such an approach is characterized as strategic philanthropy. Its practice leads the philanthropic impulse towards the creation of social assets. These assets can serve the needs of the populace by providing them with a reliable and a relatively steady source of necessary goods. The necessary goods generated by these assets include, but are not limited to, education, skills development, health and welfare. The recent rise of philanthropic organizations has created many opportunities to expand the practice of strategic philanthropy.

However, access the full realization of these opportunities still remains an issue, as does their adequacy of resources. The role of individual societies and social economic conditions enhances or diminishes the role and efficacy of philanthropic organizations. The changing economic and social development challenges facing the world demand collective action.

Governments are no longer able to single handedly fill the development gap that emerges due to a
lack of human and financial resources. As such, the significant gap between the rich and the poor remains largely unaddressed. This is a global truth. What is most important is the development of partnerships across society for increased contributions both material and technical.

Within the Muslim world, the divide is all the more obvious when we consider the wealth of nations and the impoverishment of the masses. Luckily, there is now greater awareness that these inequities have to be addressed. The world is looking closely at the potential of the Muslim world to develop the philanthropic paradigm. Financial estimates range from 500 billion dollars to one trillion dollars per annum accruing to the organizations. Philanthropic organizations across multiple sectors are supremely interested in opportunities and solutions to multiply these assets and increase their potential for investment into social sectors. We have to weigh all such approaches with care and caution.

New development strategies are replacing conventional approaches as the world moves towards accommodating rights based actions for social and economic development. While pervasive poverty and inequity remain the root cause of social problems, there is an enormous opportunity for positive change through synergistic use of resource and organizational partnerships.

Such an approach can flourish only in an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence. One of the major obstacles to institutionalized philanthropy is the lack of trust between the giver and the receiver. Civil society is assuming a definitive role in social development and governments are beginning to recognize the need for meaningful partnership with civil society organizations (CSO). Such a partnership is necessary to effectively bridge the social development gap because neither party is able to achieve this in isolation. As such, there is a need for a strategic approach towards building the capacities of civil society and promoting civil society organizations as a credible source for, and partner in, development. Civil society, in turn, needs to engage with the private sector which has access to vast resources as well as an interest in socio-economic development.

The following is a description/presentation of an institutional program that seeks to lend credibility to the work of CSOs and strengthen the partnerships that they are capable of making by examining their governance structures, financial management systems and program delivery services to certify them for ultimate tax exemption by the government. Such a program exists in Pakistan as well as other parts of the world. Different countries’ models were studied before the PCP program was launched. These studies will also be reviewed.

The Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy (PCP)

The Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy’s mission is to increase the volume and effectiveness of philanthropy on social development in Pakistan. To achieve this, it works towards strengthening the partnership between the three sectors of society (private sector, civil society and government) to work together in achieving the common goal of social development. The focus of PCP’s philosophy is on partnerships. Partnerships need a platform of trust and confidence in order to prosper, especially when partnerships deal with significant amounts of money that is being funneled into social development. In order to build this confidence the needs of the respective parties must be met. The donors need to be confident that their contribution is reaching the correct beneficiary, the beneficiaries’ needs have to be analyzed and addressed in a rational manner and a suitable
guarantor needs to be identified whose guarantee holds both moral and administrative power. The tri synergistic partnership which PCP promotes is divided as follows:

1. **Partnership with civil society**

The role that civil society plays in filling the social divide has now been transformed into a paradigm of development.

The size, scope and capacity of civil society organizations working for public benefit have expanded dramatically. While informal activities especially of a self help and mutual support kind have characterized village life for millennia, formal organizations were few and far between in our part of the world and confined to a narrow range of relief and welfare activities. This spectrum has now broadened to include around 45000 organizations employing about 300,000 workers and engaging 200,000 full time volunteers in activities ranging from the traditional to the specialized. The role and the functions of Government have also undergone a phenomenal change. The State is shifting from being a monopoly provider of social services to creating an enabling environment for a variety of non state actors to deliver a variety of important social services. The state is thus moving towards becoming a facilitator rather than a controller. Such an approach is bound to unlock significantly greater contributions to national development by civil society partners than has happened in the past. Such an approach is likely to give incentive to business and individuals to move towards social investment through civil society organizations thus unlocking its own scarce resources for more efficient and effective management. (i)

Civil society is recognized as the most effective vehicle for supporting the needy and providing services during emergencies while state institutions are still in the process of being mobilized. There emerged startling evidence of this phenomenon during the numerous natural disasters which have hit Pakistan. Two prime examples of this are the earthquake of 2005, which killed 73000 people and left many more crippled, homeless and destitute and the floods of 2010, termed as the greatest natural disaster the world has ever faced which left 20 million homeless and destitute and thousands dead and washed away. Both calamities destroyed not only people but also any basic infrastructure which may have existed. It was the civil society organizations and individual donors who were the first to reach the site of these calamities; they remain committed to the rehabilitation of the affected masses. The government tried very hard to play its part but the tragedies were of such a massive scale that it was not within the power of any government to single handedly address the people’s needs. It is interesting to note here that the assistance which Pakistan received from the countries of the world included extensive civil society intervention in terms of cash, goods and time volunteered.

Civil society, while being a critical resource, is at times the subject of criticism and mistrust. There are always exceptions to the rule of honesty and integrity. Such exceptions create a climate of distrust and lack of confidence. The diversity in the foci and sizes of CSOs plays a part in this perception. The ability that these organizations have to both assess and address the needs of their constituents cannot be found with any other actor in the social development field; this is the source of their immense value and potential. They are staffed by committed individuals whose objective is to redress the rampant inequities of society at whatever scale they can handle it and partners in these efforts must recognize the spirit and its worth and find ways and means of supporting them.
2. Partnership with the Private sector

The private sector is the repository of much entrepreneurial wealth which places a social responsibility on its shoulders to share that wealth with the society that helped generate it in the first place. Many private/corporate organizations have now established social sector financial institutions or charitable foundations of their own to channel their giving while also developing corporate social responsibility portfolios. However, they still need the help of CSOs to deliver services in thematic areas of their choice to geographical areas selected by them; it is not always possible for them to reach grass roots level populations on their own. Their purposes are better served by engaging CSOs in terms of service delivery as well as saving themselves the cost of creating establishments which would drain funding for social development. The private sector, though wary of government intervention, is not averse to government support for establishing civil society sector credentials.

3. Partnerships with donors

Donors can be national or international. However, their defining requirement is a proof of capacity and the ability to deliver services with credibility and efficiency. Many donors institute their own evaluation mechanisms which increase delivery costs which reduces funds available for the actual projects. In order to avoid this, the donors need to be convinced that the delivery channels selected for their projects are secure, effective and reputable.

4. Partnership with Government

The Government is the most potent guarantor for any activity. This is evidenced by the many sovereign guarantees our governments extend for securing substantial foreign loans. Additionally, those guarantees are accepted irrespective of the financial solvency of the governments extending them. So, if there exists a government guarantee, the civil society sector is reasonably assumed to be effective.

The Trust Deficit

The trust deficit is based not only on suspicion but on a lack of information about the protagonists of the social sector development enterprise. The two major stakeholders, the government and CSOs operating for public benefit, distrust each other. This credibility gap mars all interaction between the two. This was exemplified during PCP’s consultations with stakeholders.

The reasons for a lack of trust are manifold and some have already been discussed. However, donors, no matter the size of the donation, seek an insurance policy before committing their money for altruistic causes. The donors have a responsibility to themselves, their organizations, their own ideologies and raison d’ etres to ensure that the subject of their largesse is well defined, deserving and focused in its endeavors. Additionally, donors need a guarantee that CSO projects possess the succor needed to achieve their stated ends. The onus of responsibility for providing proof that these needs are being met lies not with the donor but with the implementing partners, who have to establish their credentials and provide a guarantee to the donor through transparency and detailed record keeping. There are many CSOs which are recognized purely by their work
and do not need any props for generating support. In Pakistan, the Edhi Foundation, the Shaukat Khanum Cancer Hospital, the Layton Rehamatullah Benevolent Trust, the Al Shifa Eye Hospital, and the Citizen’s Foundation are all prime examples.

The search for credibility has been a recurring theme throughout literature on philanthropy. Some countries have addressed this problem by regulating CSOs through state institutions. CSOs, on the other hand, have never approved of such regulation; the idea of state regulation is abhorrent to them. As both the government and CSOs have legitimate arguments, this point will be explored further in the context of Pakistan.

In September 2001, the government of Pakistan commissioned the PCP to undertake a study of all laws pertaining to civil society organizations, especially non-profit organizations working for public benefit. A country-wide consultation was launched with a broad range of stakeholders to ascertain their views on the present systems and seek suggestions for improvements towards good governance, transparency and accountability. The center set up a team of prominent national and international experts who participated in more than 65 consultations and meetings across the country, engaging more than 2200 participants. Diverse perspectives, rigorous analysis, reflective deliberations and intense debate characterized the exercise undertaken by PCP. These consultations produced a consensus-based legal framework for the growth and development of CSOs operating in the public interest. However, despite the transparent and participatory process, civil society in the final analysis denied the validity of the framework and opposed any regulation that was even proposed, yet alone recommended. The larger CSOs were not willing to accept any kind of a regulatory system that would hold them accountable in any way.

The results reflect a clear reflection of lack of trust: civil society to accept any formal regulation even when the framework was established by non-governmental stakeholders. In response, PCP started work on a volitional certification program which in order to establish CSO reputability by basing this credibility on their performance as well as the soundness of their systems.

The NPO certification programme was at the centre of controversy when it was initiated. Many civic groups questioned PCP’s mandate to certify independent and self governing organizations. Government agencies and donors were sceptical whether a certification scheme would gain the necessary legitimacy and scale. Business donors favoured their own due diligence mechanisms and were keen to retain their own independence and discretion. Since its inception however, the certification scheme has gained legitimacy among many of those who have been involved with it from government, civil society and business (ii).

Given the suspicion between stakeholders, government, civil society and donors, it was exceptionally difficult for PCP to convince all these actors to accept the process. PCP strengthened its case by asking for a role that would imply total volitional response from the civil society sector. The government had long been unable to circumvent its reputation of being too willing to grant of tax exemptions to CSOs. In Pakistan, an organization registered as a non-profit organization working for the general public good is granted tax-exempt status by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR). The PCP proposed a partnership with the FBR under which organizations evaluated and duly certified by the PCP would be given tax exemption. The PCP proposed a certification regime
that would be: eclectic in nature; would draw upon best international practices; develop a scoring system that would take local environments into cognizance. This regime would deliver an assessment of the CSO governance systems including management, finance and program delivery to show the transparency and efficiency with which they worked and were able to deliver.

Overview of Certification Internationally

Over the past 10-15 years, certification mechanisms have been initiated in many countries as a means to promote transparency, accountability and good governance. Recently conducted research studies provide ample evidence of the value added by certification as a mechanism for improving systems and processes in non-profits as well as for providing credibility assurance to donors about recipient organizations. In some cases, certification programs are also recognized by the governments, such as mechanisms which grant tax exemptions. For example, the AusAID Accreditation Scheme is mandatory for all Australian NGOs eligible for government funding. The accreditation process is designed “to provide AusAid and the Australian public with confidence that the Australian government is funding professional, well managed community based organizations that are capable of delivering quality development outcomes.” (ICNL) AusAid considers its accreditation program to be a “front end risk management process.” (ICNL) The accreditation process has two parts: an organizational review and a financial systems analysis.

In the Philippines, the certification mechanism is linked to tax benefits and is carried out by a designated independent accreditation agency, The Philippines Council for NGO Certification (PCNC). PCNC evaluation criteria include standards in the following categories: Vision, Mission, Goals, Governance, Administration, Program Operations (including monitoring and evaluation), Financial Management and Networking.

In Canada, a self-certification program ‘Code of Ethics’ is mandatory for all members of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation, an international civil society cooperation umbrella network.

Each type of accreditation/ certification mechanism has strengths and weaknesses, depending on the context in which it operates. Self-certification is certainly low-cost and easy to administer. However, the effectiveness of this mechanism depends to a large extent on the rigor with which the self-evaluation is carried out. By comparison, certification by a professional agency provides the best assurance of quality in service delivery, but is expensive to implement.

In India, Give India maintains a web-based donation service through which donors may contribute online to certain not-for-profit organizations of their choice. In order to receive on-line donations through the “Give Online” site, an organization must meet selection criteria established by Give India. Specifically, an organization must be: a registered nonprofit which implements social development projects in India, politically unaffiliated at least 50% of its beneficiaries must be economically underprivileged, it must meet standards established by the “Credibility Alliance,” and it must be “willing to provide prompt feedback for the donations” that are made. The process for selection involves submission of an application which requires substantial disclosure in terms of financial reports and legal documents as well as an appraisal according to Credibility Alliance norms and an on-site visit.
The Credibility Alliance is a consortium of voluntary organizations and networks. Its norms are divided into “minimum norms” and “desirable norms,” both of which must be met by organizations listed on the website. There are 25 minimum norms, which focus on, among other things: board governance; consistency of activities with the organization’s mission; the existence of appropriate systems for planning, monitoring and review; internal control and consultative decision-making; clearly defined rules for personnel, including volunteers; appropriate financial and annual reporting. Desirable Norms require: that 2/3 of Board members be unrelated by blood or marriage; that a board rotation policy be in effect; disclosure of key executive staff’s salary and benefits; the distribution of staff by salary levels is disclosed in the organization’s annual report.

In the USA, the Maryland Association of Nonprofit Organizations (MANO) has established a “Standards of Excellence as an Ethics and Accountability Code” for the non-profit sector. MANO is a state-wide membership organization of more than 800 nonprofits devoted to strengthening and improving “individual nonprofit organizations and the nonprofit sector as a whole, while also working to bolster public confidence in and support for nonprofit organizations.” By establishing high, mutually agreed-upon standards in ethics and accountability, MANO has been able to raise public confidence and support for the non-profit sector in Maryland.

MANO began its ethics initiative in the wake of several national scandals involving improprieties by charities in the United States. After receiving a major funding commitment from the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation as well as other philanthropic organizations and corporations, the organization formed a 50 member working group. The working group consisted of NGO representatives, academics, lawyers, and other professionals, with subcommittees devoted to self-regulation, sector education, and public education. Over the following year, the working group conducted research and analysis of other regulatory frameworks, self-regulatory programs, educational initiatives, and public service campaigns. After completing the research phase, the working group drafted the Standards of Excellence as an Ethics and Accountability Code and designed a self-regulatory program as well as developed education and public relations plans.

PCP Certification Program

1. The Context

Nonprofit organizations (NPOs) have recently grown in importance throughout the world. It is generally recognized that social development cannot be achieved by government alone but requires broad-based, public and private partnerships, which involves ordinary citizen at all levels of society.

In Pakistan, the nonprofit sector has emerged as a significant force in promoting social and human development in the last decade. Nonprofit organizations are considered invaluable partners within the international donor community because of their ability to effectively deliver social services such as education, health, poverty alleviation, or rights advocacy. The diverse reforms being implemented in Pakistan, which include an enhanced role for the CSO sector, depend on effective relations between state institutions and civil society, especially NPOs. The Government of Pakistan’s (GoP’s) Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) spells out the measures needed to build the capacity of nonprofit organizations so that they may assume their role in building partnerships
for both service delivery and as advocates for the poor. However, with the rapid growth of civil society and its emergence as a key player in the development agenda, nonprofit organizations are facing many new challenges. As they seek to diversify and develop their resource base, nonprofit organizations increasingly realize the importance of putting in place mechanisms which guarantee transparency, efficiency and good governance.

Multiple consultations undertaken by PCP have time and again indicated that the lack of information about NPOs is one of the major impediments to the expansion of their development activities. However, the need to improve accountability and transparency is a worldwide concern and not limited to Pakistan. Different approaches and solutions are being tried out in a variety of contexts; they all have the common goal of improving accountability, financial transparency, governance and program delivery.

2. The case for certification

In Pakistan, this includes the codes of conduct developed by various NGO networks (i.e. the one developed by Pakistan NGO Forum [PNF] a few years ago). Establishing such codes is a significant effort towards self-regulation as well as improving governance and transparency for NGOs. However, compliance remains a problem; many NGOs are not serious about adhering to standards so progress has remained minimal. In the absence of any enforcement mechanisms, the voluntary codes of conduct fall far too short of having a noticeable positive influence on the state of governance in the nonprofit sector and improving their public image.

PCP’s second initiative was titled “Nonprofit Organizations Certification Program.” Certification is a system where NPOs are voluntarily evaluated by an external agency based on standardized parameters. This not only provides critical and credible information about evaluated NPOs to a range of stakeholders, but also helps NPOs to streamline their internal systems and mechanisms in accordance with international best practices.

Certification is particularly valuable in the context of Pakistani because there are a large number of citizens’ organizations working for public benefit absent any reliable mechanisms to establish credibility. Corporate and other philanthropists have neither the means nor the time to thoroughly assess these organizations’ capacity and quality. Therefore, identification of credible organizations is essential in order for the government, corporate sector and other funding agencies to manage their assistance and to increase credible organizations’ access to support for their program.

3. Certification experience in Pakistan

In Pakistan, the Government entrusted to PCP the task of development of a certification and accreditation regime for NPOs. Mr. Shaukat Aziz, the then Finance Minister, announced the proposed reform in the 2003 Finance Bill (Para 34):

In order to assist in the creation of a credible rating list of NPOs, the income tax law contains the provision of non-government professional evaluation of the NPOs for entitlement to tax privileges. The Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy has therefore been assigned the initial responsibility for setting up a hierarchy for evaluation of the NPOs seeking ben-
efits under the income tax regime. They would operate against a transparently laid down criteria delivered by qualified professionals. It is hoped that in due course of time other rating agencies will also come into being on need basis to perform the same job.

The same commitment was more loudly pronounced in the PRSP (2003; Para 5.190 - 5.191):

The poverty reduction strategy recognizes the significant role that NGOs can play in social service delivery, advocacy, and empowerment. However, the arrangements do not exist to identify credible Not-for-Profit Organizations (NPOs) that can be trusted for contributions from corporate philanthropists towards social investment. Certification of NPOs will help bridge that gap. As a first step, the Government has authorized the PCP for such certification.

A formal Memorandum of Understanding was also signed in 2003 between PCP and the Government of Pakistan’s Revenue Division. In pursuance with the mandate provided by GoP, PCP undertook an extensive research and consultation exercise to develop the certification standards and process. The year-long process involved in-depth analysis of registration and taxation laws in Pakistan, comparative examination of various certification regimes in other parts of the world, study of codes of conduct developed by NGO networks in and outside Pakistan, and nation-wide consultations with key stakeholders (most notably, NPOs and corporate and international donors). The product was the Certification Model, which contained process and standards for certification. The standards (72 in all) were grouped together in three broad categories: internal governance, financial management and program delivery. The Model is available on PCP’s web site (www.pcp.org.pk) and has been formally approved by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR).

PCP also undertook the task of implementing the certification regime and was formally authorized as Pakistan’s first NPO Certification Agency (Appendix 1). In 2002, through a series of amendments in the Income Tax Rules, the CBR linked tax exemptions to evaluation and certification by an independent certification agency.

Since December 2003, PCP has received 485 applications from a very diverse range of NPOs including large networks and umbrella organizations (like Pakistan Micro-finance Network) and small-scale community initiatives (like SESWA). The Centre evaluates about 8 -10 NPOs every month and by, June 2005 had certified 206 NPOs. Brief organizational and program profiles for each of these NPOs can be found on PCP’s website.

Certification is awarded after a very rigorous and detailed evaluation which requires 15 - 20 person days of investigation spread over a period of two months. Two basic instruments of evaluation - the desk review and field evaluation - are applied. Desk review involves examination of documents furnished by the NPO. Then, a team of experienced and trained evaluators visits the organization (including any branches or facilities/ outlets) as per a mutually convenient program, conducts a review of field records, critically evaluates program delivery, and scores the NPO on relevant parameters. Observations from desk review and field evaluation translate into a detailed evaluation report, containing strengths and weaknesses of the organization. Professional advice is also provided to the NPO to help improve weaknesses. The report is shared with the applicant NPO for feedback. Then it is presented to an independent Certification Panel, which has the final
authority to grant or refuse an NPO's request for certification. (For a description of certification process, see Appendix 2.)

4. Response from stakeholders

The response from corporate, international and Diaspora donors has been very positive. They have welcomed certification as an important strategic initiative to improve governance and transparency in the nonprofit sector and to provide credible information about potential recipients of their support. International donors are now asking for PCP certification as a preferred qualification for CSOs seeking funding, while some donors both national and international have made it a prerequisite. Some major Pakistani corporations and networks have already approached PCP for evaluation of their current and prospective partner organizations.

An issue of concern to many donors, as well as PCP, is the increasing pressure placed on PCP as it is currently the only certification agency. For this reason, PCP is reluctant to proactively approach additional donors who require their NGO partners to undergo certification since PCP may not be able to meet the demand.

The GoP relies on certification as the sole mechanism to strengthen governance in the nonprofit sector in Pakistan. GoP support also manifests itself in its representation on the Certification Panel, financial support for certification through the Ministry of Social Welfare (MoSW), PCP engagement for FBR capacity building, and PCP’s representation on a number of official forums and committees.

The FBR and its Zonal Commissioners accepted certification by PCP as sufficient and necessary proof of good performance by an NPO in achieving its aims and objectives during the last three years. This trust speaks to the confidence FBR possesses in this rigorous evaluation process as well as the value it adds to government’s work for channeling tax benefits to NPOs with a credible track record.

The response from the civil society sector itself has been mixed, at least initially. Some prominent NGO leaders (including those belonging to PNF) have questioned the utility of certification in view of the existence of voluntary codes of conduct. Their concerns also include PCP’s capacity and legitimacy to certify other organizations. They also consider certification as an exclusionary regime.

However, the bulk of NGOs (including most members of PNF, especially its provincial chapters in Punjab and NWFP), have expressed their full support for this initiative and view certification as a window of opportunity to diversify their resource base and to access increased philanthropic assistance. Many NPOs feel that certification helps them to obtain tax exemptions, saving them from the arbitrary and subjective discretion of the tax authorities. Overall support from the sector is increasing, as demonstrated by the influx of applications to PCP.

5. Lessons learned

The evaluation experience of the past few years has revealed that governance is a major issue in the nonprofit sector. Internal governance structures are weak and personalized. Too often, the
governing body is either nonexistent or fails to perform its policy-setting and supervisory role. Policy decisions are frequently left to the chief executive officers, who then work without clear accountability to the governing body. NPOs’ credibility is eroded and scarce development funds wasted. NPOs’ ability to deliver services innovatively and to sustain development advocacy is hampered.

As the role of the nonprofit sector in social development increases, its capacities must also be augmented to increase its efficiency and effectiveness. Several capacity-building organizations are working to do this. However, there are no clear standards and benchmarks for performance. Because it is semi-formal, the nonprofit sector does not adhere to sector-wide standards of governance, financial management, and program delivery. The certification standards not only constitute such benchmarks, but also incentivize adoption of and adherence to these standards by linking certification with a range of benefits.

6. Goal and objectives

The goal of NPO certification program is:

• To strengthen the nonprofit sector in Pakistan

The objectives of NPO certification program during 2006-09 are:

• To set sector-wide standards in critical areas of internal governance, financial management and program delivery
• To bridge the information and credibility gap between grant makers and grant recipients
• To help professionalize grant making of various categories of donors (national and international)
• To build NPOs’ capacity to meet international quality standards, GoP supports NPOs through tax incentives but does not have the required capacity and institutional mechanisms to evaluate their governance and financial attributes. Though FBR (and its Zonal Commissioners) scrutinize applications before allowing tax benefits, it does not have an objective system capable of yielding reliable information based on a transparent and professional process of evaluation. Through an amendment in the 2002 Income Tax Rules, tax authorities are obliged to apply the same parameters as developed by PCP. However, the FBR and its subordinate offices lack the capacity and the will to meet the rigor of a truly comprehensive evaluation. The system of standardized evaluations for performance assessment is also new to them. Therefore, the capacity of relevant FBR officers needs to be expanded so that they understand the new tax exemption regime and the process and parameters of performance assessment. Such capacity building efforts would help the FBR to target its tax incentives at professional, well-managed and transparent NPOs in addition to helping NPOs to obtain tax exemptions.

PCP’s experience with certification clearly illustrates the continued need for further expansion of the certification system and for refinement of process and standards for validating NPOs. Also important is the communication and dissemination of information; linking certified organizations with national and international donors (individuals and organizations) remains the overarching aim in strengthening Pakistani civil society.
The conventional to strategic continuum will always exist in the context of philanthropic giving. Accepting this, philanthropic actors must focus on pursuing as many sustainable solutions for social development as possible. There cannot be a sense of finality enshrined in any approach. The answers will be found in the effort, commitment and dedication of actors. Philanthropic actors must remain committed to sustainability by moving from individual to institutional; from charity to social development; from foreign dependence to indigenous resources.

Works Cited

- ICNL website
- Internal PCP documents
  - “Pakistan, A case study.” The Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy.

End Notes

Community Foundations As A Vehicle for Institutionalizing Corporate Philanthropy In Egypt’s New Cities: A Case Study of 10th of Ramadan City

Mahi Khallaf

---

6 Mahi Khallaf is a Freelance Development Practitioner and Consultant based in Cairo, Egypt.
Preface

This paper was originally conceptualized in 2008 as part of the requirements of the Center for Philanthropy and Civil Society City University Emerging Leaders in Philanthropy fellowship. The field work and stakeholder interviews were carried out in 2009; the paper has been a work in progress since. This is the first time that the results of this field work will be shared in a conference setting and the author looks forward to participants' feedback.

It is important to point out that this paper does not take into account the historic revolution that took place in Egypt in January 2011. The resulting removal of President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak and the dismissal of the National Democratic Party government which ruled Egypt for the last 30 years has dramatically changed Egypt's government and society. Although the paper does not take into account these historic events it is important to point out that, in light of these changes and Egypt's foreseeable transition to democracy, the community foundation model put forward in this paper is even more pertinent.

This paper puts forward a model for a grant making community foundation which is predominantly financed by the corporate sector to serve specific communities clearly defined by a specific geographical area. With the fall of Mubarak’s regime and many highly influential business tycoons, there is a general mistrust among the population as to the intentions of businesses and their genuine interest in giving back to society. However, the establishment of independent community foundations which are financed by businesses and serve the needs of specific communities can change this image: they will help reestablish lost trust and will allow the corporate sector to channel their giving through such foundations rather than setting up their own NGOs.

Civic engagement and volunteering increased in magnitude during the revolution, a trend which continues today. It is imperative that this spirit is harnessed and channeled at both the community and national level. The proposed community foundation will serve as a coordinating body for NGO activities in a given community and will serve as an information hub for volunteers as well as individuals interested in civic engagement within their community.

Introduction

Philanthropy is the act of giving one’s private wealth (be it money, in-kind contributions or time) for the public good. The word philanthropy originates from the Greek language and translates literally to the ‘love of humanity’. The word ‘philanthropy’ does not translate well into the Arabic language and more than one term has been introduced to capture its meaning in Arabic e.g. ata’ al igtima’i (social giving), takafol al igtima’i (social solidarity), takafol insaniye (humanitarian solidarity). Despite the challenge of finding accurate terminology to capture the concept of philanthropy, the actual practice of philanthropy is alive and well in the Arab region as a result of Islamic and Christian teachings which clearly outline the importance of giving and social solidarity.

Charitable giving is the predominant type of philanthropy practiced in the Arab region. It caters to immediate social needs rather than strategically dealing with causes of these needs. John D. Rockefeller Sr. explained that the “best philanthropy is constantly in search of the finalities—a search for cause, an attempt to cure evils at their source.” However, only recently has the thinking
about Arab philanthropy shifted towards a model more in line with Rockefeller’s definition of philanthropy. Multi-lateral institutions such as the UNDP, as well as bi-lateral donors (USAID, CIDA) are actively engaging with would-be and existing philanthropists to build their awareness about strategic philanthropy. As philanthropy is potentially a powerful tool for bringing about development and positive change, it is no surprise that awareness building activities are currently underway to propagate it. According to Abigail Disney, founder of the Daphne foundation, “good philanthropy” has four specific characteristics:

1. Connected
2. More than just writing a check
3. Thoughtful and reflective
4. Effective and lasting

These characteristics are largely absent from Egyptian philanthropy at this stage. However, there is an increasing awareness about the importance of moving from ‘charity’ to ‘strategic philanthropy’.

In the past few years the Egyptian economy has moved towards a capitalist market economy which created a small group of high net-worth individuals who, with their increasing wealth, are increasingly relied upon to contribute to the country’s development. The Egyptian government-sponsored welfare state is rapidly disintegrating. Now more than ever, mushrooming citizen needs are creating a demand for a multi-stakeholder partnership between government, corporate and civil society sectors to bring about development and prosperity.

Within this multi-stakeholders partnership, strategic philanthropy will play a very critical role. If harnessed properly, strategic philanthropy will contribute greatly to bringing about positive change in Egypt; change that is owned by the Egyptian people and therefore much more firmly grounded in the reality of Egyptian society. It is change for the people by the people.

This paper explores the possibility of harnessing what Abigail Disney refers to as ‘good philanthropy’ at the community level to bring about much needed sustainable development.

The paper examines the community foundation (CF) concept which originated in the USA in 1914. This approach to development has since successfully expanded all over the world, including Africa, Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. However, there is no one definition of what a community foundation is. Suzanne L. Feurt provides an accurate description which will be used for the purpose of this paper:

A community foundation is an independent philanthropic organization working in a specific geographic area which, over time, builds up a permanent collection of endowed funds contributed from many donors, provides services to those donors, and makes grants and undertakes community leadership activities to address a wide variety of current and long-term needs in its service area. The foundation is governed by a board of citizens broadly reflective of the community it serves. (i)

This paper will focus on exploring the possibility of launching a community foundation that is largely, but not solely, funded by the corporate sector in the geographic area of 10th of Ramadan City. The 10th of Ramadan City is an ideal geographic area to conceptualize a ‘grant-making’
community foundation in Egypt. This is due to the fact that the city has an estimated quarter of a million inhabitants and an additional quarter of a million workers who commute to the city daily. Additionally, the 10th of Ramadan City is one of the first of such government-initiated ‘New’ cities making it the oldest and the most established. The 10th of Ramadan Industrial City also boasts long-standing civil society organizations that, if properly utilized, may greatly contribute to fulfilling the city’s needs. Also, the city has a large pool of high net worth investors who can provide the means to meet development needs, thereby ensuring that the city will continue to flourish. Last but not least, in the event that the community foundation concept is actually implemented successfully in 10th of Ramadan City, there is a good chance for replication in other new cities around the country.

Research Questions

This paper attempts to answer the following questions:

1. What are the types of corporate philanthropy initiatives currently being carried out in 10th of Ramadan city? How institutionalized are these efforts?

2. How relevant is the community foundation concept as understood/practiced in the United States as well as developing and transitioning countries (e.g. Russia, Brazil, Kuwait and South Africa) to the Egyptian context?

3. How aware are corporate stakeholders of the community foundation concept? What are their reactions to the community foundation model?

4. What would be the main features of the envisioned community foundation model in the 10th of Ramadan Industrial city context? Here the research will introduce an institutionalized community foundation model based on the reality of the Egyptian context.

5. In the Egyptian context, what are some of the anticipated challenges that may hinder the success of the community foundation model for corporate philanthropy? How can these challenges be mitigated?

In order to answer these questions the author carried out a review of existing data about community foundations worldwide. Key informant interviews were also carried out in Egypt with investors and members of the 10th of Ramadan Investors Association to get their feedback about the CF concept and its applicability in 10th of Ramadan City. An additional set of key informant interviews were also carried out with community foundation leaders and experts from the USA, Russia, Mexico, Kuwait and Brazil. (See Annex 2 for list of key informants).

This paper is the first step towards creating a road map for the establishment of a grant-making endowed community foundation in the 10th of Ramadan City. In many ways it reads as a preliminary feasibility study that requires validation by key stakeholders. The ideas presented should be considered as a starting point, on the understanding that they will continue to grow and change as they become better grounded in the present realities through consultation with key stakeholders.
The Egyptian Reality: An Overview

In the past few years Egypt has undergone rapid political and economic changes aimed at democratic and economic liberalization. These changes were championed by the Egyptian government in an attempt to transition the country to a new development stage similar to post-communist European countries. The result of Egypt’s recent economic liberalization process has moved the country up the rankings of the International Financial Corporation’s Doing Business Report. According to this report, in 2006-2007 Egypt was the top reformer world-wide. Thanks to these highly publicized and applauded reforms, doing business in Egypt is becoming easier. This improvement in the economic environment in Egypt has produced many new Egyptian businesses as well as an increasing number of high net-worth individuals.

However, this economic growth is yet to trickle down to the average citizen. In fact, the World Bank 2005 data shows that poverty is on the rise in Egypt: 43.9% of Egyptians live on less than $2 a day. The same report revealed that the Gini Coefficient index is 0.34, indicating a fairly high level of socio-economic inequity. The poorest 20% of the population share only 8.6% of the country’s income or consumption levels, while the wealthiest 20% of the population share 34.6% of the country’s income or consumption levels.

In recent months, Egypt has witnessed a rapid increase in inflation and a shortage of government subsidized bread. This resulted in wide spread discontent and a call for a nationwide strike on April 6, 2008. In light of these socio-economic conditions, the Egyptian government is faced with continuing economic reforms, while simultaneously responding to the dire needs of the Egyptian people. In order to do this the government must: halt inflation, make subsidized goods readily available, provide employment opportunities and adjust minimum wage. Besides the Egyptian government, other sectors of society –namely the business and civil society sectors— have a major role to play in bringing about sustainable development and strategically fulfilling the needs of the Egyptian society.

Egyptian Business Sector and Philanthropy

The growth in Egypt’s economic sector has been accompanied by an increase in corporate philanthropy. As a result, a few national level grant making private foundations have emerged. These foundations are affiliated with, and funded largely by, corporations, high net-worth businessmen and prominent Egyptian families such as: Sawiras Foundation for Social Development (http://www.sawirisfoundation.org/), EFG Hermes Foundation (http://www.efghermesfoundation.org/), M.F. Khamis Foundation (http://www.mfk-foundation.com/), Vodafone Foundation and Abou-El Anin Foundation. The increase in corporate philanthropy initiatives is not surprising given the fact that the culture of giving is engrained in Egyptian society through Islamic and Coptic Christian religions teachings. However, what is surprising is the institutionalization of corporate philanthropy through private foundations, which is a relatively new phenomenon. This institutionalization is similar to western models such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, etc.
On a less institutionalized level, corporate social responsibility initiatives have mushroomed within the business sector. Multi-national corporations were the first to set an example through their CSR activities, but lately Egyptian corporations have also become active in undertaking innovative CSR practices. These practices are encouraged by a plethora of bi-lateral and multilateral donors such as the United Nations, USAID, CIDA, etc. In recent years, CSR committees have been created within different chambers of commerce came to exist which serve as platforms for increasingly institutionalized CSR practices.

Despite the increase in the number of corporate philanthropy initiatives, these initiatives remain isolated from one another and are largely ad-hoc in nature. Very few such initiatives have sustainable development as an end goal. In many cases, corporate philanthropy is carried out as part of the company’s public relations activities. For smaller companies, philanthropy is a way for the business owner to disburse his/her religiously obligated philanthropic giving for charitable purposes.

With the increase in Corporate Philanthropy initiatives in Egypt, the time and environment is optimal to explore ways to institutionalize and link these initiatives to development ideals to ensure a lasting impact on society. As a first step it is important to engage the business sector in an awareness-building process about the importance of institutionalized philanthropy for development, rather than purely charitable, purposes. The premise of this argument can be made in explicit business terms because stagnant development will curtail the growth of the Egyptian society and ultimately the corporate sector’s profits. Laila Iskander, author of the Business Solutions for Human Development report, states: “Businesses in emerging economies realize that there are structural problems which inhibit their growth and profits. The most strikingly apparent is the lack of skilled labor to meet their needs at all levels of the business. This derives from a number of factors, including an educational system which has not responded to market needs and which requires major systemic changes in order to move the country and business sector forward.” It is in the best interest of the corporate sector to expand corporate philanthropic practices towards institutionalized means of giving. Only then will the Egyptian corporate sector become a full partner in the country’s development.

Since the late 1990s, corporate involvement at the community level has gained international importance and more companies have come together to establish measurements to effectively assess their community involvement. The London Benchmarking Group Model is an interesting tool for Egyptian corporations to assess their involvement in communities: it measures 5 important variables for corporate investment in the community; these variables constitute a company’s voluntary contributions to community development (see figure 4).
Egyptian Civil Society and Philanthropy

Egypt’s organized civil society sector is one of the oldest and largest in the region. It is estimated that 20,000 civil society organizations (CSOs) are registered with the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS) in Egypt. CSOs are governed under law 84 for 2002.
According to the Egypt Human Development Report (2008), the total revenue of 15,150 associations in 2006 was LE 1.928 billion.\(^{v}\) The expenditure of these associations totaled nearly LE 1.471 billion. As for employment levels within the sampled associations, they amount to an estimated 100,761 employees, which indicates limited employment in the civil society sector.

Egyptian civil society was assessed through a national, multi-stakeholder participatory process utilizing the CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI) assessment tool. The CSI in Egypt was carried out by the Center for Development Services (CDS) and revealed a relatively underdeveloped civil society sector. The CSI diamond for Egypt (see figure 1) shows:

Shows a civil society with a relatively weak structure characterized by limited citizen participation and limited resources. Its environment is assessed as quite disabling, particularly with regard to the restrictive political context. Civil society exhibits rather insignificant impact on government and society, and it is limited in its efforts to promote positive values among the public, despite a more favorable internal practice of these values within civil society.

Despite the fact that Egyptian civil society is underdeveloped, it does have a lot of strengths that if built upon will lead to the further development of the sector. Among these strengths is the strong role that Egyptian civil society organizations (CSOs) play in the delivery of services and outreach to marginalized groups especially in rural areas and frontier governorates. Additionally, trust in civil society is high. According to the World Values Survey data (1999-2000), 86% of the population has trust in some groups or organizations in the civil society sector (political parties excluded). Overall, civil society comes was the second most trusted institution in Egyptian society at large, while police were considered the most trusted institution despite closeness to the government. However, at the time this survey was conducted, police were seen as the protector of the average citizen. The spirit of philanthropic giving by individual citizen is yet another strength that CSOs need to utilize. Currently the majority of citizens prefer to give directly rather than through CSOs (64% compared to 15%).

According to the CSI assessment and the UNDP Human Development Report (2008) the following are some of the main identified weaknesses of the Egyptian civil society sector:

1. Lack of adequate financial capabilities to fully carry out their mission
2. A weak advocacy and public policy influence
3. An inadequate ability to play a convening role for citizens
4. Lack of cross-sector cooperation and communication within the sector
5. Lack of collaboration with the private sector beyond sporadic fundraising attempts.

Addressing these weaknesses will help the Egyptian civil society sector become more effective and act as an active contributor to the country’s development. Dealing with these weaknesses requires not only the unilateral intervention of the civil society sector, but also increased collaboration with other sectors including government and private sectors.
Individuals and Philanthropy

Philanthropic giving is deeply rooted in the values of Egyptian society. These values are shaped by the religious traditions of Coptic Christianity and Islam, which are the predominant religions practiced in the country. The two religions clearly outline the contours of philanthropy and provide a detailed guide of how it should be practiced:

Coptic Christian Giving Practices:

- **ushur** (tithing) is the practice of giving a tenth of one’s wealth or income to those less fortunate in the community.

Islam Giving Practices:

- **Zakat** (alms giving) is an obligatory annual practice to be carried out by all Muslims. There are various forms of zakat (money, trade, merchandise etc…). For Zakat el mal (alms on money) a Muslim is responsible for paying the equivalent to 2.5 percent of net worth, after meeting their families’ needs. There are eight designated groups that are eligible to receive Zakat.
- **Sadaqa** (benevolence) is voluntary giving of all types including voluntary work, in-kind contributions and free services. Sadaqa can be given to anyone with no specific groups designated.
- **Waqf** (endowment) is an Arabic term meaning to stop, confine, isolate or preserve in perpetuity. Like Sadaqa Waqf, it is not obligatory but rather it is voluntary; an individual or group of beneficiaries is able to allocate profits made through a Waqf to a certain cause.
- A survey conducted by the Center for Development Services confirms the relevance of religious giving in Egyptian society as it revealed that the motive behind philanthropic giving for 45.8% of the respondents was to fulfill religious duties, while in a very close second place (45.5%) respondents’ motive was to get closer to God. The same survey revealed that 62% of respondents had made some sort of contribution to charity, while 38% had not made any contribution. The main form of charitable giving is cash donations, while volunteering comes as the smallest form of contribution (see figure 2). Volunteering may be underestimated as respondents may find it difficult to account for informal forms of volunteering such as taking care of an elderly family member or helping a neighbor.
Another relevant concept in assessing civic participation is collective community action: the practice of citizens coming together to deliberate and solve a community issue. The CSI assessment in Egypt has shown that collective community action is rather weak in Egypt; only 30% of respondents have taken part in a community meeting to discuss a community issue in the past year, while 35% have never participated in any such event. In light of the current socio-economic difficulties which Egyptian society is experiencing, collective community action is a notion that needs to be further developed in order for citizens to have a voice in overcoming the challenges they are facing. It is imperative that the strong charitable culture of Egyptians is utilized and further developed at the community level in addition to expanding the prevalence of collective community action. Together these two variables will help communities come up with collective community-based solutions to deal with their challenges. As such, the community foundation concept is a very valuable concept that builds on the strengths of Egyptian society and addresses its weaknesses.

**Community Foundation Concept: From Conceptualization To Reality**

**Development of CF Concept**

The birthplace of the community foundation concept is the United States of America. Established in 1914 by a Cleveland banker named Frederick Goff, the Cleveland Foundation was the first community foundation. The Cleveland Foundation was established as a mechanism “to collect many charitable trusts under unified management and allow a select group of local leaders to ensure that the funds’ charitable directives would be served over time and under changing local circumstances.” Goff’s idea gained much appreciation and support: within a year, 15 community foundations were established throughout the USA. In 2005, it was estimated that 700 community foundations were in operation throughout the US. As a result, it is fair to say that the community foundation concept originated to fulfill donors’ need for a mechanism to manage philanthropic funds. The concept was exported to Canada in the 1920s and has been successfully tailored and expanded throughout Canadian communities. Since the 1980s the concept has found its way
across the Atlantic Ocean and has experienced astounding successes in the United Kingdom. Since the 1990s, the concept of community foundation has been picked up in the global South and many innovative adaptations have emerged, especially in post-communist and African countries. A total of 1,680 community foundations have been identified worldwide. The following graph shows the geographic distribution of community foundations around the world (Figure 3)

Figure 3: Number Of Community Foundations By Region

According to WINGS, Community Foundations are grant making organizations that:
- Seek to improve the quality of life in a defined geographic location;
- Are independent from control or influence by other organizations, governments or donors;
- Governed by a board of citizens broadly reflective of the communities they serve;
- Make grants to other non-profit groups to address a wide variety of emerging and changing needs in the community;
- Seek to build, over time, a collection of endowed funds from a wide range of donors, including local citizens, other non-profits and businesses;
- Provide services tailored to the interests and giving capacity of donors;
- Help donors achieve their philanthropic and charitable goals;
- Engage in a range of community leadership and partnership activities, serving as catalysts, conveners, collaborators and facilitators to solve problems and develop solutions to important community issues;
- Have open and transparent policies and practices concerning all aspects of their operations; and
- Are accountable to the community by informing the general public about their purposes.

Box 1: Key Distinguishing Features of Community Foundations

It is important to highlight that the ultimate goals of community foundations are to service the needs of a geographically defined community (city, town, cluster of regions etc.) and to positively contribute to the wellbeing of this community. This is done through the pooling of community resources (individual citizens, corporations, government and civil society) and reinvesting the dividends of these resources through funding community initiatives (e.g. CSOs, public works etc.). Although pooling, managing and dispersing funds to meet community needs are at the heart of the work of community foundations, CFs have assumed a convening, technical support and knowledge generation role within communities. Despite similar basic goals, no two community foundations are the same. There may be commonalities between different applications of the community
foundation concept, but given the flexibility and diversity of the concept it has metamorphosed into colorful variations around the world.

**International Applications of CF concept**

American-based private foundations spearheaded the transformation of the community foundation concept outside North America. The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation was especially supportive of the establishment of such foundations in the UK. The Mott Foundation began to support the propagation of the concept by “providing challenge grant funds for a community foundation endowment program, and by supporting the creation of a national member-based support organization for community foundations.” (vii) In the wake of the collapse of communism in Europe, the concept was also seen as attractive and relevant to provide much needed support for young CSOs. The Slovak Republic was the first country to establish a community foundation in 1994 (The Healthy City Community Foundation). Mexico led the way in Latin America (1995), while more Western European countries started adopted the concept: Germany in 1996 and Italy in 1999. Africa also welcomed the CF concept in 1999 in South Africa, and has now expanded to Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. In the Asia and Pacific region different countries of varying degrees of wealth also introduced community foundations starting in 1997, namely: Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Philippines, South Korea and Thailand. However, the Middle East is far behind in establishing CFs. Despite this, since 2005 there has been an increased interest and some activities have started to take shape in Turkey and Egypt.

The adaptation of the CF concept around the world has resulted in interesting variations that cater to the specific contexts in each country. It is possible to envision these variations on a continuum. On one end of the continuum, CFs play the classical role as ‘bankers’ of the philanthropic sector (i.e. collecting, investing and granting funds). The older CFs in the USA are examples of this classical role. On the other end of the continuum are CF-like organizations which play a convening, knowledge generation and capacity building role but do not collect and manage resources. An example of this is the Community Philanthropy Organizations (CPOs) in Brazil. The majority of the CFs around the world can be placed in the middle of the continuum as they perform grant management and dispersing functions, as well as knowledge generation, community leadership development and technical assistance. Thinking about CFs in terms of this continuum shows the potentially universal applicability of the concept, in light of its contextual flexibility. It is the responsibility of practitioners to learn from the experiences of CF applications around the world and to tailor the concept to the realities of their context.

**Factors Affecting the Formation of Community Foundations**

The growth of the community foundation concept around the world can be related to some core variables which facilitate their existence in any given country:

- Conducive legal system for the establishment of community foundations in particular or civil society organizations in general;
- Tax system that provides incentives
- Accumulation of wealth within a community
- Economic stability in the sense that people need to feel that income will continue to stay stable or grow in order to give
• Strong philanthropic values – such values are enforced through giving be it through monetary, in-kind or volunteering
• Support for the idea that an individual is an agent of change
• State is not the only provider of public services
• Visible examples of philanthropists as success stories
• Relatively institutionalized civil society sector
• Strong financial investment sector
• The presence of supporters and champions of community foundations within the community to act as ambassadors for the concept
• Culture where issues of wealth and inequality are spoken freely

Additional Thoughts on the CF Concept

As one engages with the community foundation literature from around the world, one is left with some lingering questions that warrant further exploration. In this section some of these questions and answers will be put forward.

What is the value added of a community foundation when donors can give their donations directly to charity?

1. Knowledge of the community’s needs through continued communication and interaction with community members and CSOs.
2. Ease in managing donors’ funds without burdening the donor with logistical issues.
3. Independence of CF from stakeholders’ Interests, making it credible in its grant making.
4. Guarantee that the donations will be granted to credible CSOs.
5. Linking donors to CSOs and playing an intermediary role.
6. Building capacity of CSOs.
7. Encouraging funding sustainability at the community level and empowering the community to deal with its own challenges in a creative manner rather than relying solely on state funding.
8. Engaging donors civically through funding CSOs and therefore increasing trust among community members, consequently contributing to the creation of social capital
9. Utilizing endowed capital to invest in the economy of the community in addition to grant making
10. Moving philanthropic funds from charitable contributions to long term strategic philanthropy in order to deal with the root causes of issues rather than their symptoms.

Where can we place CF concept, solely within the civil society sector or potentially on the intersection with the private sector?

Legally, community foundations are normally classified as part of the civil society sector, this is despite the fact that they operate very much as the bankers of the sector. Through community foundations donors deposit money that is either used to build the endowment or to operate the actual CF. This money is in turn invested and granted to CSOs. Community foundation funds which are part of an endowment are available in perpetuity, much like banks. However, it is important to point out that payout guidelines vary from on fund to another depending on the donors’ wishes. In
most cases, donor advised funds tend to have a set time before payout, while pass-through funds are usually for the long haul. On another level CFs must be closely connected to the communities they operate within; they position themselves as brokers and facilitators of development. In their operations, CFs must employ professional standards that will allow them to gain the trust of donors, CSOs and the community at large (viii). As a result, CFs are institutions which operate at the intersection between the civil society and private sector. They contain qualities from both sectors. It is therefore appropriate to conceptualize CFs as non-profit corporations.

Relevance of Community Foundation Concept to Arab Countries

Islamic religious practices have clearly outlined different ways that Muslims may give to charity. Traditionally, a waqf endowment can take the form of money, real estate, land, buildings, cars, machinery, books etc... The purpose of the waqf is set by the endower and should only be changed in accordance with his/her will. If a waqf is endowed on behalf of a dead person, the funder chooses the purpose of the waqf. The most common manifestations of this case are public water fountains or mosques built in the name of a dead person.

According to Atia: "[h]istorically, awqaf were an important source for funding and played a critical role in the provision of public services, including support for the building of mosques, schools, libraries, hospitals, water supply, cemeteries, gardens, windmills, public transport facilities, parks, roads, and the provisions of healthcare services for the needy and disabled." (ix) It is important to clarify that waqf is not the same as Zakat for Muslims; it is not compulsory. Additionally, it is not directly mentioned in the Quran, but relies on the sayings (ahadith) of the Prophet and on stories dating back to the Prophet’s time. A sustainable sadaqa for example, (which is another term for waqf) is among three things that sustain one’s life after death. The hadith indicates that, “when the son of Adam dies, his job ceases [stops] except for three things: a sustainable giving [sadaqa jariya, or waqf], a useful education that benefits people [beneficial knowledge], and a faithful offspring who prays for him.”

The current state of awaqf in Arab countries varies considerably, from thriving and innovative models to completely stagnant applications. The Gulf countries such as Kuwait, Qatar and United Arab Emirates boast a thriving waqf system, where legal regulations are conducive to establishing waqf.

Egypt, on the other hand, has witnessed a decline in the waqf system since the nationalization of awaqf after the 1952 revolution; numerous laws were passed to bring pre-1952 awqf (plural for waqf) under the supervision of the national or local governments. The Egyptian awqaf have been poorly managed and there has been a decline in the number of new awaqf as well as in the revenues of old awaqf. In recent years there has been a call for the revival of Egypt’s waqf system similar to initiatives which took place in Turkey, Iran and Arab Gulf countries. Waqfiyat Al-Maadi, is a new community foundation-like organization that was established in 2007 with the aim to revive the waqf tradition as well as to provide sustainable funding opportunities for development efforts at the community level. The Community Foundation of the South of Sinai (CFSS) is yet another CF that is attempting to start its activity to serve the South of Sinai area. The CFSS has been registered since 2005 and has a functioning steering group. In 2009 a total of US$9,820.00 in grants was distributed to the Bedouin community that the foundation serves.
The presence of the Islamic tradition of waqf as well as the growing success stories of utilizing awaqf for development purposes around the region provide a great opportunity for the launching of a grant making CF concept in Egypt. The following section will put forward a framework for establishing a grant making community foundation within the industrial city of 10th of Ramadan.

Envisioned Community Foundation – 10Th Of Ramadan City

Background to New Cities

Before delving into the details of the 10th of Ramadan city, it is appropriate to provide background to Egypt’s new cities. These cities are managed by the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA), which was established according to law 59 for the year 1979. NUCA is affiliated with the Ministry of Housing, Utility, and Urban Development, which is currently headed by Engineer Mohamed Al Maghraby. The following are the objectives of NUCA:

- Creation of new civilized centers for achieving community stability and economic prosperity;
- Redistribution of inhabitants far from the narrow strip of the Nile valley;
- Development of new attraction areas beyond the existing cities and villages and extension of urban areas to the desert and remote areas;
- Curbing the urban infringement upon agricultural areas.

Since the establishment of NUCA in 1979 a total of 22 new cities have been developed throughout the country. This number will reach 60 by 2017 (See Map below for list of current and future new cities).
The NUCA utilizes the latest techniques in urban planning and ensures that low income housing is established at affordable prices. Additionally, the lands in these new cities are provided to investors at cost to facilitate investment by businesses.

A total of 172,000 acres have been developed in all 22 new cities. A majority of the developed lands in these cities is dedicated to housing, while the remaining lands are developed for commercial-service-tourism and Industrial uses respectively (see graph for distribution).

Additionally, the NUCA has invested in Social services infrastructure to accommodate the inhabitants of these new cities including: schools, hospital, religious houses and youth clubs, which are in addition to significant social services provided by NGOs. During the past 25 years, the new cities accommodated 4,178 producing factories with total investments of LE 51.7 billion Egyptian Pounds which created 368.7 thousand new job opportunities. An additional 2,615 factories are currently under construction with an additional investment of L.E 11.8 billion Egyptian pounds and an estimated opportunity of creating 102.6 thousand new job opportunities. It is estimated that once the 22 new cities are fully developed they will be able to house 9.8 million inhabitants.

**Background to 10th of Ramadan City**

The City of the 10th of Ramadan is the first New City to be established by the Egyptian government during Saddat’s reign under decree 249 for the year 1977. It is officially referred to by NUCA as a first generation new city. Located in the Sharqiyah Province, it lies between the following cities: Cairo, Ismailia, Belbais and Zagazig. Its total area is 95,000 acres of which 50,000 acres are developed and include the necessary infrastructure. It is estimated that the city can accommodate half a million inhabitants, however currently it accommodates only 250,000.

A total of 6,000 acres is dedicated to housing projects, including low-income, medium and luxury housing; 450 million Egyptian pounds have been spent on these housing projects. NUCA has also invested a total of 117.8 million Egyptian pounds on providing services to the city including educational, health, recreational, commercial, cultural and religious services. In the coming 5 years it is expected that branches of the Azhar University (the leading Islamic university) and the Zagazig University will open in the city. Utilities such as water, electricity and sanitary drainage...
system have also been made available to the city at a total investment of 257.7 million Egyptian pounds. Limited Agricultural activities are also taking place in the city with a total investment of 33.4 Million Egyptian Pounds.

Industrial activities are by far one of the major areas of activities of the city, with the total area of 9.5 thousand acres used for this purpose. The following table summarizes the magnitude of industrial activities in the 10th of Ramadan City:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factories</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Investment</th>
<th>Labors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>1224</td>
<td>LE 16300 M</td>
<td>141900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Construction</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>LE 1300 M</td>
<td>14400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The industrial activities carried out by these businesses include: heavy industries (metals, timber, plastics, furniture etc…), consumer goods (food, weaving, clothing etc…) and chemical & pharmaceutical products.

**Governance Structures**

The governance structure utilized in the 10th of Ramadan City is unique compared to the regular governance structure employed in older Egyptian cities. Traditionally, the governance structure features government-employed local councils made up of government bureaucracy and headed at a higher level by a governor. In the case of the new cities, NUCA has adopted a different and arguably a much more pragmatic and empowering governance model. In the 10th of Ramadan City, the Local Council is replaced by a Trustees Council. The Trustees Council is formed by the Minister of Housing Utilities and Urban Planning. Its membership is split between representatives from the different ministries (50%) and the investors in the city (50%). A total of 50 investors and government members sit on the Trustees Council; the Council is headed by an investor while the vice chair position is filled by the head of the city council (i.e. government representative). The council meets once a month for the purpose of responding to the needs of the city’s residents and investors. The Trustees Council is funded through a tax which is incurred on every cubic meter owned and operated by investors, this is a nominal fees of 25 piasters (1 US = 5.40 LE), however the levied taxes are all deposited in the treasury of the Trustees Councils to maintain its activities. There are different committees within the Trustees council which deal with issues such as social needs, investors’ needs, and NGOs activities.

According to two investors and trustees council members who were interviewed, the trustee's council is an innovative governance structure that facilitates proactive decision making and quick responses to the challenges facing the city. One interviewee put it this way: “…the trustee’s council combines the government and private sector modes of operation, which is finally in the best interest of the community”
The interviewee gave an example of the challenge faced by residents who complained about the lack of transportation to help them take their kids to schools. The issue was brought up in the council of trustees and the government representatives acknowledged it as a challenge and offered to take it back to the ministry. Fearing the delay in responding, a few investors donated buses to be used to transport students to schools for free. In this case the Ministry of transportation only had to allocate drivers. This example shows a responsive governance structure that is rarely available in Egypt. It shows that the government realizes the importance of facilitating decision making processes in the city to ensure that investors are able to work productively and effectively.

**Tenth of Ramadan Investors Association**

TRIA is very closely related to the Trustees council. TRIA is one of the oldest and most highly institutionalized CSOs in the city. (x) TRIA's main objective is to serve the needs of the investors, making it a business association. It is important to point out that many of the members of the board of directors of TRIA also sit on the Trustees Council, thereby giving the organization a great deal of power within the official governance structures of the city. Despite a relatively well developed website, TRIA's financial information is very hard to obtain.

A member of the board of directors explained that the organization is heavily supported by investors through in-kind contributions such as the association’s building which was provided by Mohamed Farid Khamis one of the major investors and the first Chairman of the Board of Directors. Others have contributed furniture and construction materials to make the building fully operational. Additionally, TRIA has been awarded funding by foreign donors such as the Industrial Modernization Center (EU funded project) and NGO Service Center (USAID funded project). The organization employees a total of 25 staff members, which is very large by Egyptian CSO standards.

Despite the fact that TRIA has a strong outreach and representation within the investor Community, there are still many investors who choose not to engage with the organization. One such investor was interviewed for the paper and was of the opinion that he does not need to engage with TRIA to get his work done. Rather, he “focuses on his business needs without engaging with the association.”

---

**Tenth of Ramadan Investor Association (TRIA)**

Established in 1965.

**TRIA’s Strategic Goals:**

- Lobbying for investors’ issues and promoting Egyptian exports.
- Boosting the city socially, economically and in services.
- Assisting in solving the unemployment problem and expanding social participation.

**Membership:**

TRIA has a membership of 400 investors, from the following sectors:

1. Food industries
2. Textiles, spinning and pile industries
3. Paper and Printing industries
4. Building materials and thermal industries
5. Engineering and metal industries
6. Chemical industries
7. Plastics and Petro-Chemicals industries
8. Pharmaceutical and medical supplies

**TRIA’s Committees:**

A total of 15 committees have been established to cater to the needs of the investors as well as the community at large, these committees are:

1. Social security (welfare) committee
2. Information committee
3. Economic Committee
4. The Directory Committee
5. Resources development and membership committee
6. Taxation and Customs Committee
7. Culture and Parties committee
8. Exportation Committee
9. Exhibition committee
10. Youth & sports committee
11. Industry & investors’ affairs
12. The environment committee
13. Valuation and foreign affairs committee
14. Small sized enterprises committee
Other CSOs are operational in 10th of Ramadan city, mainly to provide services to disadvantaged groups such as the handicapped or orphaned children, as well as community development services such as day care and religious education programs. It is estimated that a total of 50 CSOs are registered in 10th of Ramadan city. These CSOs are supported by funds from the Ministry of Social Solidarity, Ministry of Awkaf, the Trustees Council and fundraising campaigns targeting individual donors and religious giving specifically.

**Philanthropic Trends in 10th of Ramadan City**

Philanthropy in the 10th of Ramadan City is generally geared towards charity rather than strategic development. It is in many ways ad-hoc and contingent to the personal interests of donors rather than the actual needs of the community.

**Corporate Giving**

The investors’ community is very active in responding to emerging needs of the community by providing financial and infrastructural support through the Trustees Council or through corporate foundations established by the businessmen. One of the interviewed investors explains that: “the giving by investors is slowly becoming more institutionalized and organized to deal with social development issues which the government is unable to handle despite its strong efforts in this regard.”

The same interviewee explained further that, in many cases, business owners who want to donate to charity are unaware of how to disperse their funds. As a result, they rely on NGOs, or they choose to spend the money on popular charitable causes such as orphanages. Only a few business owners in 10th of Ramadan have actually established their own foundations e.g. Mohamed Farid Khamis Foundation.

The following section discusses the community foundation that is proposed for development in the 10th of Ramadan City. It utilizes the existing philanthropic trends and tries to move philanthropy to the strategic development level.

**Proposed Grant making community foundation for 10th of Ramadan**

The proposed grant-making community foundation model for 10th of Ramadan builds on existing competencies and strengths of the government, corporate and civil society sectors in the 10th of Ramadan City.

To ensure the success of the 10th of Ramadan Community Foundation launch and institutionalization, it is important to carry out the following steps:

**At the National Level**

Engage different actors - It is important to ensure that government representatives, namely those in the Ministry of Social Solidarity, are aware of the CF model and that they are brought on board early to ensure that they will not complicate the legal establishment process.
Equally important is engaging with the Industrial Modernization Center, which is an EU funded project that works closely with Investors in the New Cities on issues around corporate social responsibility.

Additionally, it is important to engage with the National Federation of Investors because it has committees which specialize in national-level advocacy. There is also a representative from 10th of Ramadan City who is a board member of TRIA.

At the Community Level

Step One: Awareness Raising

- Raising awareness about the community foundation concept among donors and likening it to existing practices in Egypt and similar countries around the world. This step should utilize existing structures such as TRIA and Trustees Council meetings.
- Open dialogue with CSOs in 10th of Ramadan City to familiarize them with CF concept and how it will impact their work to ensure their buy in.
- Present the community foundation as an unbiased and autonomous entity that may be created in a manner that earns it the respect and trust of the community.

Step Two: Create Critical Mass of Supporters

- Request technical assistance and organize study trips for champions from within the community to other countries where established CFs are operational. This can be organized through international organizations such as the WINGS Global Fund for CFs.
- Create a critical mass of champions for the proposed community foundation within 10th of Ramadan City, preferably including high net worth individuals who may be willing to provide initial seed funding for the organization or the endowment.
- Explore the possibility of housing the new foundation within the 10th of Ramadan Investors association for infrastructural purposes, while making it clear that this is an incubation phase and does not mean that the CF is in any way part of the 10th Ramadan Investors Association so the CF doesn’t lose its autonomy and credibility within the community.

Step Three: Building the Endowment (Concurrent with Knowledge Generation Phase)

- Engage community in fundraising campaigns tailored towards:
  1. Residents of 10th of Ramadan City - The city includes residents from all economic levels. Therefore, the fundraising campaigns should be tailored to the different donors.
  2. Investors of 10th of Ramadan City - Utilizing the existing affluent TRIA membership base, reach out to investors and offer them different options to contribute to the endowment based on their interest. Additionally, utilizing existing databases of all investors in the city, make sure to engage those who are not civically engaging by conducting site visits and offering them tailored giving packages that may suit their needs.
Engage in a process of knowledge generation about the community and NGO needs.

Carry out a needs assessment of the 10th of Ramadan City – potentially utilizing funds from TRIA or the Trustees council or even national institutions such as the Industrial Modernization Center (EU funded project). This needs assessment should also be complimented by a participatory Stakeholder analysis of the power dynamics in the city, a social forces analysis method may be utilized for this purpose.

Conduct an organizational assessment of CSOs operating in 10th of Ramadan city to assess their levels of competencies and needs.

**Proposed Model for CF**

The foundation proposed for 10th of Ramadan is a hybrid in the sense that it holds on to the classical characteristics of a community foundation as an endowed grant making entity similar to the American CFs. But, the proposed 10th of Ramadan CF will deviate slightly as it will rely mainly on corporate giving to establish its endowment as is the case in Russia Togliatti CF (see box for more details about Togliatti Community Foundation ). On the other hand, the 10th of Ramadan Community Foundation will also play a strong role in knowledge generation and technical assistance for donors as well as NGOs, similar to the role played by CPOs in Brazil.

**Geographic area**

The 10th of Ramadan City is the core of the geographic area to be serviced by the foundation. However, it is important to expand the foundation’s reach beyond the new city and to neighboring areas including: Belbeis, Mataria, El Ebour city and Zagazig. This is necessary as these areas include poverty pockets that require active involvement by the CF to provide funding for local CSOs’ efforts to address community needs. These neighboring areas also include small affluent groups that may be potential donors. The outreach to additional donors may be carried out after the full institutionalization of the CF operations in 10th of Ramadan city.

**10th of Ramadan CF Staff**

The foundation’s staff needs to have a general understanding of and investment in the community. As such, ideal staff members will be drawn directly from the community. They need to combine skills such as fundraising, marketing and understanding the business environment, while at the same time having a thorough understanding of civil society. The foundation’s human resources needs may be filled at the beginning by a core set of staff members to work on the initial stages of launching the organization, while additional program officers may come on board once the granting phase starts.
Governance of 10th of Ramadan CF

The board of the CF will be comprised of representatives of all major sectors within the community. It will be comprised of members from TRIA, Trustees council (including both local government and investors), Academia and other high net worth individuals who are not necessarily active in the existing governance structures in the community, as well as longtime residents of the community. This will ensure that the group is not a replica of TRIA and the Trustees Council. The CF’s board will have between thirteen and fifteen members. It is important to point out that “Community foundations that have representatives of different sectors on their boards have an advantage when building collaboration and partnerships between sectors. Thus they can draw on a wide spectrum of networks to open up opportunities and build trust and confidence.”

On average, board members will meet every other month and sub-committees can be formed within the board to capitalize on board members’ expertise in different areas.

Staff members will work closely with board members to ensure their full involvement and support for the CF’s activities.
Start up Activities

In order to ensure that the CF builds a strong reputation and track record within the community, a few major activities may be launched including:

- Study financial models and forge a relationship with a financial investment company to manage the endowment and other funds (preferably on a pro-bono basis)
- Strategic philanthropy awareness-building campaigns among high net worth individuals
- Community needs assessment
- CSOs organizational assessment
- Basic corporate philanthropy training offered at subsidized prices to businesses
- Basic trainings are offered to CSOs at subsidized rates based on organizational assessment results (these trainings may include proposal writing, financial management, monitoring and evaluation etc.)

Endowment Building

Endowment building is a long process that requires patience and active cultivation of potential donors. It also requires a thorough understanding of the needs of the donors and services tailored specifically to those needs. The 10th of Ramadan CF will ensure that donor services are diverse, catering to both high net worth business owners as well as citizens of 10th of Ramadan city from all different levels of wealth. Outreach activities may be launched to raise funds from donors wishing to invest in CF from outside the community.

Additionally, the endowment building may include in-kind contributions, such as business products, properties and expertise from the private sector.

Grant Making

Grant making needs to be developed in phases in order to enable the CF to develop strategies and expertise in effective grant making. This will allow the CF to train CBOs on responding to RFPs and properly planning out their project activities to ensure sustainable development.

Grant Making schemes may be specialized to cater to some of the emerging trends in development such as social entrepreneurship and CSR capacity building for small and medium sized enterprises.

Ongoing Monitoring and Evaluation

It is essential to incorporate a solid but uncomplicated monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system that donors as well as grantees are aware of and can appreciate. The results of the M&E efforts should be made publicly available to both donors and grantees to foster legitimacy and transparency in both the non-profit and private sector. This legitimacy will also transfer over to the public sector over time.
This section attempted to sketch the road map for establishing a CF in 10th of Ramadan City. This is a model of best practices based on research and understanding of the international implementation of CFs around the world as well as field work and interviews conducted in 10th of Ramadan city.

In order to be realistic in putting forward this proposal, it is important to engage in a SWOC analysis (Strengthens, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Challenges). The following analysis for the proposed 10th of Ramadan CF, assumes such an organization is already in place. This exercise should ideally have been conducted through a collective deliberation process with stakeholders. However the author has engaged key informants and exercised her own analytical thinking to conduct the exercise, which may be carried out again in the future by practitioners and advocates of the CF model in 10th of Ramadan City. The SWOC analysis is an important planning tool that helps build a solid foundation for the 10th of Ramadan CF.

**SWOC for Proposed 10th of Ramadan CF**

**Strengths**

The following are some of the anticipated strengths of the CF’s internal organizational workings as per the proposed CF design:

- Presence of high net worth business women and men as champions of, and donors to, the CF – There is an underlying assumption that the initial preparatory work at the community level will yield supporters of the CF model who will contribute financial and moral support, prompting others to do the same.

- Close collaboration and coordination of work with existing governance structures - The Trustees council is the city’s main governance structure that is fully operational and innovative in terms of its setup. It is therefore necessary to ensure close collaboration and coordination of activities with the trustee’s council.

- Reaching out to community members and existing NGOs – One of the most important preparatory activities of the CF is to reach out to community residents and existing NGOs such as TRIA and other CBAs. This is necessary to ensure the support of the community and NGOs for the CF.

- Unbiased position within community – Any community has different power dynamics which at times may conflict, be it across sectors or within a single sector. It is imperative that the CF portray itself as unbiased and as a facilitator of community issues from the start or it will lose its credibility and will be potentially associated with one group or the other.

- Competent and diverse staff from within the community - It is imperative that staff members are from the community or are aware of the community issues which arise. This will facilitate the work of the CF and will earn the organization more respect and credibility within the community.
• Support from, and forging linkages with, national structures - National governmental and non-governmental structures must be involved in the preparatory phase of establishing the CF in order to ensure support and facilitation of the registration process. Such organizations include, but are not limited to: the Ministry of Social Solidarity, National Federation of Investors, International Modernization Center, Egyptian Federation of Industries, and UNDP.

Weaknesses

The following are some of the anticipated weaknesses of the CF’s internal organizational workings as per the proposed CF design:

• Being incubated through TRIA – One method that has been utilized international by the World Bank and other institutions is to encourage the incubation of CFs within existing NGOs. This model may be utilized in 10th of Ramadan City, where TRIA can contribute to the incubation of the CF by offering physical space and infrastructure. Although this is a common practice internationally, it is a potential weakness to the internal operations of the CF as it could be associated with TRIA by other stakeholders, jeopardizing its credibility within the community.

• Staff may be unfamiliar with CF concept – community foundations are completely new to Egypt. It will be very difficult to recruit staff members who have a working knowledge of this type of institution. It is therefore important to recruit staff members with strong project development and management skills and to provide them with intensive training upon joining the CF.

• Lack of financial and moral support to CF model start-up phase - It might be more difficult than anticipated to convince financial supporters and knowledgeable leaders to participate in the project. This will delay the successful launch of the CF. Therefore, this step is of the utmost importance and requires careful attention and planning.

• A small staff may have difficulty reaching out to the whole community – The preparatory steps in setting up the CF require significant time and human resources. It is important to explore the potential of utilizing volunteers and allowing sufficient time for the preparatory phase of the work so as not to overburden the small number of staff members.

Opportunities

The following are some of the expected opportunities present in the community and country as a whole (i.e. factors external to the organization) that will be of benefit to the proposed CF model:

• Ideal geographic area - The 10th of Ramadan City is an ideal geographic area with concentrated wealth as well as development needs and surrounding poverty pockets which require support.
• Governance structures - The existing Trustees Council governance structure is unique and already inclusive of civil society as well as corporate and government representatives.

• High interest by international donors in growing corporate giving and strategic philanthropy - International donors such as EU, UNDP, CIDA and USAID are interested and active in promoting corporate social responsibility as well as engaging the corporate sector in strategic philanthropy initiatives and capacity building.

• Giving Culture - Giving is already entrenched in the religious practices of Egyptians. Therefore, the focus will be on refocusing this giving culture into strategic philanthropy rather than short-term charity.

• Waqf as a basis for explaining CF concept – The endowment concept is not completely foreign to Egyptians as it is similar to Islamic practice of Waqf. However, research has shown that citizens are not fully aware of what it entails (CDS philanthropy Study).

• Interest in professionalizing CSOs is paramount – the Ministry of Social Solidarity is keen on the professionalization of CSOs and the corporate sector because they are seen as ideal partners in this process. Therefore, the CF concept may be presented to the MSS as the solution to professionalizing CSOs through corporate input.

• Growing number of Foundations – The growing prevalence of corporate and family foundations has made Egyptians more familiar with foundations as a concept; they might be more inclined to grasp the notion of CFs at this time.

• Indigenous funding to foster trust in CSOs - CSOs have always been criticized for receiving foreign funding and have been accused of servicing the interests of these external donors. The proposed CF concept provides an opportunity for devising sustainable and indigenous funding mechanisms for CSOs which will increase public trust in CSOs.

• Existence of Community CSOs active in 10th of Ramadan - The presence of active CSOs in the 10th of Ramadan City offers an opportunity in that many of them are in need of additional support to sustain and expand their activities. The proposed CF would provide funding to strengthen CSO work in the community.

Challenges

The following are some of the expected challenges that are present in the community and country at large (i.e. factors external to the organization) which may hamper the proper functioning of the proposed CF model:

• Outright shunning of CF model as yet another foreign concept exported from the west

Proposed Solution: Root CF model in the traditional Islamic and Coptic philanthropic practices and showcase adaptations from similar countries such as African, Latin American and other transitioning countries, rather than focusing on the USA and Western Europe.
• CSOs in the community are threatened by the CF as an additional structure that competes for their funding.
  Proposed Solution: Raise awareness about the role of community foundations and explain that the money raised by the CF is for the community and not the CF as an organization. Also explain that the CF’s role is to raise money for CSOs thereby allowing them to focus on providing development services rather than having to constantly fundraise. Additionally, the CF staff should attempt to find an external source of funding for the running costs of the organizations (i.e. staff and infrastructure) so as not to use donor funds for the everyday administration of the organization.

• Community-based associations (CBAs) operating in 10th of Ramadan City lack competencies to apply for RFPs and design a sound project document.
  Proposed Solution: Provide initial trainings and technical assistance for CBAs to build their capacity before launching RFPs

• Lack of time for high net worth individuals to engage in awareness-building engagements organized by CF staff
  Proposed Solution: Use respected and trusted champions of the CF as entry points to busy, high net worth individuals

• Religious traditions that encourages secrecy in giving
  Proposed Solution: Seek fatwa (religious edict) from Religious authorities to clearly explain the virtues and draw backs of secrecy in giving in light of the current pragmatic concerns (i.e. transparency).

  Additionally, for investors, use a business reporting methods analogy to bring across the importance of declaring giving. However, it is important that giving be encouraged regardless, so the CF should still allow anonymous giving

• Respect religious instructions when it comes to Zakat and Eshor rules
  Proposed Solution: Engage with Muslim and Coptic Christian Religious leaders early on in the preparatory stage to get a clear understanding of religious obligations and to create programs in line with these religious guidelines.

• Dealing with the negative legacy and discrediting of the Egyptian Waqf systems caused by the nationalization of Egyptian Waqfs after the 1952 revolution
  Proposed Solution: Join forces with existing advocacy initiatives to influence the modernization of Waqf system vis-a-vis governmental ministries such as the Ministry of Social Solidarity and Ministry of Awkf.

10Th Of Ramadan Community Foundation - Ways Forward

For this proposal to become a reality the following activities would need to be carried out at the immediate, midterm and long-term levels.
Immediate Next Steps

To start, it is important to engage with a linguist to attempt to come up with a proper Arabic term for the concept of a community foundation. Some may argue that referring to a community foundation as a Waqf is the easiest route to take. However, this is a double-edged sword because of widespread disillusionment with the current Waqf system. Additionally, Waqf is traditionally an Islamic concept and as a result it may be exclusionary of Coptic Christians and other non-Muslim groups. It is therefore important to try and come up with a term that adequately describes CFs and avoids alienating anyone.

It is also essential that the findings of this research be shared widely with different stakeholders for their feedback. These stakeholders include:

1. The Trustees Council
2. TRIA board of directors and staff
3. Donors who are active in this area such as the American Chamber of Commerce, Industrial Modernization Center and UNDP.
4. The community at large (i.e. residents and local civil society groups)

The feedback collected from these stakeholders will be incorporated in the paper at a later stage in order to ensure that findings are grounded in the reality of the situation in Egypt.

Potential Mid-Term Next Steps

Assuming the feedback collected from stakeholders is positive and there is a genuine interest in the CF concept, initial start-up activities may be launched. For these initial start-up activities, international donors such as Synergos, Ashoka and WINGS may be approached to fund staff time, technical assistance and study visits abroad. However, international donors will not be approached to contribute to the actual CF funds as this will take away from the CF credibility and image as a locally funded initiative.

Potential Long Run Next Steps

In the long run (i.e. 2 years from the immediate next steps phase), the actual CF should be legally launched after securing initial funding and contributions to the endowment.

In order to ensure that these next steps are carried out, a dedicated and knowledgeable practitioner needs to be at the helm of the process to kick start the establishment of the 10th of Ramadan Community Foundation.

Conclusion

Community Foundations are not the answer for all the development woes in Egypt today. However, they have tremendous potential to be a powerful mechanism to towards sustainable community development in the long run. As explained by Jana Kunicka:

The role of community foundations is not to replace State intervention but in many ways
to complement it by developing a range of practices dedicated to increasing the strength and effectiveness of community life, improving local conditions, especially for people in disadvantaged situations, and enabling citizens to participate in public decision-making and debate. Community activity nurtures human bonds and forms of social capital (e.g. relations of trust between individuals) which neither the State nor the market alone can provide. (xi)

The proposed community foundation application in Egypt provides an opportunity for three sectors -- government, corporate and civil society -- to work together at the community level. This first attempt at close collaboration at the local level may serve as the seeds for stronger national level collaborations as trust and better understanding among the different sectors are grown from the bottom up.

Through its role as an agent for development, a community foundation brings people together:

[A CF] allows philanthropy to be as individual as it needs to be and, at the same time, bring all those different individuals together in a common cause. Whether one is rich or poor, is a corporation, foundation, or individual, whether one has lofty or modest goals, all can create a fund for charitable good. The community foundation empowers each equally, but multiplies everyone's resources. (xii)

It is also important to remember that people “give through…not to” a community foundation: “[B]y giving through a community foundation, a community foundation can leverage people’s time, energy, thinking, and leadership, as well as money, to achieve something greater. It can help people take action.” (xiii) This conceptualization of a community foundation as a convener is much needed in Egypt where collective community action is weak. At a time when government can no longer fulfill the needs of the Egyptian people, it is time to develop citizen’s capacity to collectively take action. Through the 10th of Ramadan Community Foundation, citizens of the city will be empowered to voice their opinions and contribute the necessary resources to improve their reality. These resources may be monetary, but more importantly must include non-monetary resources such as time and effort to identify the needs of the city and collectively work to fulfill those needs.

The success of the 10th of Ramadan Community Foundation lies in contextualizing the CF concept to ensure that it fits the reality of the Egyptian situation. There is much to learn from the experiences of others around the world. However, we should not shy away from ultimately coming up with a newly envisioned community foundation that does not mirror existing CF models from around the world.
Works Cited


El Daly, Marwa. Philanthropy in Egypt. Center for Development Services, 2006


Lenkowsky, Leslie. “Foundations and Corporate America,” in The State of Nonprofit America

Sacks, Eleanor W. 2005 Community Foundation Global Status Report

Salamon, Lester and Helmut K. Anheier and Associates. “Civil Society in Comparative Perspective” in Global Civil Society, Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector


Samorodov, Vadim, “The Future of Philanthropy in Russia: A „weapon' that we need”, Alliance

End Notes


iii. For details of some of these initiatives please review the Business Solutions for Human Development 2007 UNDP publication (http://www.undp.org.eg/Portals/0/Business%20Solutions%20Report%20English.pdf)


v. Data from 2007 Survey Conducted by General Federation of Associations


ix. Atia15

x. (http://www.triaeg.com/about.html)

xi. (Jana Kunicka, EFC 2005, 6)

xii. (Elan Garonzik 1999, 17)

xiii. Ibid.
Better Knowledge, Better Giving:  
The Need for Philanthropic Data in the Arab Region

Atallah Kuttab\textsuperscript{7} and Paula Johnson\textsuperscript{8}

\textsuperscript{7} Atallah Kuttab is a Founding Member of Arab Human Rights Fund and Founding Member of the Arab Foundations Forum. He is also a member of the Editorial Board of Alliance Magazine, Global Philanthropy Leadership Initiative, and WINGS Coordination Committee.

\textsuperscript{8} Paula D. Johnson is Vice President of The Philanthropic Initiative, Inc. (TPI) and Director of its Center for Global Philanthropy.
Background

Around the world, institutionalized philanthropy is growing and gaining visibility. The Middle East is no exception; the region has witnessed a steady increase in the number of charitable foundations over the last two decades. In addition, there is increasing emphasis on being strategic and effective in the use of philanthropic capital. There is also considerable attention being paid to developing clear indicators which demonstrate that such funding contributes to lasting, positive impact.

Yet the growth and impact of philanthropy are limited, in the Arab region and globally, by the lack of reliable information on philanthropic capital and its deployment. In most countries, neither governments nor private organizations collect or make available data on philanthropy and social investment. Religious and cultural traditions, political sensitivities, and individual preferences for anonymity further limit the public sharing of information on giving. In addition, in many countries the legal policies that regulate charitable activities make it difficult to even identify philanthropic institutions let alone track their activities. Moreover, the limited data that does exist is not comparable across countries, as it derives from disparate study frameworks, methodologies, and definitions. While the global philanthropic sector increasingly provokes interest and inquiry, it defies easy definition and lacks necessary data.

A recent study, Global Institutional Philanthropy: A Preliminary Status Report, released by Worldwide Initiatives for Grantmaker Support (WINGS) and The Philanthropic Initiative, Inc. (TPI) provides an initial attempt to collect existing philanthropic data. The study was conceived as exploratory rather than either comprehensive or representative. It is based primarily on responses to an electronic survey distributed to 147 WINGS members in 55 countries. Thirty two responses from 24 countries and the Arab region were returned. The survey from the Arab region was completed jointly by the Arab Foundations Forum (AFF) and the John D. Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement.

In an effort to avoid the pitfalls of legal classifications, the study's typology included six broad categories of institutional philanthropy based on operational/functional definitions: independent foundation, corporate foundation, community foundation, host-controlled fund, government-linked foundation, and multi-purpose fundraising institution. Each category was defined in such a way as to provide latitude for local variations in institutional types while at the same time allowing for comparable analysis.

The survey comprised five sections which explored the characteristics and operations of philanthropic institutions around the globe. They included: the environment in which philanthropy operates, institutional forms and operating models, philanthropic assets, institutional expenditures, and information resources.

The WINGS/TPI study cited the following key obstacles to data collection and analysis:

- There is no reliable philanthropic data in many countries.
- Where data does exist it often relies on a small sample size or response rate and may not be representative.
There are no agreed upon standards or norms for institutional definitions, asset valuation, or expenditure accounting.

There are few baseline studies that allow analysis of increases or decreases over time.

Existing data sets are seldom updated.

In addition, the report underscored the limitations to its own methodology and analysis:

- The number of survey responses was limited and many of the respondents provided incomplete answers.
- Much of the information gathered was subjective.
- There was inconsistent use of definitions and typology. Some survey respondents used the WINGS definitions and typology; others used their country’s legal classification.
- Availability and reporting on quantitative data was extremely limited.
- Some respondents were only able to provide information on one segment of institutional philanthropy (e.g., community foundations) rather than the entire sector.

Despite the generalized and specific limitations to the study’s data and analysis, it offers an important reference point for global philanthropy. This brief paper summarize some of the study’s key global findings, highlights its information on the Arab region, and illuminates the need to develop a far more comprehensive regional knowledge base to serve as the cornerstone of a regional philanthropic sector that can not only support but help lead the way to a peaceful, prosperous, and equitable future.

**Global Context and Trends**

The WINGS/TPI study includes overviews of the world’s major regions -- Sub Saharan Africa, the Arab Region, Asia, Europe, Latin America and North America – and individual profiles of 24 countries. It emphasizes the rich diversity of philanthropic pathways and traditions while also noting the common themes and trends from the survey respondents. Among its key observations:

- Cultural traditions, religious norms, political histories, and economic conditions have profoundly shaped the charitable sector in individual countries and regions. The unique philanthropic heritage of each region is critical to understanding the contours of the current landscape and to appropriately linking new institutionalized forms of philanthropy with long-standing practices and traditions.
- Institutional philanthropy is on the rise around the globe. While the factors influencing this growth vary from region to region, the key forces are generally: the enormous increase in global wealth; the opening-up of political space; the shifting roles of the state, market, and civil society; the increased visibility of philanthropy and its influential leaders.
- Associated with the growth of institutional philanthropy, there is a shift, albeit gradual, away from traditional charitable giving toward more strategic giving aimed at achieving significant social change. There is a growing focus on the causes of social ills, not merely on their symptoms. While this trend is generally perceived as positive, it is important not be dismissive of charitable giving. Rather, dialogue must be inclusive or a range of giving goals and approaches.
• Collaboration is key to broad and lasting impact. Solutions to entrenched and complex challenges will require cooperation and coordination between sectors. The philanthropic sector should seek to coordinate their activities with the government and private sector as appropriate to attain greater effectiveness and sustainable change.

• Challenges to philanthropic growth and effectiveness abound, but are not insurmountable. The principle obstacles include an unfavorable legal and tax policy environment, the lack of reliable philanthropic data, perceptions around the appropriate roles of philanthropy, a lack of trust and transparency in the sector, and the difficulty of demonstrating the societal impact of philanthropic investments.

The Arab Region

Given the dearth of the philanthropic information on the Arab Region, the WINGS/TPI study is based on one survey response summarizing information collected from several countries in the region rather than individual responses on different countries. The survey was jointly filled by the John Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement and AFF with input from several of AFF’s members.

The growth and development of philanthropy in the region is emerging in a wide range of national contexts. For example, in Palestine the long-term absence of a functioning government has led to a proliferation of non-profits providing basic social and welfare services. In contrast, in Egypt the government has strongly limited the activities of private social actors for over 50 years.

The surge in the number of foundations established in the region over the last ten years encouraged the establishment of AFF in 2007. Starting with only four core foundations, AFF has expanded into a network of over thirty four regional foundations. Support for this expanding philanthropic community will continue to be provided by AFF, the Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement and SAANED for Philanthropy Advisory and Services Arabia.

The WINGS/TPI survey noted several trends in Arab region philanthropy. The first trend is that philanthropic activities in the Arab region are highly influenced by religious traditions. Much modern-day philanthropy continues to be associated with or is the product of ancient religious giving obligations. For Muslims, traditional practices include zakat, sadaqqa and waqf, which is similar to an endowment in which revenue or property is preserved for philanthropic purposes. For some Christians, religious giving takes the form of ushur or tithe which is giving 10% of one’s income to the poor.

A second trend, described more fully by Barbara Ibrahim and Dina Sherif in From Charity to Social Change: Trends in Arab Philanthropy, is that Arab philanthropic actors are structuring their giving through more institutionalized models to achieve greater impact. This marks a transition from individual generosity and charity to more strategic modes of giving within the region. This transition includes the establishment of new models such as grantmaking foundations, corporate philanthropy, social investment ventures and other models of collective giving. Ibrahim and Sherif describe how new trends have resulted in a “philanthropic renaissance” characterized by more diverse modalities of giving.
The authors also identify the changing philanthropic role of the business community as an important regional trend. Ibrahim and Sherif explain that during much of the 20th century, the business community remained aloof from public life. Recently, there has been a shift by business leaders towards more involvement in addressing critical issues. Business leaders increasingly envision themselves as partners with the government and civil society rather than independent actors. They are likely motivated by several factors with elements of both altruism and self-interest. And as in other regions, some business leaders believe that their commercial sector experience and skills can be used to strengthen the operations and impact of non-profit organizations.

And importantly, collaborative philanthropic approaches are occurring across not only sectors, but borders as well. Arabs in the Western diaspora have been active in establishing foundations to serve people and support organizations in their home country or region. There have also been creative initiatives generated by the interface between civil society, public advocacy and corporate social responsibility.

Obstacles and Challenges to Philanthropy

The WINGS/TPI report identifies several key obstacles and challenges which constrain the practice and growth of philanthropy around the world:

- An unfavorable legal and regulatory framework for philanthropy.
- Lack of reliable data and information.
- Levels of trust and transparency in the sector.
- Public perceptions regarding the role of philanthropy in relationship to the role of the public sector and government.
- The difficulty in demonstrating the impact and effectiveness of philanthropic giving.

For many countries, the lack of reliable data and information is perceived as one of the most critical obstacles to effective philanthropy. Around the world, there are calls for more robust and reliable data on giving. The TPI/WINGS study notes that, “Better data and analysis have the potential to lead to increased philanthropic capital, more effective giving practices, a more favorable policy environment, and a stronger civil society.”

Interestingly, it appears that in the Arab region, despite the paucity of reliable philanthropic data and knowledge, many foundations do not see a need to improve the knowledge base. When asked, most Arab foundations attending a recent WINGS conference said that “lack of reliable data and information” or “lack of organized information” is not a challenge for their work. Any future efforts to collect data will be difficult unless foundations perceive a value in better sector data/information, are willing to share data on their own activities, and begin a dialogue on optimum ways to represent and disseminate data.

While not the focus of this paper, it is important to note the significant obstacles put forward by the legal system in the Arab region and around the world. While some countries have a relatively favorable legal environment, the majority of survey respondents noted multiple legal and tax impediments which limit the growth, activity, and potential impact of philanthropy. Of particular note are issues around legal identities of philanthropic entities, the regulation processes,
government intervention and oversight, and tax policy. In the Arab region specifically a key issue is that the law regulating charity work does not differentiate among various kinds of institutions (e.g., foundations and NGOs) or among various forms of foundations. This ambiguity often leads to uncertainty regarding e.g., permissible activities, allowable partnerships, and the nature of tax treatment and is likely a disincentive to create philanthropic institutions.

Moreover, foundations themselves do not necessarily seek clarity on the issue of a specific legal identity. Indeed, several foundations simultaneously undertake the activities conventionally associated with NGOs, operating foundations, and grant-making foundations. If countries believe that it is advantageous to have clearer distinction among types of charitable organizations, future legal policy will need to answer myriad questions such as: How do we define a foundation? How do we define an endowment? How do we define other assets of a foundation? For family foundations, are the assets of the foundations and that of the family clearly segregated?

Furthermore, legal regulations often limit the potential impact of philanthropic giving. In many Arab countries, philanthropic organizations are not allowed to involve themselves in political activities or any activities that are seen as threats to “social cohesion.” It was also reported that in all countries, giving is encouraged if channeled through government or semi-government entities.

**Global Efforts to Develop Philanthropic Knowledge**

To transcend current limitations on philanthropic practices in the Arab region and maximize its impact, it is useful to look at existing global philanthropic efforts. There are several global initiatives that aim to advance our knowledge of philanthropy – some of which the Arab region might draw inspiration from and others of which the region might wish to participate in.

- The Global Philanthropic Capital Project (GPCP) is a global initiative to strengthen the impact of philanthropy around the world by providing reliable, accessible, and comparable philanthropic data. A coalition of leading experts, many of whom have led national and regional data collection efforts, is working together in an unprecedented effort to create a system and a methodology that will provide quantitative data on institutional philanthropic capital and its deployment. The project will provide a more robust understanding of levels of philanthropic capital, knowledge of local philanthropic forms, and information on where and for what purposes institutional giving is invested. In so doing, the GPCP will support more strategic decision-making by philanthropic practitioners, other social investors, and policymakers in order to advance the unique role that philanthropy plays in addressing socio-economic challenges worldwide. The project’s secretariat is TPI and its pilot phase is coordinated by TPI and the Salzburg Global Seminar (SGS).

- The Foundation Center, based in New York, has created a platform, Philanthropy In/Sight, for visualizing information about U.S. and global philanthropy. This platform currently holds information on some 102,000 foundations and 2.4 million grants. Most of the information is on U.S. foundations, but it is systematically adding information on grantmaking in many other countries. Philanthropy In/Sight demonstrates that it is possible to capture philanthropic data and display it in such a way to illuminate its global dimensions.
Global Philanthropy Leadership Initiative (GPLI). In May 2009, the Council on Foundations (COF), the European Foundations Center (EFC), and Worldwide Initiatives for Grantmaker Support (WINGS) convened a leadership group to discuss the issues and opportunities in philanthropy brought about by its increasingly globalized context and to identify specific issues that collective global leadership could help to address. A task force was appointed to focus on the following three areas:

1. Improving the legal and regulatory environment for philanthropy in a global context.
2. Developing models for improving and increasing collaboration in philanthropy in a global context.
3. Identifying key opportunities to engage with policy makers/multi-lateral organizations.

Conclusion

It is little surprise that data concerning philanthropic sector activities in the Arab Region is limited. For the reasons articulated above, such data in most world regions is inadequate. Yet optimistically, in much of the world, there is a clarion call for more empirical data on institutional giving that can lead to improved philanthropic practices, a more favorable policy environment, and greater impact.

There are two principal sources of such data: the government and foundations (and more indirectly, other civil society organizations). To date, most Arab regional governments have not facilitated public access to data nor, more importantly, have they encouraged institutional giving. As for the foundations, few appear to summarize their own data and even fewer make it available to the public, and there appear to be no plans to improve documentation at the sector level in the near future.

The lack of data inhibits the growth and effectiveness of the philanthropic sector within countries and across the region. Limited transparency limits trust. Open information could demonstrate the value of philanthropy, encourage a more effective policy environment, help identify effective philanthropic strategies and collaborative opportunities, and ultimately be a harbinger to a more just, productive, and peaceful society.
Works Cited


Kuttab, Atallah; “Arab Foundations Forum: the Advantage of Arriving Late”; Alliance- online, London, December 2009

U.S. Foundation Funding in the Middle East and North African (MENA) Region

*Molly Schultz Hafid⁹, Nadia Roumani¹⁰ and Archana Sahgal¹¹*

---

⁹ Molly Schultz Hafid is a Program Officer at the Unitarian Universalist Veatch Program at Shelter Rock, where she is responsible for the Democratic Participation, Civil and Constitutional Rights and Community Organizing program areas.

¹⁰ Nadia Roumani is the Principal of Roumani Consulting, LLC. She is also the Director of the American Muslim Civic Leadership Institute (AMCLI), a faith-based leadership development program, housed at the University of Southern California and working in partnership with Georgetown University.

¹¹ Archana Sahgal is a Program Officer with the Equality and Opportunity Fund, U.S. Programs at the Open Society Foundations in New York City.
I. Executive Summary

Background

Asian American/Pacific Islanders in Philanthropy (AAPIP) commissioned this paper, with support from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, to provide an overview of domestic philanthropic support for Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim, and South Asian (AMEMSA) communities in the United States as well as for philanthropic organizations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The following excerpt focuses solely on foundations based in the United States with active grants in the Middle East and North Africa.

This paper was commissioned and prepared prior to the unprecedented and historical shifts which occurred in early 2011. The interviews and grant-making data utilized were largely in response to dramatic shifts in the domestic and international landscape following the events of September 11, 2001. Therefore, this paper is intended to provide an important baseline for measuring shifts in philanthropic support following the events of early 2011 as well as recommendations for foundations considering beginning or expanding support in AMEMSA communities in the U.S. or in MENA.

U.S. Foundations Funding in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region

This paper provides an initial snapshot of U.S.-based foundations with active grants in MENA. Due to the challenges of collecting data on philanthropic giving, the paper focuses largely on providing a basic overview of which U.S. based foundations are active in the MENA region, what they are interested in supporting, the most significant challenges facing U.S.-based grant-makers in the region, and recommendations to program officers and foundations interested in providing philanthropic support in the MENA region.

There are several important observations necessary to provide context for these findings. First, the MENA region consists of 21 countries, each possessing different laws governing foreign contributions to non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Second, the levels of transparency and oversight over NGOs vary considerably by country as well as by the type of work in which the NGO is engaged.

Third, almost every country has a few, well-funded, larger NGOs that receive international aid and a much larger number of small, volunteer-run, community-based NGOs that receive very limited local or international support. Finally, the tools most commonly used by philanthropic institutions in the U.S. to measure performance and impact do not transfer well to most NGOs working in the MENA region.

The research and interviews revealed three prevailing approaches to grant-making by U.S.-based institutions with active grants in the MENA region:

1. Research and Fellowships
2. Support for Identity-Based NGOs (e.g. marginalized or under-supported constituencies)
3. Support for Civil Society Development
Additionally, the foundations identified several specific challenges to funding in MENA and offered recommendations to others interested in supporting programs in the region. These include:

**Challenges:**
- “U.S. Engagement with Muslim World” Frame
- Developing Effective Country and Region-Specific Grant-making Strategies
- Measuring the Impact of Individual Grantees and the Overall Grant-making Strategy
- Increased Oversight of Grant-making by U.S.-based Institutions with Active Grants in the MENA Region—Domestic and International
- Developing a Comprehensive Understanding of the Local Landscape

**Recommendations:**
- Be Creative and Flexible
- Take Calculated Risks
- Provide Long-term, General Support Grants
- Cultivate Strong Local Partnerships
- Collaborate with Like-Minded Colleagues

**II. Methodology**

This study was conducted from March to June 2010 using a combination of desk research and individual interviews with philanthropic staff. The desk research included Foundation Center preliminary research to identify registered U.S. foundations with active grants in MENA.

The initial list of prospective foundations was generated at the Foundation Center using the following search terms: Funding in the MENA Region: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank, Gaza, Yemen, Sudan, Middle East, Middle East International, Islam, and North Africa and the names of specific foundations previously identified as funding in the MENA region.

Following completion of the Foundation Center research, the list was narrowed by excluding foundations that met any of the following criteria:

- Annual grant-making allocation in the MENA region of less than $100,000.
- Foundations whose primary mission was proselytizing or religious charity work.
- Corporate foundations.
- Foundations or public charities whose primary grant-making activity is re-granting to affiliates in other countries for direct relief and related charitable activities.
- Grants primarily directed to Israel.
- Individual scholarship programs providing international students with support for undergraduate studies.
After narrowing the Foundation Center results, web-based research was conducted for all identified foundations with websites. For foundations without websites, attempts were made to contact staff members via email and/or telephone. If there was no response, and the Foundation Center profile had insufficient detail on the foundation’s grant-making program, it was excluded from the study. Please note that each foundation is different and has a unique calendar, grant period, and reporting schedule. In addition to vastly different reporting schedules, there is no uniform system, program areas or categories for reporting or grants related to the MENA region. Where appropriate, the paper suggests themes and categories of funding based on the interviews and available grants data. However, these should not be considered exhaustive and, due to inconsistencies in the data, the paper is not able to project percentages of funding directed to specific program areas and strategies.

The researchers utilized personal contacts to reach out to those organizations they knew to be receiving funds in the MENA region. These contacts were asked to identify foundations currently supporting their work or those who had a reputation for funding in their community or region. These additional foundations were added to the Foundation Center results.

Based on the Foundation Center profiles, suggestions from the field and web-based research, the research team conducted a total of 40 interviews with individuals at 32 institutions or grant making programs; 19 of them were directly related to the MENA region. Several of the larger foundations including the Ford Foundation, the Open Society Institute, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Chicago Community Trust, and the San Francisco Foundation, required separate interviews. This was due to the allocation of grants from more than one fund/program or very little overlap between the domestic and international grant-making strategies. In several cases where there existed relevant, overlapping, or programmatic interests, researchers conducted interviews with multiple staff members from a single institution. Addendum A includes a complete list of all of the institutions contacted for interviews and Addendum B includes the list of interview questions used during the interviews.

Given the sample size and the relatively small number of individuals and foundations supporting programmatic work in the MENA region, the text does not identify individual interview subjects throughout the paper. Identifying characteristics of a program officer, grant-making program, or foundation have been removed where required to maintain confidentiality. This is largely at the request of the interview subjects who requested anonymity in order to be candid with their observations. Several of the foundations included in this paper have also conducted internal evaluations of the MENA work they fund. However, none of these reports have been made public nor were they made available to the researchers for inclusion in this project. During the course of our interviews, program officers occasionally referred to these evaluations and shared anecdotal information that has been included where appropriate. Unfortunately, specific details are not available for this paper.

Finally, it is important to note that this paper is an initial attempt to define a field of philanthropic support and provide a preliminary analysis of the funding landscape. The data available is largely qualitative and anecdotal. It also precedes the historic events of early 2011, the impact of which will continue to unfold in the months and years ahead. The researchers have made every effort to organize the information from the interviews into themes and we take full responsibility for the
limitations of our proposed classifications and observations. We expect that future research will help to clarify, refine and quantify the amount of funding available for the MENA region as well as the effectiveness of different funding strategies.

III. U.S. Foundations Funding in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region

Philanthropy in the MENA Region: An Overview

The purpose of this paper is to provide an initial snapshot of U.S.-based foundations with active grants in the Middle East and North Africa. Based on reporting trends and requirements within the U.S. philanthropic sector, additional data on new grant allocations from the U.S. to the MENA region will not be available until 2012 at the earliest. The most recent comprehensive examination of international philanthropy originating in the U.S. estimates that U.S. foundations gave $5.4 billion dollars to international causes through both domestic and international recipients. (iii) The study, International Grantmaking IV: An Update on U.S. Foundation Trends, was published in 2008 by the Foundation Center in cooperation with the Council on Foundations. (iv) Below are several report highlights relevant to U.S.-based foundations’ support in the MENA region:

- A majority of U.S. foundations direct their grant-making to international causes through U.S.-based groups. (v)
- The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation provided over half of all overseas grant dollars and The Ford Foundation accounted for nearly one in five grants to overseas recipients. (vi)
- Over half of international grants are directed to Sub-Saharan Africa, with international development—specifically health-related programs—as the fastest growing area. (vii)
- 31% of the foundations surveyed cited a “stricter U.S. post-9/11 regulatory environment for giving to non-U.S.-based organizations” as a key factor in shaping their approach to international giving. (viii)
- Follow-up interviews determined that the initial confusion around the new international grant-making guidelines had lessened among foundations but that the “ongoing negative consequences for overseas giving…such as the greater difficulty getting money to grassroots organizations supporting advocacy work” remains a significant concern. (ix)
- Approximately $150 million dollars of foundation support is directed to U.S.-based international programs working in the Middle East and North Africa. In contrast, over $500 million is directed to Sub-Saharan Africa. (x)
- 70% of the grants directed to the Middle East and North Africa are awarded to U.S.-based programs, while an estimated 30% is direct overseas giving. (xi)
- An estimated $60.1 million was allocated to overseas recipients in the Middle East and North Africa. This represents approximately 3.2 percent of all overseas giving. (xii)
- An estimated $145.2 million was allocated to U.S.-based recipients with programs in the MENA region. This represents approximately 11.3 percent of international grants to U.S.-based recipients. (xiii)
- There are no countries from the MENA region (excluding Israel) listed in the top 25 countries receiving direct overseas grants from U.S.-based foundations. (xiv)
- Turkey and Sudan are 12th and 14th respectively on the list of the top 25 countries receiving support through giving to U.S.-based international programs.
The Foundation Center report does not offer significant additional information by region, nor does it specifically list the individual foundations allocating grants in the MENA region.

In addition to philanthropic support originating in the U.S., the MENA region has a growing number of local foundations whose missions are supporting regional non-governmental organizations (NGO). According to one estimate, the total possible aggregate of per capita giving in Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East, North Africa, the Gulf states, and South Asia, is somewhere between 250 billion and 1 trillion dollars annually.\(^{(xv)}\) The John D. Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement at the American University in Cairo produced the first comprehensive study of philanthropic development in the MENA region and the Gulf States. The study, From Charity to Change: Trends in Arab Philanthropy, profiles philanthropic development in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine.\(^{(xvi)}\) The study found an emerging field of diverse and highly creative formal philanthropic institutions in the region. In general, these emerging charitable institutions fit into four categories: family foundations, corporate giving, community foundations, and shilla (or partner foundations). The first three are similar to their U.S. counterparts, while shilla resembles the idea of giving circles popularized in the United States in the 1990s. There are no reliable statistics on the amount of giving or number of people involved in the emerging philanthropic sector except for vague projections that say it is "a huge sector, comprising large resources and many hundreds of thousands of individual donors, providing significant support to the needy who would otherwise ‘fall through the cracks’ in Arab societies."\(^{(xvii)}\)

**U.S. Foundations Funding in the MENA Region**

The following section examines U.S.-based foundations with active grants in MENA. For the purposes of this research, the following countries are considered part of the MENA region: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Oman, Palestine (West Bank and Gaza), Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. The information below is based on Foundation Center research, review of each foundation’s website and phone interviews with foundations which have active grants in the region. Additional information on the methodology is available in Section III.

The following foundations had annual MENA grantmaking allocations in excess of $100,000 between 2007 and 2009:

**Family Foundation**
- Chrest Family Foundation
- Flora Family Foundation
- Rockefeller Brothers Fund

**Independent**
- Ford Foundation
- William and Flora Hewlett Foundation

**Operating Foundation**
- Open Society Institute
Level of Grants and Areas of Interest

The annual MENA grantmaking allocation for a majority of the above foundations ranges from $180,000 to $850,000. The most recently data released by the Ford Foundation, the National Endowment for Democracy, the Skoll Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and the International Youth Foundation indicate they made estimated grants in excess of $15.1 million, $8.2 million, $1.5 million, $1.8 million, and $6.3 million respectively. Program areas covered by these grants include: arts and culture, community-based organizations, conflict management, gender, international affairs, goodwill promotion, international democracy and civil society development, international peace and security, land and water issues, peace building, relationships between Muslim and Western societies, U.S. global engagement, women’s rights as well as youth development. Ten of the foundations indicated a particular interest in a limited subset of countries (indicated in parenthesis in the list below) within the MENA region:

- Chrest Foundation (Turkey)
- Flora Family Foundation (Turkey, Morocco, Egypt)
- Ford Foundation (primarily Egypt and Palestine, although they continue to make grants throughout the region)
- Fund for Global Human Rights (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia)
- Grassroots International (Palestine)
- International Youth Foundation (Morocco, Egypt, Jordan)
- Jerusalem Foundation: Palestine Center (Palestine)
- National Endowment for Democracy (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Palestine, Yemen, Sudan)
- Rockefeller Brothers Fund (Iran, although they make grants throughout the region)
- United States Institute for Peace (Iraq, Iran, Sudan)

Rationale and Strategy for Funding in the MENA Region

Of the foundations surveyed, there was no dominant framework to explain their rationale for funding in the region or the type of grant-making strategy they utilized. Some foundations were
interested in a particular country others on different types of organizations and still others on the region overall. When asked about their framework or approach to grant-making in the MENA region, most cited an interest in providing support to NGOs working on the following areas (xviii):

- Democracy Promotion
- Human Rights
- Infrastructure Support
- Civil Society Development

None of the foundations indicated religion (e.g. support for faith-based work, religious reform, interfaith dialogue, etc.) as a primary interest. Approximately half of the foundations identified were active in the region prior to the events of September 11, 2001 while the other half developed their programs in the following decade. For those foundations in existence prior to September 11th, there was no significant change in their interest or strategy in the region. Of the foundations established after the events of September 11th, no interviewees specifically identified it as the precipitating event for their formation.

The interviews revealed three prevailing approaches to grant-making by U.S.-based institutions with active grants in the MENA region. Some of the foundations interviewed use only one of these strategies, while others may use all three:

- Research and Fellowships: Support for individuals, universities, research, and policy think tanks. Grants tend to be made for graduate and post-graduate research at U.S. institutions, to academics or universities conducting research in the region, and to policy think tanks in the U.S. and MENA region seeking to influence U.S. foreign policy by publishing papers and sponsoring conferences. When the grants are made to entities in the region, it is often with the understanding that, in many cases, the researcher or institution will face censorship or limitations on the topics available for study.

- Identity-Based: Support for a particular subset within the country’s population, usually one which is marginalized or under-supported by the government and/or larger international aid agencies. This type of strategy would likely focus on women’s organizations, youth development and groups working on minority rights (e.g. Berber in Morocco, Kurds in Iraq).

- Civil Society Support: Support for broad-based civil society development including NGOs working on democratic development, human rights, political reform, community development, and legal reform. In some areas this strategy may include arts and culture organizations, particularly youth media projects and other programs intended to create an artistic response to the challenges in a particular country. Foundations whose main approach centers around supporting general civil society development, as opposed to a specific issue or population, will often include women’s organizations and youth development in their grant-making programs.
Challenges

The respondent foundations identified the following challenges for U.S.-based foundations with active grants in MENA: framing a coherent and relevant rationale for prioritizing giving in the region, developing an effective grant-making strategy to accomplish the foundation’s goals, measuring the impact of existing grants, navigating U.S. domestic and international policy, and developing a comprehensive understanding of the overall social, political, cultural and religious landscape in the MENA country or countries in which a foundation is operating.

- “U.S. Engagement with Muslim World” Frame: Several interviewees disclosed that their foundations have had internal conversations about whether to frame investment in the region as a completely secular endeavor or one related to Islam. Many suggested the religious frame was too narrow and none of the foundations indicated an interest in awarding grants solely to faith-based institutions. However, they also acknowledged that framing their work in purely secular terms seemed to understate the relevance of religion within social and political discourse in the U.S. and within the region.

- Developing Effective Country and Region-Specific Grant-making Strategies: Most foundations acknowledged that developing a regional grant-making strategy is challenging. This applies to research, issue-based, and civil society donors who often noted that each country, and each issue within that country, required its own distinct strategy. This is challenging because most foundations have a staff person with background in only one country or on one particular issue. The foundation staff indicated that they lacked sufficient expertise to develop a broader regional strategy.

- Another challenge to effective grant-making strategy development is the tension in some foundations between their private sector and government donors. Corporate partners and government aid agencies tend to have vastly different approaches to charitable giving. These can include the length of time they are willing to invest in grantee partners, the level of outcomes they expect proportionate their level of investment, and which funding areas will best serve their corporate or government priorities. When a foundation has donor partners from both of these sectors, these differences can be a significant source of tension.

- A final area mentioned by several foundations was the effectiveness of making small grants to smaller NGOs. They acknowledged that this was a labor-intensive strategy particularly because these grantees do not have the capacity to translate their work into information the foundation can easily use to evaluate a program’s success. These foundations often combined small grants with capacity-building programs to provide in-depth technical assistance to the organization. They often indicated that this approach helped to counteract the current pattern of investment where several large foundations and international donors limit their grants to a relatively small number of large, well-funded NGOs.
• Measuring the Impact of Individual Grantees and the Overall Grant-making Strategy: Several of the interviewees, at both large and small institutions alike, identified the difficulty measuring the impact of the foundation’s grant-making. While there is a general sense that the grants had contributed to improvements on the issues NGOs were concerned with, none of the foundations interviewed had successfully measured the direct impact of their grants or the work of their grantees. For example, one supporter of research and fellowships noted that their funding strategy relied on selecting promising individuals and research, but that the most common measures of impact (number of people fed, number of jobs created, policy outcomes achieved, etc.) did not really pertain to the production of academic research. Other foundations commented that the social and political context that most of the NGOs are working in has so many unpredictable variables (state repression, threat of violence and war, limited legal rights, etc.) that measuring the impact of their grant-making strategies is nearly impossible.

• None of the foundations claimed “success” in the region. Defining success was most often framed in terms of the survival and growth of an organization, a specific program of a grantee, and in one rare instance the ability of a set of grantees to raise the profile of an important issue (migrant rights in Morocco). In general, the foundations acknowledged that success in the region will require a long-term plan for their work whether that is building research capacity, continuing issue-based work or building civil society infrastructure. One key component to the few successes identified in the interviews was some aspect of hands-on technical assistance and/or capacity building support.

• Increased Oversight of Grant-making by U.S.-based Institutions with Active Grants in the MENA Region—Domestic and International: The increased oversight mandated by the USA PATRIOT Act was cited by several foundations as an area of frustration and an unnecessarily cumbersome regulatory framework. They also noted that their boards perceived grant-making in the MENA region as a riskier endeavor due to the added layers of federal oversight. In addition to scrutiny from the U.S. government, there is the added complication of monitoring and oversight by governments in the region who may not be supportive of the type of work funded by U.S.-based foundations.

• One foundation that supports human rights organizations in the region indicated that their email correspondence with local grantees had been monitored and that a government in the region had actively campaigned against them in the local media. Another foundation referred to its patchwork approach to funding in the region, and said it was due in large part to the barriers their grantees faced when they tried to accept foreign support or funds.

• Developing a Comprehensive Understanding of the Local Landscape: Making grants in the MENA region is especially challenging for U.S.-based foundations without staff based in the region. Several foundations spoke of the rapidly changing political environments and the need to have a strategy specific to each country. Severe travel restrictions to certain places in the region, most notably Iran and Palestine, are an additional barrier. Several foundations indicated that their U.S. origin was enough to raise suspicions with local NGOs. This was more pronounced during the Bush administration but it remains an area that requires additional attention and sensitivity. The foundations noted that word
of mouth from current grantees to prospective grantees was the best way to counteract any reluctance to seek support from U.S.-based foundations. These foundations used their current grantees to reach out to prospective grantees to address possible concerns about relationships between the foundation’s grant-making interests and other U.S. government funds available for local projects. Whenever possible, local consultants/staff were also crucial to identifying prospective grantees and laying the groundwork for positive relations.

**Recommendations**

The foundations interviewed offered reflections on several of the lessons they had learned over the course of their MENA region grant-making. Despite the changes in the region, the recommendations remain relevant for U.S.-based foundations interested in implementing programs in the MENA region:

- **Be Creative and Flexible:** Most foundations cited the need to develop strong relationships on the ground and a willingness to adjust a grantmaking strategy to fit the changing political landscape as one of the most important lessons learned. One foundation shared this example: They decided to bring a delegation of grantees to the U.S. to meet with lawmakers about U.S. relations with their country. This strategy was developed with the grantees after their government had blocked the ability of the NGOs to receive any support from international foundations for their human rights-related work. The foundation shared this example to illustrate the need for creativity and a willingness to work closely with grant recipients, especially those operating in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian environments.

- **Take Calculated Risks:** Many of the foundations interested in supporting civil society development stated the importance of taking risks and investing in less developed groups. For example, one interviewee argued that although it may be easier for U.S.-based foundations to give larger grants to well-developed organizations with the capacity to write thorough reports and monitor the grant’s activities, it is also important to employ a certain amount of risk-capital to help nurture and develop emerging NGOs. This can be done by working closely with prospective grantees, funding for local consultants to work with newer organizations and partnerships with capacity-building intermediaries.

- **Provide Long-term, General Support Grants:** Another area that several foundations indicated was important to offset is the preference of international aid programs to fund one- to two-year projects. Thus, foundations should consider providing long-term general support grants. The foundations noted that this support is particularly important because it gives groups the flexibility to respond to changes or opportunities in the political landscape and not just focus on the deliverables for a single program. General support grants also allow NGOs to bridge the gap between project-based grants.

- **Cultivate Strong Local Partnerships:** In order to navigate the social, political and legal dynamics specific to any country in the MENA region, it is essential that U.S.-based foundations work with knowledgeable, local consultants and strong intermediary
institutions. For some foundations this means a local in-country consultant. For others it means a partnership with an in-country intermediary organization working with NGOs in their area of interest and some additional foundations (who did not have the capacity for either of the above) relied heavily on the in-country staff of other foundations with similar grantmaking interests to advise them on their overall funding strategy and to help them identify specific organizations to support.

- Collaborate with Like-Minded Colleagues: As this preliminary study indicates, there is a relatively small group of U.S.-based foundations active in the MENA region. An immediate priority should be the creation of a peer network or learning community for professional staff with grant-making responsibilities in the region. The majority of the people interviewed indicated a desire to learn who else was funding in the region, what they were supporting, and where there might be an opportunity to work with one another. A peer network or learning community would also provide an opportunity for foundation staff to share resources about local consultants, intermediary organizations, and current or prospective grantees.

Author Post-Script (3/15/2011):

Following the unprecedented events of the Arab Spring, there are a few notes the authors would like to offer.

On the prevailing approaches to grant-making by U.S. foundations and public charities supporting communities impacted by the events of September 11, 2001:

- Political upheaval abroad, and increased scrutiny on AMEMSA communities resulting from congressional hearings focused on Muslim radicalization within the U.S., has increased philanthropic attention on these communities in the U.S. Thus far, the authors only have anecdotal information that points to increased interest in learning more about grant-making opportunities to support AMEMSA nonprofit organizations.

- The unprecedented and historical shifts occurring in early 2011 further highlight the diversity of AMEMSA societies and the “Muslim World” as well as the need to develop and embrace a new frame that includes an analysis of the complex relationships between diaspora communities in the U.S.

On the three prevailing approaches to grant-making by U.S.-based institutions with active grants in the MENA region:

- Research and Fellowship: This is an area with enormous potential for future funding strategies in the region. Foundations that have previously awarded research and fellowship grants should review past portfolios and make new grants for follow-up research with a special emphasis on grants to scholars within the MENA region. There is a narrow window of opportunity to provide the funding required for researchers and scholars to document what has happened and make thoughtful policy recommendations for future reforms.
• Identity-Based: The role of youth, women, and other minority groups in the popular movements has been heralded by many. However, it is not yet clear what types of reforms will be institutionalized and what spaces will be created for previously under-represented groups. It is essential that these organizations continue to be supported and that new resources are allocated to emerging efforts.

• Civil Society Support: Expanded support for civil society development is an obvious and essential priority for any foundation considering new or increased funding in the region.

As of the submission of this paper, there are several preliminary recommendations the author would add for U.S. based foundations with an interest in the MENA region:

• Encourage the efforts of Egyptians, Tunisians, Jordanians, Syrians, Bahrainis, Moroccans, Libyans, and others, living in the United States who are working to support the social movements in their home countries. These communities are organized via social media and actively engaged in dialogues with friends and colleagues at home. This is also an area of potential overlap for funders investing in AMEMSA communities.

• Revisit the role of migrant remittances in supporting civil society development. Research in this area has been largely stalled in light of the global economic decline. Prior to 2008, it was an area of inquiry with promising early case studies for how migrant communities can use remittances to support social movements in their countries of origin. It is worth additional research to determine what, if any, role remittances have played in the social movements of the past few months and how they can continue to provide essential support to fledgling social organizations.

• Take philanthropic risks! For foundations already funding in the region, now is the time to increase support and encourage grantees to be bold. For foundations considering funding in the region, this is an important time to partner with foundations and organizations that are familiar with the work already happening in the region. For additional information, please contact the authors for a list of foundations interviewed for this paper.
ADDENDUM A

List Of Interviews

The following symbols indicate overlapping funding areas between foundations funding in AMEMSA communities and those funding in the MENA region:

- (+) Overlap with U.S. Foundations Funding AMEMSA Communities
- (^) Overlap with U.S. Foundations Funding in the Middle East and North Africa

Names in italics indicate that a foundation was contacted for this report and no response was received or we were unable to schedule an interview prior to June 30, 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foundation</th>
<th>Name and Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ashoka Arab World, Ashoka Innovators</td>
<td>Ahmed Fouad El-Karrany, Fellowship &amp; Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the Public</td>
<td>Building Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flora Family Foundation</td>
<td>B. Stephen Toben, President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund for Global Human Rights</td>
<td>Chloé Ponchelet, Program Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Fund for Women</td>
<td>Zeina Zaatari, Senior Program Officer, Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots International</td>
<td>Nikhil Aziz, Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Youth Foundation</td>
<td>Mara Kronenfeld, Manager, Middle East Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Youth Foundation</td>
<td>Maria Andrawis, Program Coordinator, MENA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irfan Kathwari Foundation (+)</td>
<td>Nadia Kathwari, Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Women’s Fund</td>
<td>Shahnaz Taplin Chinoy, Founder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Society Institute</td>
<td>Anthony Richter, Associate Director of OSI, and Director of the Central Eurasia Project and the Middle East &amp; North Africa Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockefeller Brothers Fund (+)</td>
<td>Taleb Salhab, Program Director, Peace and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockefeller Brothers Fund (+)</td>
<td>Ariadne Papagapitos, Program Associate, Peace and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockefeller Brothers Fund (+)</td>
<td>Debra Eisenman, Program Assistant, Peace and Security and Western Balkans Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carnegie Corporation of New York (+)</td>
<td>Hillary Wiesner, Director, Islam Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford Foundation</td>
<td>Judy Barsalou, Representative, Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skoll Foundation</td>
<td>Bridget McNamer, Senior Program Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synergos Institute</td>
<td>Hishan El-Rouby, Synergos Field Staff Sarina Beges, Senior Coordinator, Arab World Social Innovators Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William and Flora Hewlett Foundation</td>
<td>Jacob Harold, Program Officer, Philanthropy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
<td>Steven M. Riskin, Senior Program Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### U.S. Foundations Funding in AMEMSA Communities, or AMEMSA-Related Issues

*(findings from these interviews are not included in this version of the paper. For a copy of the full paper, email mollyhafid@gmail.com)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foundation</th>
<th>Name and Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agha Khan Foundation, USA</td>
<td>Mirza Jahani, Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders in Philanthropy</td>
<td>Archana Sahgal, former Director of Civic Engagement Fund Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Arab American Philanthropy</td>
<td>Maha Freij, Deputy Executive Director &amp; Chief Financial Officer, ACCESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago Community Trust</td>
<td>Phillip Thomas, Senior Program Officer, Community Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Fdn. for Southeast Michigan</td>
<td>Randy Ross, Senior Program Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Fdn. for Southeast Michigan</td>
<td>David Contorer, Philanthropic Services Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doris Duke Fdn for Islamic Art</td>
<td>Nadia Roumani, Consultant Program Officer, Building Bridges Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Freedoms Fund</td>
<td>Naomi Abraham, Program Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Luce Foundation</td>
<td>Lynn Szwaja, Program Director for Theology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irfan Kathwari Foundation (*)</td>
<td>Nadia Kathwari, Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Womens Giving Circle</td>
<td>Fairuz Abdullah, Co-Chair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Foundation (*)</td>
<td>Kevin Ryan, Program Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Society Institute</td>
<td>Nancy Chang, Campaign Manager, National Security and Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARSA Community Foundation</td>
<td>Noosheen Hashemi, Founder and Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proteus Fund</td>
<td>Dimple Abichandani, Security and Rights Collaborative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar Foundation International</td>
<td>Maggie Mitchell Salem, Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockefeller Brothers Fund (*)</td>
<td>Taleb Salhab, Program Director, Peace and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockefeller Brothers Fund (*)</td>
<td>Ariadne Papagapitos, Program Associate, Peace and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockefeller Brothers Fund (*)</td>
<td>Debra Eisenman, Program Assistant, Peace and Security and Western Balkans Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silicon Valley Community Foundation</td>
<td>Manuel Santamaria, Grantmaking Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Carnegie Corporation of New York (*)</td>
<td>Hillary Wiesner, Director, Islam Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Carnegie Corporation of New York</td>
<td>Geri Mannion, Director, U.S. Democracy Program and of the Special Opportunities Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ford Foundation</td>
<td>Sheila Davaney, Program Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The San Francisco Foundation</td>
<td>Tessa Rouverol Callejo, FAITHS Program Coordinator</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


ADDENDUM B

Interview Questions

1. What is the frame/approach that your foundation uses toward funding AMEMSA communities/funding in the MENA region?

2. How long has the foundation been involved in this area of funding?

3. Why did the foundation begin its work in this area?

4. What are the thematic areas that you fund? (Types of programs?)

5. What have been some of the challenges to funding in this area?

6. What have been some of the successes to date? What has been the impact of your funding program?

7. What have been some of the key lessons learned?

8. Is there a time period for the program? How long do you expect to continue this area of funding?

9. Will the program increase in scope? If so, in what direction?

10. Is there anything that would help you increase your investment to these communities/regions?

11. Have you been able to find funding partners in this area? In the U.S.? Overseas?

12. With regard to Obama’s Cairo speech, will it, or has it, impacted your grantmaking?

13. What is the role of the events of September 11, 2001, in the development of your foundation’s grantmaking strategy? Have there been any special post-9/11 initiatives? Have there been any changes to the program over the last nine years?
## ADDENDUM C

### Excluded Foundations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foundation</th>
<th>Name and Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achelis Foundation</td>
<td>No MENA grants, except discretionary to The American University in Cairo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmar Family Foundation</td>
<td>Insufficient MENA grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America Near East Refugee Aid</td>
<td>International aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Express Foundation</td>
<td>No U.S. to MENA grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Near East Refugee Aid</td>
<td>International aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americans for Peace Now</td>
<td>Israel/Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America’s Development Foundation</td>
<td>International aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache Corporation</td>
<td>Egypt grants originate in Egypt office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Student Aid International Corp.</td>
<td>Primarily scholarships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur B. Schultz Foundation</td>
<td>Grants made through U.S. institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BD Corporate Giving Program</td>
<td>No active MENA grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA, Inc. Corporate Giving Program</td>
<td>Only 1 MENA grant, all Information TechnologyIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Channel Foundation</td>
<td>Support through Fund for Global Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exxon Mobil Corporation</td>
<td>MENA grants do not originate in U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation for Middle East Peace</td>
<td>Most grants are to U.S. based groups working on Israel/Palestine issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Fund for Children</td>
<td>Only two grants in 2006 (Lebanon, $2,500) and 2007 (Egypt, $15,000).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM Corporate Giving Program</td>
<td>MENA grants do not originate in the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran World Relief</td>
<td>International aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG America, Inc.</td>
<td>International aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Women’s Fund</td>
<td>Insufficient MENA grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Philanthropic Trust</td>
<td>No identifiable MENA grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olayan Charitable Trust</td>
<td>Giving to American University of Beirut, not enough info available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Nation Foundation</td>
<td>Operating Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Rubin Foundation</td>
<td>Grants are largely to U.S.-based groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sparkplug Foundation</td>
<td>Giving is for Israeli projects that involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rockdale Foundation, Inc</td>
<td>Focus changed from Foundation Center search profile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Civilian Research and Development Fdn</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women for Women International</td>
<td>International aid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgments

The authors extend our deepest gratitude to the many individuals who agreed to be interviewed for this paper. For thoughtful comments on an advance draft of the paper, we thank Cynthia Choi, Sharon Hing, and Laila Mehta at Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders in Philanthropy and Debra Eisenman, Ariadne Papagapitos, and Taleb Salhab at the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. We also thank Erin Essenmacher for her editing assistance; and finally, a sincere thank you to our research assistant, Sarrah AbuLughod.

End Notes

i. This paper is based on a report commissioned by Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders in Philanthropy (AAPIP) with support from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund (RBF)

ii. This version of the paper only includes the material relevant to U.S.-based Foundations Funding in the Middle East and North Africa. For a complete version of the Foundation Mapping Report, including the information on U.S. Foundations and Public Charities Supporting Communities Impacted by the Events of September 11th, email mollyhafid@gmail.com.

iii. Foundation Center, International Grantmaking IV: An Update on U.S. Foundation Trends, xi. The study included data from 2002-2006 which was the most recent data available.

iv. The report offers an important observation: without the investments of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, international giving would have declined during the period studied.

v. Foundation Center, International Grantmaking IV: An Update on U.S. Foundation Trends, 51

vi. Ibid. 52

vii. Ibid. xvi

viii. Ibid. xiii

ix. Ibid. 17

x. Ibid. xviii

xi. Ibid. 54

xii. Ibid. 56

xiii. Ibid. 58

xiv. Ibid. 58

xv. Alterman, “The Idea and Practice of Philanthropy in the Muslim World,” 1


xviii. These proposed areas are based on the interviews with program officer and intended to suggest themes across diverse institutions who each utilize different language to describe their grantmaking programs in the MENA region.
Muslim Philanthropy And The Production Of Space: The Muslim Philanthropy Digital Library Case

Sherine El Taraboulsi

---

12 Ms. Sherine El Taraboulsi is Research Manager at the John D. Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement, the American University in Cairo.
Introduction

In *The Production of Space* (1986), Henri Lefebvre argues that space is not a static location or framework wherein content is poured, but is a production that results from the dynamic interaction of a cluster of relations spanning both the tangible (i.e. physical dimension of space) and the intangible (ideological dimension of space). Space, according to Lefebvre, is a symbiosis between an understanding of space as a product and as a process of relations as well as interactions.

Today’s digital world provides a platform upon which new spaces are produced, while social media is intensifying relationships and accessibility. Together, these developments render Lefebvre’s complex understanding of space inescapable. The physical space of traditional libraries is no longer bound to the physical limitations of a geographic location; within digital libraries, information is exchanged and shared wherever there is internet access worldwide. Open access libraries are now available online covering multiple topics, locales and fields of inquiry, including arts and literature, history, technology and cross-disciplinary fields such as philanthropy.

In the midst of a rising interest in Islam and the Muslim world [defined hereafter as Muslim-majority countries and Muslim communities worldwide], there is dearth of information and need for an open access resource on philanthropic practices in the Muslim world that takes a comprehensive approach to Muslim philanthropy. This paper argues for an understanding of Muslim philanthropy that is culturally rooted and not only religious-bound; one that acknowledges it as complex ongoing process that defines philanthropic giving and continues to evolve on historical, social and cultural levels.

The history of the spread of Islam in the world is instructive in this regard. Islam emerged at a time and place in which numerous philanthropic practices already existed; Muslim philanthropy as we know it was established in the Quran as well as through mutual interactions between early Muslims and other traditions. The teachings of the Quran and Prophet Muhammed (pbuh) were integrated within a larger framework that included indigenous ideologies, histories and cultures. And there are many contemporary examples of this today. While it is mostly held that zakat should only be given to Muslim beneficiaries, a growing number of philanthropic institutions which do not discriminate between Muslims and non-Muslims as recipients of charitable giving. Some Muslim philanthropic institutions focus on providing to Muslim societies “including the establishment of mosques, community centers and community programs,” whereas others such as Muslim Aid claim that they give to “the poor and the needy regardless of race, ethnicity, color or religion.” (Cited in Weiss 28)

In order to uncover the historical and contemporary richness of giving in the Muslim context, it is necessary to draw on a diverse body of texts and artifacts from many parts of the world. The Muslim Philanthropy Digital Library, recently launched by the Gerhart Center at the American University in Cairo, is an example of how a new space can be forged to house documents on the practice of philanthropy within the Muslim world. In line with Lefebvre’s theory of space, the Library has established a new repository where multiple dimensions of Muslim philanthropy intersect: history, law, art and architecture, religion, economics and diaspora practices. The Library is a resource which is not limited simply to documentation and preservation but also to the active generation of
knowledge. Through video and sound recordings, the Library establishes a space for dialogue and new ideas. Users will get to listen to and watch interviews with philanthropists from all over the Muslim world. They will also get to see architectural representations of philanthropy.

The purpose of this paper is to reflect upon the complexity of philanthropic practices within the Muslim world using Lefebvre’s theory of space as a backdrop for analysis. Contemporary examples from Muslim-majority countries are cited to expose the many layers of philanthropic practices which may not generally be considered purely ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’. Moreover, the Muslim Philanthropy Digital Library is used as a case study to explore how the digital world can be employed to introduce a new understanding of Muslim philanthropy that is more comprehensive, eclectic and not bound solely and exclusively to the religious context. The Library is a complex space encompassing a cluster of interactions and relations between the various dimensions of Muslim philanthropy that can be viewed metaphorically as a mirror or an extension of the intricate birth and development of philanthropic practices within the Muslim world.

**Conceptual Framework: Henri Lefebvre And The Production Of Space**

Written at a time when Althusserianism and deconstruction were salient, Henri Lefebvre’s *The Production of Space* (1986) examines the complexity of the notion of space, underscoring its ideological, social and physical dimensions. He dispenses with reductionist discourses which perceive of space as “an empty zone, a container indifferent to its content, but defined by certain unexpressed criteria: absolute, optico-geometrical, Euclidean-Cartesian-Newtonian.” (Lefebvre 206) According to Lefebvre, space does not exist in vacuum but is essentially a product wherein processes of production and reproduction are central and emerge dialectically through the dynamic interplay of various forces and a cluster of intricate relationships.

Lefebvre’s dialectical thinking departs from the Manichean views, prominent at the time, and is expressed in terms of a “triplicate,” of three terms or dimensions. The third term deconstructs binary thinking, adding yet another third dimension to the process. This triple view opens up opportunities for a more complex discourse; space is “at once a physical environment that can be perceived; a semiotic abstraction… and finally, a medium through which the body lives out its life in interaction with other bodies.” (Gottdiener 131)

For Lefebvre, space is a product and, at the same time, an active component in the process of production itself. He says: “As a product, interactively or retroactively, space intervenes in the production itself… In its productive role, and as a producer, space (well or badly organized) becomes part of the relations of production and the forces of production.” (Lefebvre 208) In this manner, space is an interaction between product, producer and “underpinning social and economic relations.” (Lefebvre 209).

Lefebvre maps a process for the understanding of space that links “the mental and the cultural, the social and the historical.” Simultaneity, thus, informs much of Lefebvre’s thinking and theorizing of space. Space, according to him, is both a spatial practice [material environment, physical or abstract entity], a representation of space [a mental concept or discourse, the mental] and a space of representation [a terrain wherein social interaction happens in relation to the environment, the social] (Gottdiener 131). Both abstract and social spaces involve this tripartite of the physical, the
mental and the social. He gives Greek space as an example to illustrate his point: Greek space is defined by their understanding of the divine and geometry. Rome, on the other hand, is governed by notions of power. Both cultures inform space each in its own manner. Thus, the Greek agora (an abstract space) is empty and proportionately influenced by notions of the golden mean; it is a place where Greeks meet and are one with the cosmos. The Roman Forum, by contrast, is cluttered with objects. Each space is a representation of the culture that informs it, the social relations that construct it and the organization of the space itself as an entity – be it physical or abstract (Gottdiener 131).

Lefebvre’s theorizing of space provides a framework for this paper which seeks to explore the interface between Islam and other cultures within the philanthropic sphere in a manner that dispenses with simplistic Manichean discourses and espouses a more comprehensive approach. The Muslim Philanthropy Digital Library [MPDL] will be used as a case study to offer insight into the need for a more inclusive approach that acknowledges the dynamics of influence between culture and philanthropy within the geographic scope of MPDL. This will be proven superior to an exclusive approach that addresses Muslim philanthropy in an intellectual and cultural vacuum.

The Problem Of “Muslim Philanthropy”: The Need For A New Ijtihad

In Muslim-majority countries, the general approach to “Muslim philanthropy” has been generally directed towards the main forms of charity in Islam. One thinks of waqf, zakat and sadaqqa as the three main pillars of Muslim philanthropy which are, more often than not, distinguished in popular perception from Western institutionalized philanthropic practices. Moreover, according to Dwight Burlingame, for the West, concepts of charity and philanthropy are not necessarily features connected to Islam and “its moral universe” and that “the religio-ethical standards of behavior implicit in such words as ‘kindness,’ ‘generosity,’ ‘love of mankind,’ and ‘compassion’ are not particularly evident when Islam and its adherents are depicted in the electronic and print media.” (Burlingame 269)

This is coupled with the prevalence of the Huntingtonian paradigm of a Muslim-Western clash of civilizations, has led to a polarized, binary mode of thinking and an overlooking of the fact that philanthropy, inherent in Islam, emerged in the Muslim world diachronically as a result of a dynamic interaction with other philanthropic practices and cultures. As such, Muslim philanthropy is not purely Muslim in the traditional sense. The attempt here is to open up a conversation about Muslim philanthropy using a more inclusive paradigm that dispenses with the exclusive bifurcations which have permeated discourses about this field.

According to Mohammed Arkoun, a new ijtihad for Muslim and non-Muslim scholars is needed to rethink Islam within the context of a history of thought or epistemology. The same is needed when thinking about Muslim philanthropy. He argues that this project of rethinking Islam would respond to two major needs in Muslim societies:

1) the particular need of Muslim societies to think, for the first time, about their own problems which had been made unthinkable by the triumph of orthodox scholastic thought; and 2) the need of contemporary thought in general to open new fields and discover new horizons of knowledge, through a systematic cross cultural approach to the fundamental
problems of the human existence. These problems are raised and answered in their own ways by the traditional religions. (Arkoun 28)

Thinking of Islam within an epistemological context would bring up the problem of historicization or historicity which contradicts the general Islamic perception of Islam as fixed and unchanging irrespective of the passage of time. However, rethinking Muslim philanthropy as a product and an active component in the production processes of philanthropic trends is necessary because the social, religious and human elements are paramount in the study of Muslim philanthropy. Philanthropy as stated in the Koran needs to be rethought within a context that opens up a new understanding of philanthropic institutions. This rethinking must acknowledge the interface between Muslim philanthropy (as perceived in the popular mind) and other socio-historical factors.

First, a semantic distinction between the ideological and intellectual spaces of Islam and Muslim is relevant. The reference here is to Muslim philanthropy rather than Islamic philanthropy. Islam is the faith and, as such, Islamic philanthropy would denote philanthropic practices stated within the Quran and Sunna [the faith]. However, the word “Muslim” introduces human and social considerations into the equation which is at the very heart of philanthropy. Philanthropy is a space of interaction between the self and the other. This interaction occurs within a collective and for its overall benefit. That said, the concept of philanthropy is a space in which interaction and communication are a must; isolation is unthinkable. No one can practice philanthropy on his/her own. Philanthropy is by definition an act of belonging to and benefiting a collective. It is interaction that is dialogic rather than dialectic.

The spread of Islam bore witness to a dialogic exchange between multiple spaces. Islam spread into a world where philanthropic institutions already existed; each institution was a product of the indigenous culture and history from which it emerged. Today, philanthropic practices in the Muslim world are the result of an interface between Islam and the cultures it encountered. This interface actively produced and reproduced new spaces wherein Islamic philanthropy adapted to the indigenous cultures of the geographic space in which it existed.

A historical review of the waqf provides a good example of the complexity of the Muslim philanthropic space within the global context. According to A. A. Fyzee, the first account of the Islamic waqf pertains to Omar ibn al-Khattab who, after procuring land in Khaybar, approached the Prophet Muhammed PBUH to consult him about it. The Prophet responded: “If thou likest, make the property itself to remain inalienable, and give (the profit from) it in charity.” (Cited in Morgan 21) So Omar made it a charity to serve the needy and to free slaves. This is considered the first account of Islamic waqf. However, there are other accounts that point towards the existence of similar institutions in biblical times.

The Jewish heqdesh had its origins in biblical times and it took the form of “consecrated property donated for the upkeep of the Jerusalem Temple and its officials, including the purchase of sacrificial animals for the cult.” (Cohen 200) In the post-biblical period, the role played by the heqdesh was expanded and extended to benefit both the religious institution itself and the poor. In this way, the Islamic waqf mirrored the Heqdesh as a sustainable vehicle for delivering charity (Cohen 201). The only major difference between the two is that the Islamic waqf had at its very essence the service of the poor from the beginning as a sadaqqa jariyya, while that of the heqdesh
evolved historically. Both the heqdesh and waqf created a space where philanthropy changed and was rendered more complex as a result of the interplay with one another. The processes of producing space and reproduction are concurrent: one feeds into the other. An incomplete picture is developed if each is treated individually.

Although the existence of the heqdesh preceded that of the Islamic waqf, their influences on one another can be perceived both ways; the Middle Eastern Jewish pattern was reinforced and influenced by the Islamic waqf. Muhammed Amin noted that the emergence of waqfs during the Mamluk period was at least partly “the quest for prestige” through the building of religious institutions. Similarly, for Egyptian Jews, heqeshim were named after their founders (Cohen 203). The Egyptian Geniza frequently mentions the religious obligation to help the needy. There is evidence that the Jews took this duty very seriously and that this was heightened by the diligence of their Muslim neighbors (Cohen 243).

The synergy between the Islamic waqf and other institutions, both biblical and post-biblical, are further highlighted in the description of the beneficiaries: the poor. It is significant that the language used to describe them in the Geniza reverberates with very little semantic change in Islam, Christianity and Judaism. The poor were described as trying to avoid “uncovering their faces” or kashf al-wajh, a description that appears in Medieval Islamic sources and in al-Ghazzali’s writings as well as “in the Egyptian Christian chronicle of the Patriarchs of the Coptic Church.” (Cohen 244)

In addition to this historical interface, cultural and sociopolitical interfaces are also possible. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century city of Surat in western India, philanthropic practices were part of a culture of symbolic investments which merchants developed in building social relationships with members of their community and their rulers. This is further evidence as to the interface between philanthropic trends and institutions as well as the environment in which philanthropy is practiced. Philanthropy was part of a person’s commitment to Hindu and Jain religious values, but also a part of the sociopolitical environment around them: “Gifting was a means of establishing one’s identity as a member of a mahajan (guild).” (Haynes 340) Religious gifting or charity took two major forms: the collective duties paid to merchants’ guilds and donations of families to specific religious institutions or persons (Haynes 344).

The payment of cesses was a means of belonging to a collective. Philanthropy had a religious and social purpose. There are records which show that even Muslims had to donate funds to Hindu shrines (Haynes 344). As such, the environment influenced the practice of philanthropy. The philanthropic space created in Surat, initially born of Hindu and Jain religious values, is also influenced by the sociopolitical environment, thereby becoming an active component in the creation of another space where philanthropy is no longer tied to religion alone. Rather, philanthropy is firmly embedded in cultural and social practices. The philanthropic space resulting from this interface is the very arena in which social, political and religious threads are brought together.

Turkish imarets or large soup kitchens also blurred the line separating philanthropy from existing social hierarchies and structures. Religious obligations were, in a sense, personal obligations as well as indicators of one’s position in a collective. In her investigation of the imarets, Amy Singer examines the lists of people who were qualified to be fed in the Ottoman Empire: “She discovers that the line between need and privilege was neither clear nor necessarily relevant in assigning
rights to eat at a public kitchen.” (Cohen 357) She concludes that, as is the case with other forms of charity, “the imarets served not only to deliver assistance but also to reinforce existing hierarchies of the social order, marking status through the idiom of food.” (Cohen 357)

Today, with the presence of print, broadcast media, digitization techniques, over 158 million blogs, more than 500 million active Facebook users and over 65 million tweets a day, the question of synergies between culture and philanthropy has become an inescapable reality. New trends have emerged and previously fixed concepts of philanthropy have been challenged and rendered as versatile and dynamic as the inter-connected global environment. There are many examples of this. While it is mostly held that zakat should only be given to Muslim beneficiaries, there are examples of philanthropic institutions that do not discriminate between Muslims and Non-muslims. Furthermore, in a study conducted on philanthropy in Egypt, almost 40% of the sample expressed readiness to give zakat and sadaqqa to people of different religions. When the data by religion was cross-tabulated, 37.3% of the Muslim community compared to 34.3% of the Christian community stated that they had no objections to giving to charities linked solely to their faith. (El Daly 64)

In Egypt, religion, both Christianity and Islam, is embedded in the culture and religious traditions. In fact, philanthropy as perceived by many Egyptians is strongly connected to the faith and to the duties of paying zakat, ushur (Christian tithe) and sadaqqa. The executive director of a Cairo-based NGO noted that “Philanthropy for me is what the Prophet Mohammed said in his hadith: ‘None of you will have faith until he wishes for his brother what he wishes for himself.'” Another held that “Philanthropy is important in every civilized society, because it takes the poor and the marginalized into account. The NGO facilitates philanthropy: the rich give through donations and the not-very-rich volunteer their effort. Religion asks us to do this, whether Islam or Christianity.” (El Daly 51-52) NGOs’ role in development interacts with religious and social roles; all are interconnected spaces that make up the fabric of philanthropy in a Muslim-majority country like Egypt.

Another example is how philanthropic institutions brand themselves to collect donations. The messages used respond to the culture in which they operate. This blurs the line separating religious/faith-based philanthropy from secular philanthropy. Al Orman provides a good example in the Egyptian context: it is a decidedly secular philanthropic organization. When asked about whether the organization’s director considered Al Orman a faith-based organization or not, he insisted that Al Orman is not necessarily faith-based. However, throughout the conversation, he still used Islamic terminology and cited the Quran. This example demonstrates how the line of demarcation between religion and culture can be blurred within the philanthropic space. Muslim philanthropy is a product of, and an active component in, the production of each in people’s minds.

There needs to be a platform that espouses an interdisciplinary and comparative approach to Muslim philanthropy. This platform must shed the Lefebvre’s “empty zone” mode of thinking which ignores the interconnectedness between philanthropic practices and culture. This platform would open up a conversation about new comparative methodologies to be used in the study of Muslim philanthropy and would integrate it within the global philanthropic realm.
The Muslim Philanthropy Digital Library: Bringing Muslim Philanthropy Into The Digital World

The Muslim Philanthropy Digital Library was born of the need for a digital platform that would meet the needs of practitioners and researchers as well as anyone interested in learning about philanthropic practices within Muslim-majority countries and Muslim communities worldwide. While there is a growing interest in Muslim politics, ideology and culture, there is very little literature on Muslim philanthropy within a comparative, inclusive context. Whatever information out there is, for the most part, extremely difficult to obtain. There is a need to aggregate knowledge on Muslim philanthropy with an understanding as to the amount of diversity encompassed within the boundaries of that term. That was how the idea of the Muslim Philanthropy Digital Library emerged. The next few pages will present an outline of the library as a digital space where culture meets philanthropy. It will also describe the different mechanisms used to make this library more than a simple repository of documents but an actual platform for ideas and identifying research gaps.

With initial funding provided by Canada’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the John D. Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement (Gerhart Center), in partnership with the Center of Excellence for the Middle East and Arab Cultures (CEMEA) based in the American University in Cairo, set out to establish a digital library on Muslim philanthropy. Over twenty five meetings with university administrators, professors, librarians, and Egyptian non-profit professionals were held in order to gain a better sense of the landscape the digital library would cover. A research consultation was held in mid October 2010 which included a group of interested researchers, practitioners, professors as well as the directors of the Gerhart Center and CEMEA to discuss current trends in philanthropy within and outside the region. Additionally, the participants discussed the scope of the Library and its potential importance to broaden the scope and depth of research in this area.

Key Conclusions Derived From Meetings And Research Consultation:

The Muslim Philanthropy Digital Library was born of the need for a digital platform that would meet the needs of practitioners and researchers as well as anyone interested in learning about philanthropic prac

• MPDL’s Scope:
  The realm of Muslim philanthropy is a complex one and should not be taken at face value. The Library should cover both theory and practice; the ideas and thought behind the actual giving, as well as the various ways philanthropy is practiced in the Muslim world. To avoid misinterpretation or misunderstanding as to the mission of the Library, MPDL’s definition of Muslim philanthropy is geographic and cultural, not limited to faith-based philanthropy. This is an important distinction which opens up the scope of the library to the rich historical and contemporary influences on philanthropy as it is actually practiced. MPDL spans Muslim-majority countries and Muslim communities worldwide. As such, it is necessary to take into account the cultural, social and historical factors which influence philanthropic practices within MPDL’s geographic scope.
• MPDL's Strengths:

1. MPDL should be the 'one-stop shop' for practitioners, researchers and those interested in finding out more about philanthropy in Muslim majority countries and communities. Although there are resources already available, they are dispersed or unpublished; MPDL has the unique advantage of having them all in one place.
2. One major problem for researchers is access and mobility. MPDL's geographic scope will allow researchers from any part of the world to get a comprehensive picture of philanthropic practices in Muslim-majority communities without the need to travel to another country. MPDL also facilitates comparative studies and exchange of information and ideas.

• MPDL's Sustainability:

Digital libraries are often not sustainable largely because of two major factors: lack of proper outreach and lack of funding, which are highly interconnected problems. This can be addressed in the following ways:

1. Using social media can be an effective means to generate interest in the library by making it a growing and dynamic entity instead of a stagnant repository of documents. Facebook can also be a valuable mode of interaction. Uploading video and sound recorded interviews or a visual exhibition can be effective means of outreach by putting a human face to the practice of philanthropy. Readers and scholars are interested in not only in learning about philanthropic practices, but also knowing the story behind the practice. They are eager to read creative and original research, and not all philanthropic practices are covered by research and academic papers.
2. Developing an outreach and communications strategy which will ensure MPDL's presence in major conferences on philanthropy within and outside the region.
3. Producing and encouraging research can be another means to help the library realize its mission and vision. There is very little comparative research conducted on Muslim philanthropy and even less on the role of libraries and digitization in enhancing the infrastructure of philanthropy in the Muslim world. The creative structure of MPDL should establish a mechanism whereby research gaps are identified and more research is conducted in this field.

Based on those meetings, the structure of the Muslim Philanthropy Digital Library was designed to make widely available a repository of the world’s knowledge on all forms of philanthropy through original documents, reports, graphics, waqf registrations, as well as scholarly analysis from Muslim majority countries and communities worldwide. The focus, for the first phase of the library project, is on twentieth and twenty-first century material.

The Library’s mission is to create an open-access global information resource and virtual library on the range of philanthropic practices in Muslim-majority countries and communities worldwide. Its vision is to establish Muslim philanthropic practices and knowledge as an integral part of the contemporary global philanthropic realm.
While the initial idea was to establish a repository of documents, the project’s structure expanded significantly to incorporate digital documents, a visual exhibition, video and sound recorded interviews, as well as a research component. Below is a diagram representing the current framework of MPDL:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MPDL DOCUMENTS</th>
<th>SPECIAL COLLECTIONS</th>
<th>VOICES OF PHILANTHROPY</th>
<th>VISUAL EXHIBITION</th>
<th>RESEARCH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This section features documents covering the various dimensions of philanthropic practices within the Muslim world under the following categories: arts and architecture, cultures of giving, diaspora, economics, history, law, philanthropic institutions and religion.</td>
<td>Bint Al Nil Collection: In 1948, Doria Shafik created the Bint al-Nil journal funded by Princess Chevikar to fuse new energy in the Egyptian feminist movement. It chronicles the period before and after the 1952 Revolution and features articles on literacy programs, cultural, political and social campaigns led by women.</td>
<td>This section includes documentaries, video and sound recorded interviews with major philanthropists and business leaders from all over the Muslim world.</td>
<td>This section includes visual representations of philanthropy in the twentieth and twenty first centuries.</td>
<td>A workshop or conference will be held on an annual basis to encourage original research on Muslim philanthropy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each section of the Muslim Philanthropy Digital Library creates a new paradigm whereby the digital space is a platform which allows for an understanding of the various dimensions of Muslim philanthropy. MPDL’s digital space can be regarded as a new resource which facilitates an inclusive perception of Muslim philanthropy and expunges old, exclusive misconceptions.

The Muslim Philanthropy Digital Library Documents section taps into the various dimensions of philanthropic practices within the geographic scope of MPDL. In doing so, MPDL acknowledges the multiple layers included within the practice of philanthropy: historical, social, legal, architectural and cultural. It also includes registrations of philanthropic institutions like waqf that go all the way back to 1900. By accessing this section, researchers are able to get a holistic image of philanthropy in context. Each dimension is a component of the wider context of philanthropy.
The **Special Collections** section features selected articles from a journal titled Bint Al-Nil. In 1948, Doria Shafik created the Bint Al-Nil [Daughter of the Nile] association and journal with funds donated by Princess Chevikar to fuse new energy in the Egyptian feminist movement. The journal chronicles an important period in Egyptian history; before and after the 1952 Revolution. It also underscores the role played by women as an integral part of the nation. The journal features articles on literacy programs, cultural, political and social campaigns led by women, as well as testimonies on women’s philanthropic activities in Egypt and the world at the time.

The journal itself is a form of philanthropy. Although MPDL does not have a separate feminist or gender section, including selections from this journal as a special collection adds to the vision of the library as inclusive of the different voices and dimensions of the philanthropic space.

An Egyptian feminist journal from the 1950s contained valuable insights into women’s philanthropy at the time. During that period of time, activism and philanthropy were closely linked as the aristocratic “ladies of the salon” affiliated with Princess Chevikar actively engaged in public activism by starting associations, (جمعيات) charitable organizations and learned societies. The Egyptian University and Al Azhar relied heavily on grants from women. For example, when a school for the blind in Zaytun called for public support in 1906, a “charitable lady” donated a portion of her landed estate for the benefit of the school.

The women’s press was also another form of activism and philanthropy. Women’s journals and magazines were usually funded by women and provided a reference point on a variety of women leaders, activists and philanthropists from Europe, Asia and the Arab world. They also constituted a forum for the exchange of information and ideas as well as a record of women’s meetings and activities.

In a similar fashion, MPDL will become a forum of ideas on Muslim philanthropy, using social media and digitization as its tools. Its **Voices of Philanthropy** section is maintained on both YouTube, and the American University in Cairo Digital Archive Repository [DAR] for preservation purposes. The Library’s YouTube channel has allowed for a more interactive experience with viewers and a wider distribution of the interviews and videos uploaded.

The **Visual Exhibition** presents representations of philanthropic practices as seen through the lens of a camera instead of the mind of a researcher. Captions are provided for all the photographs and they are made available both on Flickr and DAR. The first collection was on the Egyptian January 25 Revolution; it gave users a glimpse of Egyptian philanthropy manifested itself during and after the revolution. Giving was not only financial, it was emotional, material and embedded within the very solidarity of the people. Tahrir Square was a microcosm of what was happening throughout Egypt. Pictures were accompanied by testimonials from professional and amateur photographers who were in and beyond Tahrir during the Revolution.

The last section, **Research**, is directly linked to this paper. There is a need to identify research gaps and promote the Library as a means of helping to address them. Through a comparative approach to existing material on Muslim philanthropy, MPDL will expose gaps in knowledge and encourage discourse on methods to close these gaps. A research conference, Takaful, will be held on an annual basis to encourage research on Muslim philanthropy and contribute to MPDL's sustainability.
Conclusion: Where Do We Go From Here

The space of Muslim philanthropy is multi-dimensional yet its various dimensions are not adequately understood. There is a need to develop new platforms which bring new scholars to the field and encourage new methodologies and frameworks. That contributes to more inclusive, comparative approaches to understanding Muslim philanthropy and moves away from binary modes of thinking about an “empty zone” rather than a dynamic interaction between multiple variables.

Lefebvre’s theory of space opens up a new way of perceiving Muslim philanthropy as a space that results from the intersection of Islam, philanthropy and the surrounding environment. The digital world can provide a platform wherein this intersection can be negotiated, discussed and developed into new modes of understanding Muslim philanthropy as part of the global philanthropic realm.

The Muslim Philanthropy Digital Library brings Muslim philanthropy into the digital world. Using a mix of digitization and social media, the library is more than a mere repository of documents and data on philanthropic practices. Rather, it is a dynamic platform wherein a new understanding of Muslim philanthropy becomes possible. More collaboration is needed by philanthropists, researchers and non-profit professionals to expand this library even further in order to meet the need for a new understanding of Muslim philanthropy and the development of new methodologies of research that are dialogical rather than binary.
Works Cited


----------------------- Poverty and Charity in the Jewish Community of Medieval Egypt.


Charity, Civil Society, and Social Capital in Islamic and Christian Societies, 1200-1700: Models and Hypotheses for Comparative Research

Nicholas Terpstra

Nicholas Terpstra is Professor of History at the University of Toronto.
In many societies, treating the needs of the poor is a fundamental part of religious obligation. Historically, providing institutional expression of this has been a key factor in shaping social institutions and civil society. In Islamic traditions dating to at least the 10th century, this obligation often took the form of the waqf, a religious endowment which provided food, shelter, and education to needy believers. In Christian traditions, similar charitable work took the form of the xenodochium, or the hospital, which was also a religious endowment which provided food, shelter, and education to needy believers. There has been significant research into these institutions within their respective traditions but little effort to determine what parallels or shared influences there may have at their origins, their activities, or their administration. There seems generally to have been little research into how the institutional forms and development of Islamic charity may have resonated in Christendom, and vice versa.\(^i\) Given the extensive parallels, bridging this divide must be a key agenda for comparative research.

The Christian hospital is usually seen as emerging out of Catholic monastic and Greek Byzantine traditions.\(^ii\) This is certainly a given, but we must also be open to investigating the possible influence of the waqf on the form, activities, and administration of the hospital. The parallels continue when comparing charitable activities; how they are linked both to underlying religious values and also to the social structures of Islamic and Christian communities. Finally, comparing the administration of the Muslim waqf and the Catholic hospital, the character of each as religious and yet not clerical allows them to develop as institutions which transcend the common distinction that scholars still make between secular and sacred spheres.

Comparative examination of the activities and administration of both institutions will show we can use institutional history in order to gain greater insight into the organization of civil society and the creation of social capital within different respective societies. This has been a key area of research in recent work on the Christian hospital and I would like to offer a few suggestions for exploring some of the same social dynamics in the waqfs. I should emphasize that my own research has been largely focused on Christian hospitals, and so the questions and suggestions for further comparative research offered here reflect that limitation. Clearly all scholars working on Christian hospitals and Islamic waqfs need to learn more about how both institutions operated and how they may have influenced each other from the late medieval period into the modern world. Exchanging some of the questions that rise out of our own particular research can be one helpful step in expanding this exchange.

**Civil Society, Social Capital, and a ‘Putnam Thesis’ in the Arab World**

Comparative investigation is timely because at least one scholar has argued recently that the waqf was in fact one of the social norms established by Shariah law which has historically held back the development of civil society in Arab countries. Duke University political scientist Timur Kuran has claimed that Shariah law prevented the development of autonomous, perpetual, self-governing corporations for either commercial or social purposes. The Islamic institution of the waqf facilitated the delivery of social services like education, health care and charity, but each waqf’s trustees were perpetually held back by the fixed instructions of its founding documents. Kuran argues that this left waqfs unable to change in response to shifting political conditions, let alone to participate or lead that change; they were fundamentally apolitical. Hence while legally autonomous corporate groups like guilds, confraternities, professional associations, and local
governments helped drive the development of responsible government and democratic change in Europe from the medieval period, similar changes did not develop in Arabic societies until the nineteenth century, when cultural and social groups and charities finally began assuming the social functions of the waqfs. (iii)

Kuran’s analysis adapts Robert Putnam’s argument about the development of civil society and social capital in medieval Europe, to Arabic history. In his landmark 1993 study, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, the Harvard sociologist similarly aimed to trace the roots of Italy’s democratic traditions to the medieval emergence of corporate groups which fostered a culture of responsibility, interest brokering, accommodation, compromise, and trust. (iv) Putnam argued that the areas of Italy where corporate groups like guilds and confraternities had flourished were the areas that had a more advanced civil society with higher levels of participation in civic life, more developed social relations, and greater satisfaction. By contrast, areas where these groups had not flourished saw far less social and civic involvement as well as greater suspicion of, and dissatisfaction with, the government. In the former, social life was characterized by increasingly horizontal social relations as the many members of corporate groups co-operated and competed with each other in pursuit of social, economic, and political goals.

In Putnam’s assessment, co-operation within voluntary and charitable groups expanded social capital while also developing habits of democratic behavior which led more people to participate in government, to expect things from it, and to hold it accountable. By contrast, areas without an active range of civil society organizations were more atomistic, familial, and personal, and politics was centered around more vertical social relations, purely personal ties, and nepotism. In these areas, social capital and political involvement were low, cynicism was high, and dissatisfaction with the system was rife. Putnam marshaled a great array of surveys, polls, and statistics on modern Italy to buttress a thesis which, in the end, confirmed a long-standing stereotype of the ‘two Italys’: a dynamic, industrialized, and engaged North that is distinct from the static, underdeveloped, and politically-inert South.

At a certain level, Kuran and Putnam demonstrate a conclusion in search of an argument. Putnam has come under heavy criticism for a poor historical methodology which ignores evidence of civil society operating in the medieval South and which too-neatly jumps the centuries between medieval cause and modern effect without troubling to explain the continuities and discontinuities in the years in between. (v) In fact, he simply repeats many arguments first developed in the late nineteenth century by Italian liberal scholars and public intellectuals who would have preferred to keep the south out of the newly-unified Italian state. Their characterization of southern Italy as an inert, underdeveloped, and religiously-blinkered society suffering passively under a despotic regime is strangely similar to Timur Kuran’s characterization of pre-modern Arabic societies. Edward Said’s Orientalism explored the genealogy of stereotypes like this in writing about the Arabic world, and readers of Kuran might find that reading his volume together with Said’s helps raise some critical questions about his methodology and conclusions.

The work of Putnam and Kuran must be critiqued, but not entirely dismissed. (vi) Their methodology is flawed and some of their conclusions are clearly pre-determined by an uncritical acceptance of unexamined stereotypes which are rooted deep in Western prejudices about Mediterranean and ‘oriental’ cultures. Kuran overtly eschews the view that cultural factors made Islam incompatible
with the kinds of institutional and capitalist developments which emerged in Europe. However, the
ghosts of that stereotype still haunt his argument about legal structures. He seems unaware that
different administrative forms of the waqf developed even within particular parts of the Islamic
world, some of them involving a more responsible and independent administration. Additionally,
he ignores the fact that, in some parts of the Islamic world, declining administrative efficiency and
increasing corruption came after the nineteenth century colonial takeovers and not before. At
the same time, these flaws can serve as catalysts which send us back to the historical phenomena
and archival documents in order to examine more closely and critically how civil society and
social capital developed in Arabic societies. Similarly, the search for horizontal and vertical social-
historical dynamics can be a helpful heuristic tool in examining how institutions functioned in their
social, economic, political and cultural contexts.

Both Puntam and Kuran draw on another political sociologist, Douglass North, who has re-
negated the story of institutional history and whose concept of ‘path dependency’ aims to insert
multiple contexts into that history to show that where we are now is the consequence of long-
standing patterns and conditions of cultural development. This approach brings a higher level
of sophistication to studies of charitable institutions in the western world which demonstrates
that they had a greater immediate and long-term impact on the development of civil society than
historians once thought. While exploring the historical forms of Arabic philanthropy and civic
engagement, a more critical and comparative study of Christian hospitals and Islamic waqfs is
both more vital and more promising.

Comparing Philanthropic Models: Caritas & Zakat and Misericordia & Sadaqa

What values animated Catholic philanthropy, and how did these shape political life and civil society
in the urban communities of the western Mediterranean? There are two distinct approaches:
thetical and practical, represented by the Latin terms ‘caritas’ and ‘misericordia’. These two
words were at the core of the language of Catholic philanthropy; they have a theological content,
a metaphorical meaning, and an iconic presence which together shaped public philanthropy in
Catholic communities before the French Revolution.

Caritas emphasized an obligation to help those with whom one was in close relation, while
misericordia emphasized assistance to the poor and needy in general. These are roughly parallel to zakat and sadaqa in Islamic philanthropy. Caritas, like zakat, was
very specific support given to kin or clients which was intended to strengthen social bonds. It arose out of obligations placed on the giver; it placed obligations on the recipient. This was why Caritas
usually and very deliberately reinforced the ties between wealthy patrons and their clients as well
as those between members of extended families or kin groups.
Both caritas and zakat were calculated on a percentage basis – the donor owed his prosperity
to God or Allah, and showed thanks by returning a set percentage (2.5, 5, or 10%) in the form of
philanthropy to the poor.

Misericordia, like sadaqa, was philanthropy given more generally to a communitas or corporate
group (such as a guild, confraternity or town). In Catholic philanthropy, misericordia was often
organized within these groups as a form of mutual assistance or insurance.
To borrow the terms of modern political sociology, it was support which was characteristic of civil
society, and that arose from as well as reinforced a more general store of social capital. This is not to imply that caritas and misericordia were in opposition to or competition with each other. Rather, like zakat and sadaqa, they are complementary emphases within philanthropy which highlight the social dynamics that they foster. (x)

They were public and political virtues, and their implementation demonstrated how, in pre-modern Christian societies, the modern distinctions between ‘sacred’ and ‘secular’ were essentially meaningless. (xi) This was and is even truer of Muslim societies: western modernity’s deep commitment to the distinction between the sacred and secular hinders many western efforts to understand the institutional forms of Islamic charity, both in the past and in the present.

That notwithstanding, caritas and misericordia each generated distinct forms of public and private philanthropy. The social dynamics around caritas were more vertical, and those around misericordia were more horizontal. To draw again on political sociology, both forms of aid were ‘boundary-making’, yet they set quite different boundaries as to who was a part of the corporate group or civil community. Following their practice from the late medieval into the early modern period, we can see how caritas and misericordia reinforced different political and social systems both in Europe itself and in some European colonies. Their distinct values and associations also helped to shape the different paths taken by Catholic and Protestant forms of philanthropy after the Reformation of the sixteenth century. The question then becomes whether or not similar vertical and horizontal dynamics are observable within Islamic philanthropy.

Caritas and Misericordia were the differing administrative forms by which a common set of charitable actions was undertaken. These actions were rooted in a New Testament parable where Jesus lays out a set of 7 works of charity that can secure the path to heaven: “I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and you welcomed me, I was naked and you gave me clothing, I was sick and you took care of me, I was in prison and you visited me” [Matthew 25:35-36]. From at least the fifth century, Christian monks offered some of these acts of charity in hospitals attached to their monasteries. Yet their charity was directed most often to travelers only.

From the 12th century a new development emerged: civic governments, private wealthy donors, professional guilds and lay brotherhoods called confraternities began establishing hospitals which served members of their own civic and professional communities. Historians have often credited this development to the growth of cities in Western Europe and to the emergence of the mendicant orders of friars which emphasized preaching and charity.

Comparing Institutional Forms: Waqfs and Hospitals

These religious and civic practices were influenced by encounters between western Europeans and other Christian traditions throughout the eastern and western Mediterranean during the middle ages. The Greek Orthodox xenodochium was organized much like monastic hospitals in the west so its example, while critical, did not suggest new forms of organizing charity. The Muslim waqf, on the other hand, by being organized as an endowment, offered precisely the example that the new civic hospitals in western European cities began emulating: any Christian traveller to al-Andalus, Damascus, Alexandria, or Cairo would become familiar with these institutions. And many, like the
sixteenth century Frenchman Guillaume Postel, had no difficulty rejecting Islam while expressing deep admiration for the social and charitable institutions that developed within it. The practical expression of charity served as a bridge between opposing faiths.

The Christian *xenodochium* and monastic hospital were activities attached to active religious communities and their charitable work was an extension and expression of the daily lives of the monks and nuns who made up those communities. The waqf and the Catholic civic hospital were new institutions established with charity as their first goal and prime purpose. Their administrative and financial foundation was not a residential community of clerics, but a carefully managed endowment that funded the work of paid employees, some of them resident and some not. Both institutions placed an emphasis on offering food, shelter, clothing, and care to the needy, and saw that care for the body arose naturally out of concern for the soul. This interpenetration of concerns preserved a strong religious identity while allowing them to expand their social and political influence in local communities.

Some waqfs became wealthy and influential financial presences in their communities. The Rab’-i Rashidi in Tabriz (1318), Hurrem Sultan’s waqf in Jerusalem (1552), the Bayezid endowment in Amasya (1512), the Ghuriyva complex in Cairo and the Süleymaniye in Istanbul are all prime examples. The same is true of certain civic hospitals like Pistoia’s Ceppo, Siena’s S. Maria della Scala, Florence’s S. Maria Nuova, and Bologna’s S. Maria della Vita, all of them established in the 12th and 13th centuries. These Italian civic hospitals emerged as the work of laity rather than clergy, and all enjoyed steadily increasing endowments through legacies left by dying laypeople and through gifts from city governments. By the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, these hospitals were among the wealthiest institutions in their cities: Siena’s S. Maria della Scala and Cortona’s S. Maria della Misericordia both owned more property than the local bishop or any local monastery.

So a first important parallel between the Islamic waqf and the Catholic civic hospital was their origin in, and reliance on, an endowment. A second, equally important parallel was the community which developed within the civic hospital. While monastic hospitals tended to treat temporary guests like travelers or the dying, the civic hospitals, like the waqfs, became longer-term shelters for the city’s poor. These people were not clergy, nor were they joining an order but might have still lived in the hospital for decades. This included orphans, widows, and the elderly. The waqf and hospital were their surrogate homes, and in many cases they were both long-term residents and also on site care-givers. Yet they were not clergy, and they had greater freedom of movement than the monks and nuns who ran their hospitals as extensions of their clerical communities.

It is in the administration and form of the hospital community that we see the main differences between caritas and misericordia in Catholicism. Caritas developed around the model of personal patronage, and a direct link between the care giver and the receiver: Christ’s parable in Matthew emphasized the charitable actions of giving food, clothing, and alms, or personally visiting prisoners and the sick, and the Catholic tradition emphasized that it was personal actions like these that characterized the holiness of the major saints which individual believers ought to imitate. This, on the most basic level, was why all Catholic charities were named after one or another saint — the saint chosen was often one who exemplified the particular form of charity that the hospital specialized in.
Wealthy Catholics used charity to build up groups of clients and to improve their personal reputations. In this way, caritas fostered the vertical social dynamics of patron and client. The model of misericordia (mercy or compassion), on the other hand, was collective, communal, and horizontal. It took the visual form of an image of the Virgin Mary extending her cloak to shelter groups of believers from harm, famine, plague, and the judgment of God. Who was under the cloak? That was the key. The misericordia image was a plastic one, in that the community gathered under the cloak could be narrow like a family, a guild, or a confraternity, or broad like an entire city. It was inclusive while also being bounded and limited. In the context of hospitals and charitable care, it meant that everyone under the cloak received care by virtue of their membership in that community.

Hence while caritas was offered through personal relationships and often reinforced the vertical dependency of social inferiors on their superiors, misericordia was also the care which whole communities extended to their fellows by virtue of their common membership in a group. Such community based care was often organized and run on what we could call more horizontal democratic or representative models. To adapt the language of vertical and horizontal dynamics, waqfs begin as vertical actions – a wealthy person’s endowment – but that they develop into more horizontal institutions.

Comparing Social, Economic and Cultural Dimensions

The third parallel we can investigate moves us from inside to outside the institution, exploring chiefly its social, economic and political links with surrounding communities. Misericordia was most open to members of the community – it was a community for orphans, widows, and sick. It didn’t just answer need, as caritas did, but it deliberately built community both inside the hospital, and also, by means of the hospital’s resources, throughout the community itself. It was built on and extended to civic society: broadly representative administrations, many hospital-owned urban properties rented to the poor living outside the institution’s walls, many farms offering employment and food outside the city walls. Misericordia hospitals with their huge endowments and local administration became central institutions of civil society whose impact extended far beyond whatever charity they offered to their city’s needy.

At least part of this impact was political. In Italy and France throughout the early modern period, as central, national, and royal governments were consolidating their authority in ways that undermined the autonomy of urban governments, civic hospitals emerged as reservoirs of local control. They become what we can describe as sites of resistance which preserved local civil society in the face of an expanding, external sovereign authority. It was their wealth, property, and personnel that gave them this influence. Timur Kuran argues that waqfs failed to exercise a similar social, economic, and political role in Arabic societies throughout the same centuries. However, this claim requires further archival investigation.

If civic hospitals were the form of Catholic philanthropy that was closest to the waqf in focus and form, it is possible that the parallels between the two may suggest lines of research into the forms of civil society and social capital in Islamic states from at least the 11th century onwards. Research into civic hospitals has dealt with their administration and investments, their wards and personnel, and their role in cultural life (i.e. architecture, religious activities, education). The work on
administration and investments offers the closest connection, and in studies of European hospitals this has highlighted their extraordinary economic impact. What demographic pressures and religious movements led donors to add legacies to the hospital endowment? What chronological patterns can we trace, and how do these in turn relate to political change? If the endowment took the form of real estate, then how was the land developed and administered, how were rents and crops determined, and what was done with the income from these landed investments. Siena’s S. Maria della Scala developed a series of large and fortified farms in the countryside around the city where urban orphans assisted rural sharecroppers in growing crops. These crops were then stored in huge vaults under the hospital itself; the hospital was under civic mandate to have in storage at all times enough grain to feed the entire city for an entire year. In Bologna, the hospitals of S. Maria della Vita and S. Maria della Morte used their control of real estate to consolidate underperforming rural farms in order to improve and expand crop production.

The endowment was not the only economic resource. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, hospitals which had large populations of orphans began to exploit their labor potential by devising factory-type systems of production for the textile trade. Orphanages in Florence and Bologna, for example, were important centers of low cost production of thread in these cities’ expanding silk industries. Silk was the fastest growing luxury industry in early modern Europe. Wherever it developed in Italy and in France, it depended on the low-paid forced labor of children living in hospital-orphanages. Their work was a key factor in making the hospitals themselves economically viable, particularly in those cases where there was no large endowment. Cheap orphan labor made the philanthropic work of such hospitals financially feasible and allowed them to play an integral role in developing new industries, even in the absence of large endowments. Some recent research has tracked precisely these connections, finding that it was often silk guilds and silk merchants who took the lead in establishing charitable orphanages and hospitals. They believed that the pursuit of an important act of religious charity, sheltering, feeding, and educating orphans could be combined with the development of an important industry to the betterment of society generally. For idealists, this was a situation of social capital and financial capital developing in a mutually-dependent and mutually-beneficial way. Others, of course, see ingenious forms of exploitation and perpetuating poverty.

Administrative records allow us to trace how civic hospitals developed their land and labor resources in service of the local economy. They also allow us to trace the role of hospitals themselves in civil society as agents of social capital. Above all, their presence stimulates a number of interrelated questions that can direct research into the administration of particular institutions. These include: who invests, who administers, and who benefits? Do families who endow hospitals retain a permanent role in management which allows them to place family members in influential administrative positions from which they can exercise patronage? Do donors of buildings, furniture or funds gain the right to place their clients in the hospital? Are hospital boards appointed by central authorities like Florence’s Medici grand dukes and neighborhood administrative bodies, or are they chosen by institutional patrons like guilds or confraternities? What agency do they exercise over their finances, their properties, their buildings, and their wards? To whom are they accountable? In each locality in Europe, the answers to these questions would vary somewhat, and taken collectively they would show how the hospital arose out of local political, economic, and social structures, and also how it inserted itself into the surrounding community; this would certainly also be the case with individual waqfs. One area where differences might emerge is on...
the level of relations with clergy. Some hospitals worked hard to maintain independence from Catholic authorities. They argued that they were predominantly civic rather than ecclesiastical bodies. This became a key point of contention between church and state authorities. It is not clear to me that the same tense dynamic would characterize relations between individual waqfs, local imams, and political authorities.

Historians wishing to trace the social and civil dimensions of charitable activity have also moved beyond the finance and administration of Catholic hospitals in order to consider dimensions as diverse as architectural form and educational activities. The architectural form is particularly telling since it underscores the aesthetic and functional innovations of buildings which were usually the largest non-clerical structures in the early modern city.

Hospitals were frequently trend-setting in terms of functional innovations. Florence’s Innocenti hospital is considered the first modern building designed according to the principles of the Roman architect Vitruvius; it shaped the design of a major public square in that city. Milan’s Ospedale Grande pioneered the cruciform plan and included sophisticated systems of hygiene. Both were widely imitated in other parts of Europe. Architectural theorists like Leon Battista Alberti (1404-72) [De re aedificatoria (1452)] and Sebastiano Serlio (Regole generale d’architettura, (from 1537); in English translation as The Five Books of Architecture (1611)) both included hospital plans in their treatises. Alberti advised that hospitals be on prominent streets or squares, and that they have impressive loggias extended across the front in order to underscore their importance as monuments to civil society. Yet these monumental complexes were themselves significant sites of commercial activity: both Bologna’s Ospedale di S. Maria della Vita and Istanbul’s Süleymaniye built numerous ground-level shops into their side walls, becoming sites of religious-charity but also sources of income and urban economic development.

If we consider the placement of hospitals in cities across Europe, we see that civil governments followed this explicitly. Governments were self-consciously building civil monuments where religious, charitable, and economic functions were being carried out as a civil trust by laymen; civic religion was the religious dimension of civil society. This seems equally true of the impressive waqf complexes in Istanbul, Amasya, Cairo, and cities throughout the Islamic world. However, research concerning the correlation between hospitals and waqfs is limited in this regard and further research is necessary. Many of the shops developed on waqf properties could themselves have been the sites of civil discussion and exchange. A prime example is the coffee house, long seen as a center of civil discourse in western countries and commonly found among the commercial ventures supported by waqfs as coffee houses were frequently located among their commercial holdings.

In a similar vein, Italian hospitals in particular became centers for the cultural development of marginalized populations and vehicles for significant social engagement by such groups, namely women. Most orphanages had schoolmasters of some kind, allowing them to provide a level of education to their charges that most would not have received outside the walls. One Bolognese merchant left an endowment that funded education for orphans up to the level of the university doctorate, and a number of these children ended up teaching in the University of Bologna. Venice’s Pietà was one of a number of orphanages for girls which trained their wards as musicians. Original music was composed expressly for them and public concerts were held offering a venue for their
musical expression. Women took a large role in the founding and administration of nearly all hospitals. It is worth asking whether some of these cultural activities arose out of inspirations which the hospitals took from the waqfs. Research on the latter could helpfully pursue a few questions aimed at exploring these activities as a prelude to understanding possible connections: how did the waqfs’ impressive school systems also direct needy children into the civil service and did it use them to generate cultural capital? Were the waqfs established by women run differently from those established by men? (xxiii)

Closing Observations

Institutional history can often be narrow, parochial, and incomplete if it does not investigate beyond the walls to locate the institution in its culture and contexts. Much of it traditionally has been written to praise an institution’s personalities or celebrate its successes. Yet recent work on civic hospitals in Europe and on waqfs in the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and India shows emerging interest in comparing individual institutions and placing them within their social, financial, and political contexts. Both Islam and Christianity placed a premium on philanthropic outreach, and developed sophisticated institutional structures to advance these efforts. Both featured similar dynamics: the vertical and horizontal forces; the distinctions looking inward and looking outward as these foster social capital and civil society; the factors of urban and economic development. The key is not simply to understand how philanthropic institutions emerge from religious traditions. Scholars and research must both examine the societies within which these institutions operate, and that they create. These institutions are not just products of civil society and social capital – they are creators and drivers of it. Historians generally have not always recognized this, and they have often relegated the study of philanthropic institutions to a sideshow or to the footnotes. This impoverishes our understanding of the societies whose histories we are trying to understand, and whose futures we are trying to shape.
End Notes

i. However, see the valuable collection of interdisciplinary and cross-cultural essays under the theme of “Poverty and Charity in Past Times” a special issue edited by Mark Cohen of the Journal of Interdisciplinary History 35/3 (2005).

ii. For a fuller description of cross-fertilization of examples in the late classical and early medieval period, see Peregrine Horden, “The Earliest Hospitals in Byzantium, Western Europe, and Islam” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 35/3 (2005): 361-89.


vi. Without addressing the same questions as Kuran, M. Ener finds waqfs being drawn into a more activist social agenda by the mid-nineteenth century in Cairo and Istanbul: “Religious Prerogatives and Policing the Poor in Two Ottoman Contexts” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 35/3 (2005): 501-11.

vii. Natice Yildiz describes three distinct types of vakfs on Cyprus, including one administered by an independent Board of Trustees, and also details the problems in vakf administration that developed after the British took control: N. Yildiz, “The Vakf Institution in Ottoman Cyprus” in M.N. Michael, M. Kappler, & E. Gavriel, Ottoman Cyprus: A Collection of Studies on History and Culture. Weisbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2009, pp. 118-121, 149-51.


x. Brian Pullan makes a similar distinction while reversing the terminology in his essay: “Catholics, Protestants, and the Poor in Early Modern Europe,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 35/3 (2005):441-56. For the background to my framing of the distinction between Charity and


xiv. Khalid Hamzah & Khaled A. Alhamzah, Late Mamluk Patronage: Qansuh Al-Ghuri’s Waqfs and His Foundations in Cairo (Universal Press: PDF, 2009). The Ghuriyya complex in Cairo was one of the largest, finest, and also best-preserved examples of late Mamluk royal waqfs. The authors use detailed primary source documents (waqfiyya – some translated into English) to explore the motives of founder al-Ghuri, and to study the structure and functions of the Ghuriyya complex in Cairo in its economic, political, cultural, and urbanistic contexts. See also Murat Cizackca, “Ottoman Cash Waqfs Revisited: The Case of Bursa, 1555-1823” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient. vol 38/3 (Leiden: Brill, 1995).


xix. This was the case with some of the vakfs in Cyprus, Yildiz, “The Vakf Institution in Ottoman Cyprus,” p. 120; 133-37.


BIOGRAPHIES

Ms. Caroline Blayney
Caroline Blayney received her BA from Wellesley College and is 2010-11 Masters of Science candidate in Migration, Mobility, and Development at SOAS, University of London. Ms. Blayney was a J. William Fulbright Fellow to Jordan from 2009-10 and is currently with the Danish Refugee Council in Iraq.

Dr. Omar Bortolazzi
Omar Botolazzi graduated at the University of Bologna in Political Science with a thesis on Political Development in the Middle East with specific focus on Shiites in Lebanon. He has studied and worked intermittently in Lebanon from 2000 until 2008. He holds a Master of Arts in International Studies in Philanthropy in Social Innovation. He is currently a full time researcher at the Philanthropy and Social Innovation Centre (PhaSI) at the Department of Historical Studies, University of Bologna and a fellow researcher on Contemporary History at the same department.

Ms. Nora Derbal
Nora Derbal studied Arabic, Modern Middle East Studies and European History at Oxford, Berlin, Cairo and Djidda. These days she is writing her PhD at the Berlin Graduate School Muslim Cultures and Societies on trans-local benevolent engagement and international Muslim foundations.
Email: nora_derbal@gmx.de

Dr. Shawn Flanigan
Shawn Flanigan is a Public Administration Professor in the School of Public Affairs at San Diego State University. Her research focuses on the role nonprofit organizations play in meeting the health and social service needs of minorities and marginalized groups, with a specific interest in the developing world and low-income populations in the United States. Dr. Flanigan has conducted field research in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon, Romania, Sri Lanka and the United States, and has collected additional data from Mexico, Palestine and the Philippines. She received her Ph.D. in Public Administration and Policy from the University at Albany- State University of New York in 2007.
Email: shawn.flanigan@sdsu.edu

Ms. Anjum Haque
Anjum Haque has been the Executive Director of the Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy (PCP) since October 2008. She has brought an extensive experience of the development sector to the organization through her long years of association with the government and the United Nations system in leadership roles. Her professional experience equipped her to be able to look at indigenous social development through a philanthropic lens, having worked in fund mobilization and forging partnerships at both the national and international levels.

Dr. Paula Johnson
Paula D. Johnson is Vice President of The Philanthropic Initiative, Inc. (TPI) and Director of its Center for Global Philanthropy. Dr. Johnson leads TPI’s efforts to understand, strengthen, and support global philanthropy. She works with foundations and individual donors to develop global giving strategies and programs and conducts research to strengthen giving to and within other
countries. From 2002 - 2007, Dr. Johnson was a research fellow with the Global Equity Initiative at Harvard University where she spearheaded its Global Philanthropy Program, conducting applied research aimed at strengthening the role of private philanthropic investments in advancing global equity. She has worked on a number of initiatives to build philanthropic capacity and strengthen civil society around the globe, and has authored several seminal studies on global philanthropy. She is a trustee and director of a private foundation that focuses on issues of education, children-at-risk, and the environment

Email: pjohnson@tpi.org

Mrs. Mahi Khallaf

Mahi Khallaf is a freelance development practitioner and consultant based in Cairo, Egypt. Since 2007 she has participated in numerous projects on the international, regional and local levels working with academic institutions, civil society organizations as well as multilateral institutions. She worked previously as Senior Program officer with the CIVICUS Civil Society Index Programme in Johannesburg, South Africa for three years. Mrs. Khallaf holds a Masters of Arts degree in International Affairs from the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada. In 2008, she was awarded the International Emerging Leaders Fellowship in Philanthropy from the Center for Philanthropy and Civil Society at City University New York. Mrs. Khallaf’s research interest and publications topics include: civil society, innovative philanthropy, corporate giving and participatory governance.

Dr. Atallah Kuttab

Atallah Kuttab holds a Ph.D. in civil engineering from the Imperial College of Science and Technology, University of London. He spent 3 years working in engineering consulting in the private sector and 10 years in education in planning, teaching and research at Birzeit University in Palestine and at Heriot-Watt University in Scotland. Dr. Kuttab was a GTZ technical consultant for informal sector employment in Zambia for 3 years, and served with Save the Children for 11 years, most recently as Middle East Regional Manager, covering operations in Palestine, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan. His management specialty areas are in staff management, fundraising and in forging private sector/ non-government sector relationships to further development efforts. He joined Welfare Association as the Director General in August 2005 supporting Palestinians primarily in Palestine and Lebanon. He is a Founding Member of Arab Human Rights Fund and Founding Member of the Arab Foundations Forum. He is also a member of the Editorial Board of Alliance Magazine, Global Philanthropy Leadership Initiative, and WINGS Coordination Committee.

Email: akuttab@saaned.com

Ms. Nadia Roumani

Nadia Roumani is the Principal of Roumani Consulting, LLC, through which she has consulted for several foundations that are supporting Muslim communities in America and/or addressing U.S.-Muslim World relations. She is currently the Consultant Program Officer for the Doris Duke Foundation for Islamic Art’s Building Bridges Program. She has also consulted for Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders in Philanthropy, Four Freedoms Fund, Jewish Funds for Justice, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Ford Foundation, and the Rothschild Foundation. Ms. Roumani has also consulted for the World Bank, UNDP, the UN Alliance of Civilizations, and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

Ms. Roumani is also the Director of the American Muslim Civic Leadership Institute (AMCLI), a
faith-based leadership development program, housed at the University of Southern California and working in partnership with Georgetown University.

Email: nadia_roumani@yahoo.com

Ms. Archana Sahgal
Archana Sahgal is a Program Officer with the Equality and Opportunity Fund, U.S. Programs at the Open Society Foundations in New York City. She manages the racial justice, immigrant rights, and anti-violence advocacy portfolios. Prior to the Open Society Foundations, she serves as an independent consultant to philanthropic organizations including the Rosenberg Foundation and Silicon Valley Community Foundation. Between 2004 and 2009, she developed and directed the Civic Engagement Fund (CEF) for Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim, and South Asian (AMEMSA) Communities. CEF, designed in partnership with Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders in Philanthropy and The San Francisco Foundation, is the first philanthropic collaborative focused on communities impacted by the events of September 11, 2001.

Email: archanasahgal@yahoo.com

Ms. Molly Schultz-Hafid
Molly Schultz Hafid works as a Program Officer at the Unitarian Universalist Veatch Program at Shelter Rock, where she is responsible for the Democratic Participation, Civil and Constitutional Rights and Community Organizing program areas. Prior to the Veatch Program, she worked as the Director of Grant-making Programs at a progressive social justice foundation committed to combating the root causes of economic and social injustice. She managed a portfolio that included grant-making to community organizing and advocacy groups, redevelopment and recovery grants in the Gulf Coast region (following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita), the Seasons Fund for Social Transformation (a Ford Foundation initiative), and management of the individual donor-advised fund program. Molly has also worked as a Program Manager of Strategic Partnerships at a philanthropic affinity group and as the Acting Deputy Director of a progressive foundation in New York City. She has held positions as a director, grant-maker, and development professional for nonprofit organizations in New York City, San Francisco, Chicago, Vermont, and Ohio.

Ms. Sherine El Taraboulsi
Ms. Sherine El Taraboulsi is Research Manager at the John D. Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement, the American University in Cairo [AUC]. She has also served as Research Consultant to the Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) [Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme]. Prior to this, she was Project Manager of the Muslim Philanthropy Digital Library (MPDL), a joint undertaking of the Gerhart Center and the Center of Excellence for the Middle East and Arab Cultures at AUC. She has also worked as Assistant to the Director and Communications Coordinator at the Gerhart Center, as an Editor at the Bibliotheca Alexandrina and as Teaching Assistant at Alexandria University. Ms. El Taraboulsi was an MA Merit Fellow at the English and Comparative Literature Department, AUC. Her thesis is a comparative analysis of citizenship in Egypt and Iran.

Email: staraboulsi@aucegypt.edu
**Prof. Nicholas Terpstra**

Nicholas Terpstra is Professor of History at the University of Toronto. His research deals with social issues in the early modern period, with a focus in particular on the intersections of charity, politics, and religion. His publications include *Lost Girls: Sex and Death in Renaissance Florence* (Johns Hopkins University Press: 2010), *The Art of Executing Well: Rituals of Execution in Renaissance Italy* (Truman State University Press: 2008), *Abandoned Children of the Italian Renaissance: Orphan Care in Florence and Bologna* (Johns Hopkins University Press: 2005), and *Lay Confraternities and Civic Religion in Renaissance Bologna* (Cambridge University Press: 1995); he has also edited a number of volumes including *Sociability and its Discontents: Civil Society, Social Capital, and their Alternatives in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Brepols: 2009) with Nicholas Eckstein, and *The Politics of Ritual Kinship* (Cambridge University Press: 2000).